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I. INTRODUCTION
For lesbian and queer legal theorizing,' the question of assimilation has long
been pertinent. 2 As in other legal movements, there is a tension within the
lesbian and queer quest for legal reform. On the one hand, we acknowledge a
legal reform movement that accepts the basic tenets of our legal system but seeks
inclusion for those it represents. On the other hand, some argue that this is
insufficient, dispute some of the core beliefs of our legal system, and seek
restructuring rather than mere inclusion.
One convenient shorthand for this debate is assimilation, a term that is
familiar in both legal and nonlegal theorizing. In the lesbian and queer context,
the term "assimilation" has been used from a sociological perspective to describe
1. While this Article seeks to include all sexual minorities, sexual minority advocacy, and
scholarship by its use of the term "queer," it focuses on lesbian advocacies and theories.
2. For example, in the early 1950s, the Mattachine Society, a homosexual rights group,
confronted the issue of assimilation. The founders of the organization were influenced by Marxist
ideologies and developed an analysis of homosexuals as an oppressed cultural minority. As believers
in a theory of social change that stressed action by masses of people on their own behalf, the founders
kept the society focused on mobilizing a large gay constituency and welding it into a cohesive force
capable of militancy. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970 63 (1983) (describing history and
developments of homosexual culture in the United States). Nevertheless, after the Mattachine Society
grew in size and in diversity of viewpoint, an internal struggle took place with members who preferred
a more assimilationist tone, perhaps best summed up at a divisive conference by the statement that
"we know we are the same ... no different than anyone else. Our only difference is an unimportant
one to the heterosexual society, unless we make it important." Id. at 79. This view, which ultimately
prevailed, is described by lesbian theorist Margaret Cruikshank as "integrationist," viewing social
rejection as the problem, not society's oppressive institutions. MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY
AND LESBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 67-68 (Roger S. Gottlieb ed., 1992). As John D'Emilio
summarizes, in its first few years, "the Mattachine Society had confronted issues that would surface
again and again as areas of heated debate in the gay movement," including "whether homosexuals and
lesbians should accommodate themselves to the mores of society or assert their difference," which
pitted "radicals" against "conservatives." D'EMILIO, supra at 90-91.
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the normalization process of those with minority sexual identities. 3 The term
"heteronormativity," especially as developed by Michael Warner, also captures
some of these same concerns.4 Elsewhere, I have used the term "domestication"
to describe this process, preferring it because of its gendered connotations. 5
Recently, legal scholar Kenji Yoshino has categorized various types of queer
assimilation, including conversion, passing, and covering.6  Importantly,
however, at its core, the queer assimilation controversy involves not only issues
of sexual identity, but conflicts about the process and degree of possible or
desirable change.7 Although many issues are implicated in the assimilationist
debates,8 the issue of same-sex marriage is emblematic because of its tremendous
3. See, e.g., Amy Hequembourg & Jorge Arditi, Fractured Resistances, The Debate Over
Assimilationism among Gays and Lesbians in the United States, 40:4 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY
663 (1999) [hereinafter Fractured] (discussing assimilation debates in gay and lesbian communities).
4. See MICHAEL WARNER, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND
SOCIAL THEORY vii, xxi (Univ. of Minn. Press 1993) (describing heteronormativity arising from
heterosexual culture's ability to interpret itself as co-extensive with society, as "the elemental form of
human association, as the very model of inter-gender relations, as the indivisible basis of all
community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn't exist"); see also
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE
41-88 (Harv. Univ. Press 1999) (discussing problems associated with "normal" and
"heteronormailty").
5. See RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 119-27
(Firebrand Books 1992) [hereinafter (OUT)LAW] (providing examples of legal domestication of
lesbian relationships); RUTHANN ROBSON, SAPPHO GOES TO LAW SCHOOL 153-70 (Columbia Univ.
Press 1998) [hereinafter SAPPHO] (discussing lesbian relationships in law and literature and using term
"codification"); Ruthann Robson, Making Mothers: The Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22
WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 101 (2000) [hereinafter Making Mothers] (discussing intra-lesbian custody
disputes).
6. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 504-37 (1998) [hereinafter Yoshino, Don't Ask]
(discussing homosexual assimilation as either evasive or visible); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE
L.J. 769, 784-865 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering] (discussing conversion, passing, and covering
as methods of gay assimilation).
7. As Amy Hequembourg and Jorge Arditi state:
The debate among gay and lesbian activists in the United States regarding assimilationism-
the desire of many gays and lesbians to be accepted by mainstream society and be
recognized as "couple," "mother," "father," "family," and so on-illustrates beautifully the
ambiguities inherent in efforts to resist and change existing practices of domination, as well
as it highlights the paradoxes of what it means to be an agent when we recognize the
constituted character of subjectivity. The debate revolves around claims advanced by radical
gays and lesbians who suggest, justifiably in our view, that assimilation to the mainstream
involves a "domestication" of gay identity, a forsaking of gays and lesbians' self-definition in
terms of desire and its substitution by one based on civic status. The aspiration to be
recognized as a normal couple, normal mother, normal father, normal family, involves a
"normalization" of gay identity. It forces the formulation and experience of gay identity
from one grounded on desire-an unstable, nonrational, multiple ground that "escapes" the
practices of categorization in terms of which mainstream society defines sexuality-to one
that embraces and makes mainstream categorizations of power its own.
Fractured, supra note 3, at 663-64 (citations omitted).
8. The military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy is perhaps the most obvious. See generally
Yoshino, Don't Ask, supra note 6, at 538-57 (discussing military's policy as assimilative strategy).
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symbolic import and the tangible benefits it often provides. 9
The issue of assimilation is not unique to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgendered legal theories and litigation, yet too often our attention to other"outsider" jurisprudences' has been selective at best. Thus, the first task of this
Article is a survey of the current legal theoretical interventions regarding
assimilation in legal culture. Part II of this Article analyzes specific themes in
legal scholarship regarding assimilation. Part III then distills three of these
themes into concerns for lesbian legal theory: the problem of constitutional
equality, the consideration of coercion, and, lastly, the more abstract
investigation of the state's interest in questions of assimilation. After a brief
history of same-sex marriage and similar legal devices as developed in the
United States, Part IV argues that marriage implicates serious and insoluble
problems of equality, that the present regime is one of compulsory matrimony,
and that the marital status of individuals is linked to the state in disturbing ways.
Because the issue of children and child rearing is often coupled with marriage,
Part V briefly examines the same concerns raised in the context of marriage in
relation to lesbian parenting. Finally, this Article concludes that questions of
assimilation with regard to marriage and parenting need to be taken much more
seriously in our advocacy, litigation, and scholarship than previously if we are to
honor any claim to be a movement that includes liberation among its goals.
II. ASSIMILATION AND LEGAL CULTURE
Like other minorities, sexual minorities confront ultimate questions about
the relationship between members of the minority, or disadvantaged group, and
the majoritarian, dominant culture in ways that implicate ultimate meanings of
equality and liberation. Assimilation has been an explicit issue for legal theorists
and advocates confronting the contours of equality for African-Americans,11
9. See id. (describing viewpoint that marriage indicates societal approval as well as bestowing
important tangible, health, insurance, and death benefits); Yoshino, Covering, supra note 6, at 848-49
(outlining marriage as "covering" or "signaling").
10. Outsider jurisprudence is a term coined by Mari Matsuda. See generally Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987)
(analyzing appeal of reparations for past injustice to victims of racism); Mari J. Matsuda Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (examining
harm of racist hate messages). Outsider jurisprudence refers to that body of legal scholarship that
seeks to incorporate the voices and experiences of traditionally silenced populations into an analysis of
mainstream legal systems. Id. at 2323. Matsuda explains her choice of the word 'outsider' as reflecting
a desire to avoid the more popular word 'minority,' reasoning that the latter "belies the numerical
significance of the constituencies typically excluded from jurisprudential discourse." Id. The
philosophical origins of outsider jurisprudence has been traced to European writers Marx, Heidegger,
Gramsci, and Foucault. Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, Outsider Jurisprudence and the Electronic
Revolution: Will Technology Help or Hinder the Cause of Law Reform?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 847
(1991).
11. See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the
Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 669-70 (1995) (discussing "assimilation assumption" made
by Court in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Alex. M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and
United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401,
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Latinos/as, l2 Asian-Americans, 3 Native Americans, 4 Jews15 and other religious
minorities,16  women, 17  impoverished persons,'8  and disabled persons. 19
1417-22 (1993) (discussing implications associated with African-American assimilation).
12. See Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism. Economics, Freedom and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 598
(1999) (describing how some perceive Latinos as having fallen short of standard of assimilation by
maintaining their language, ethnic communication, and other practices). See generally Kevin R.
Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 173 (1998) (discussing Mexican assimilation into American culture and society); George A.
Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical Perspective, 20 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 1 (1999) (discussing Latino assimilation into American culture and society).
13. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism:
Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81
CAL. L. REV. 863, 890-91 (1993) (commenting on how criticisms of group's assimilation are often racist
based, particularly criticism about Asian and Latino insistence on cultural diversity and distinct
communities, compared to those similar practices of European immigrant groups).
14. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Failure of the
1920's Native American Irrigation and Assimilation Policies, 19 U. HAw. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997)
(discussing failures of government's land allotment and irrigation plans to assimilate Native Americans
by making them farmers).
15. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition of Jewish "Dissimilation":
Frankfurter, Bickel, and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 809, 813-14 (1994)
(discussing Jewish attitudes towards assimilation).
16. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew A Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REV. 581, 583-84 (1993)
(discussing controversies that arise when fundamentalist Christian parents do not want their children
educated in manner that exposes them to diverse viewpoints and teaches tolerance of those
viewpoints).
17. See, e.g., Erin Daly, The Limits of the Constitutional Imagination: Equal Protection in the Era
of Assimilation, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 121, 166 (1999) (explaining that personality traits do not fall
within neat gender classifications, regardless of push to have "women be more like men"); Deborah L.
Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 106, 145 (1986) (discussing benefit of altering
existing social structures as opposed to assimilating into them so women do not have to "relinquish
difference[s]").
18. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, By Hook or By Crook: Conformity, Assimilation and Liberal
and Conservative Poor Relief Theory, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 391, 407-29 (1996) [hereinafter
Backer, Hastings] (describing methods used to assimilate the poor such as welfare reform and the
'Great Society'); Larry CatS Backer, Poor Relief Welfare Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 34-46 (1996) [hereinafter Backer, Utah] (discussing cultural taboos and their relation to
assimilation of the poor).
19. The problematizing of assimilation in the context of disability is underdeveloped. The
Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 12101(a)(1) (1994),
has as an explicitly assimilationist purpose-to "bring persons with disabilities into the economic and
social mainstream of American life," H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304, accord Statement by President George Bush upon signing S. 933, 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601, 602 (stating that ADA
"signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the
mainstream of American life."). While the vast majority of the recent scholarship regarding
disabilities uncritically applauds this purpose, important exceptions include Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 401, (2000) (acknowledging possible
importance of disability culture and arguing that "disability should be understood as a socially defined
group status" that possesses a "systematic, socially contingent disadvantage"); Paula Berg, Ill/Legal:
Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Moreover, assimilation is a theme that is implicit in much of the scholarship
regarding the relationship between disadvantaged groups and the dominant
culture. Each of these confrontations is unique, as is the controversy about
assimilation in the sexual minority context.
The most commonly theorized pattern of assimilation-the so-called"melting pot" theory-envisions immigrants from distant shores coming to the
United States to improve their lot and to begin a generational trajectory of
assimilation, resulting in the grandchildren of the immigrants being fully
assimilated.20 This theory has been criticized as it relates to more recent
immigrants21 and is obviously inapplicable to the descendants of unwilling
immigrants who were "imported" from Africa as slaves and to Native Americans
from whose perspective the colonists were immigrants. Moreover, for some
minority groups the generational trajectory may be inapposite. In the Jewish
context, theorists have adopted the notion of dissimilation to describe the
process of rejecting assimilation.22
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 4, 36 (1999) (demonstrating how regressive definitions of "disability" in
ADA doctrine "upholds dominant notions of health, illness, and disability while imposing a particular
set of expectations upon individuals deemed to occupy each class," and thus while ADA does serve
purposes of eliminating discrimination, it "also impedes attainment of equality by stigmatizing
disabled plaintiffs, undermining political unity among people with disabilities, and legitimizing many
forms of disability bias"); Jonathan Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 1341, 1408-09 (1993) (advocating "reaffirmation of one's 'disabled identity,' as crucial for
proper societal acknowledgment of people with disabilities").
In the nonlegal literature, there is important work arguing for the independence and vitality of
deaf culture. See generally HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF
COMMUNITY (1992) (advocating a shift in current methodologies of interacting with deaf community).
20. As Kenneth Karst explains, the "melting pot" did not "become part of the national
vocabulary" until the production of an eponymous play in 1908, but the idea was "as old as the Nation
itself," Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV.
303, 311-12 (1986). But cf. Daina C. Chiu, The Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and
Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1058 (1994) (stating "[tihe founding vision of America was
not that of a multiracial, multicultural, or pluralistic society .... [t]o the contrary, the first settlers and
leaders envisioned a country for pious, God-fearing, white Christians").
In terms of the generational trajectory of assimilation, Drucilla Cornell and William Bratton
explain that the "assimilation story" has as its characters the "most motivated, talented, and intelligent
of the world's dissatisfied people." Even so:
[O]nly the most clever and ambitious could reconstruct themselves completely within a few
years of arrival.... Their children, however, would go on to achieve a full American identity
and its accompanying economic opportunity. The third generation would complete the
process of Americanization; internal ties to the antecedent language and culture would not
burden the immigrants' grandchildren.
Cornell & Bratton, supra note 12, at 596-97 (footnotes omitted).
21. Some criticism has been from conservative thinkers who argue that more recent immigrants
have "refused" to assimilate, while critiques from more liberal thinkers have noted the inextricably
link between racism and assimilation. See Hing, supra note 13, at 890, for further discussion of the
alleged link between racism and assimilation comparing the identities of older to more recent
immigrant groups.
22. According to Stolzenberg, dissimilation "consists of 'the reupholding of Jewish identity' by
those who appeared to have abandoned traditional Jewish life." Stolzenberg, supra note 15, at 855.
[Vol. 75
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Similarly, sexual minorities might be said to "dissimilate" through the
coming out process by which they declare their difference from the heterosexual
majority.23 The appearance of assimilability by sexual minorities has also been
part of their threat to mainstream culture, most notoriously voiced in
McCarthyism's warning that there are homosexuals and communists among "us"
and we might not perceive them.24 Despite many experiential differences in
assimilation among various groups, there are common motifs that merit
exploration. These consist of: (1) the logical necessity for a dominant and
idealized group; (2) the coercive nature of assimilation; (3) the implication of the
constitutional interests of equality; (4) the majoritarian use of both assimilation
and anti-assimilation for repressive purposes; (5) the co-existence and distinction
between segregation and separatism; and (6) the disagreements within minority
communities regarding the virtues of assimilation.
A. The Dominant and Idealized Group
First, and perhaps most obviously, in order to logically exist, assimilation
must posit a dominant group (which may or may not be the majority group),
which may shift depending upon the disadvantaged or minority group.
Importantly, this dominant group is highly idealized; ideals that later become
normative. Thus, as it might be stereotypically posited, this dominant group
member is not only a white male, preferably of British descent, he is also
Protestant but not fundamentalist, able-bodied and healthy, and employed in a
professional status. He is married with two children, follows sports, has a dog, is
not effeminate or fussy about food and has a keen sense of competition. This
character is idealized--or stereotyped-but becomes the measure against which
assimilation occurs or does not occur.
This idealized version of dominant group members is evident in gender
jurisprudence, which concerns whether any women, as well as which women, can
be assimilated into male culture. In fact, the entire so-called sameness/difference
debate that has been pronounced in feminist legal theory from its beginnings is a
She further argues that this process of dissimilation was
exemplified by the generation of German Jewish intellectuals from the Weimar period who
confronted the tension between the universalistic culture of liberalism, into which they were
themselves raised or initiated, and the particularism of traditional Jewish life. The process of
'dissimilation' for them involved a return to a Jewish tradition that they had never directly
participated in.
Id.
23. See Ruthann Robson, Beginning from (My) Experience: The Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer
Narrativities, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1394-96 (1997), for a discussion of the importance and ubiquity of
"coming out" in lesbian theorizing.
24. See JOHN D'EMILIO, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War
America, in MAKING TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY 57, 64
(Harv. Univ. Press 1992) (stating "[s]ince Communists bore no identifying physical characteristics,
they were able to infiltrate the government and commit treason against their country ....
[h]omosexuals, too, could escape detection and thus insinuate themselves into every branch of
government").
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version of the assimilation conflict. 25 Likewise, litigating the exclusion of women
from all male institutions necessarily implicates the question of women's
assimilability.
For example, discussing the exclusion of women from all male private
clubs, 26 Deborah Rhode quotes a male club manager justifying the exclusion by
stating that "if a man has business deals to discuss, he doesn't want to sit next to
a woman fussing about how much mayonnaise is in her chicken salad. '27 As
Rhode correctly notes, such stereotypes tend to become "self-reinforcing"
because "no women are present to counteract the assumption that males'
luncheon conversation focuses on mergers while females' fixates on
mayonnaise." 28 Equally important, however, is the unstated presumption that
men will not be discussing mayonnaise-or the linking of high cholesterol foods
with heart attacks-at lunch. Men are constructed as inhabiting an idealized
realm beyond such petty concerns as health and mortality.
Similarly, in United States v. Virginia (VMI), 2 9 the Virginia Military
Institute's (VMI) justification for excluding women rested in part upon a
presumption that an adversarial model of education was not appropriate for
women; a justification that the trial court found valid.30 Again, much of the
discussion and argument revolved around dispelling the notion that women were
not capable of thriving in an adversarial environment. When the case reached
the United States Supreme Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, concluded that the state of Virginia could not categorically exclude
women "from an extraordinary educational opportunity afforded to men." 31
Ginsburg further noted the inadequacy of the state's argument because not all
males thrive in this adversarial environment. The stated goal of VMI was to
produce a superior type of man, "citizen soldiers" who would be "imbued with
love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing
a high sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free
enterprise system, and ready.., to defend their country in time of national
25. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-1985), for perhaps the best known
articulation of this conundrum. Attempts to reconceptualize the debate include Joan W. Scott,
Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in
CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 134, 138 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990); Joan C.
Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/difference Debate: A Post-modern Path Beyond Essentialism in
Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296 (1991) (describing when focus shifts from
sameness/difference debate to plethora of multiple viewpoints available to individual, sameness
dissolves into differences and vice versa).
26. This issue came before the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
The Court held that the Jaycees were subject to the Minnesota law that prohibited sex discrimination
in places of public accommodation, rejecting the Jaycees claims of First Amendment association rights
to exclude women. Id. at 628-29.
27. Rhode, supra note 17, at 122-23.
28. Id. at 123.
29. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) [hereinafter VMI].
30. VMI, 518 U.S. at 592-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 547.
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peril. '32 For Ginsburg, women must be afforded the same opportunity to
become idealized men as that afforded men. 33 Thus, the notion of the dominant
and idealized group, such as citizen-soldiers, becomes the group to which
outsiders such as women are to be assimilated.
B. The Coercive Nature of Assimilation
Second, the structure of assimilation is hierarchal. In the VMI example,
assimilation would not be at issue if there were two kinds of educational
institutions that were equally valued: one competitive and one more co-
operative. 34 As it presently operates, however, assimilation is a reciprocal but
unilaterally coercive process. It is reciprocal because both sides participate, but
it is coercive because only the members of the disadvantaged group must strive
to meet the normative standards set by the dominant group, which has the power
and the ability to accept or reject members.
Assimilation is coercive not merely because it is unilateral, but because it
carries a set of survival incentives and concomitant penalties. As Larry CatAi
Backer describes it in the context of welfare and public benefits, there is an
"assimilation imperative" that requires the poor to pay for any financial
assistance by conforming to the ideals of capitalism. 35 The award of benefits
requires the division of impoverished persons into categories of deserving and
undeserving, a separation accomplished with reference to a particular dominant
model. Workfare and refusal to increase grants for additional children are just
two aspects of the coercive power of assimilation evidenced in recent "welfare
reform." 36 It is not unusual to believe that the "most useful thing welfare can do
32. Id. at 545.
33. Ginsburg's opinion in VMI does not address the consequences to women if they should
achieve the goal of becoming ideal men. See id. at 550-51 (stating that since women are capable of
performing activities required of men for admission to VMI they should not be denied admission).
Women who become "ideal men" are gender nonconforming, a situation that could bring its own sort
of discrimination. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that female
plaintiff stated cause of action for sex discrimination under Title VII based upon her allegations that
she was terminated for not being sufficiently feminine).
34. See Daly, supra note 17, at 155-57, for an elaboration of this example whereby two colleges
are hypothesized, the University of Adversity and the University of Connection.
35. Backer, Hastings, supra note 18, at 392, 399-400. This view allows Backer to critique both
conservative and liberal ideologies of welfare "reform." Id. at 391. Backer suggests that both liberals
and conservatives accept the existence of poverty because they have too much at stake to debate and
reform the systems that give rise to poverty. Backer, Utah, supra note 18, at 32.
36. While there have been reforms in welfare and "public assistance" laws since the first Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) laws were adopted, "Welfare Reform" is consistently
linked to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 100 Stat. 2105 (1996). The Act, known as PRWORA, fundamentally altered federal policy
towards the poor by abolishing AFDC and replacing it with block grant funding to the States. The
reasoning behind the changes was delineated in H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 8 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2189, which found that "[t]he welfare system contradicts fundamental American
values that ought to be encouraged and rewarded: work, family, personal responsibility and self-
sufficiency." Id. at 2185. The report indicated that PRWORA would discourage out-of-wedlock
children by ending "bonuses for families on welfare that have additional children," and by requiring
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for the poor is to press middle-class values upon them." 37 This pressing occurs
by awarding or withholding subsistence benefits. More fundamentally, pressure
is exerted by the maintenance of an economic system that countenances and
depends upon a percentage of impoverished people for its vitality.
With the faith-based initiative from President Bush,38 we can expect more
coercive assimilationist strategies directed at impoverished persons. While the
government may have its economic agendas, the "faith-based" institutions have
the additional mandate of religious indoctrination. Thus, under the newest Bush
regime, it may not be enough to accept the beliefs of the middle class: One may
also need to accept particular religious beliefs in order to receive food or
shelter.39
Identification of the coercion inherent in assimilation has not been limited
to discussions of the poor. As Daina Chiu notes, Asian-American difference was
managed not only by attempts at exclusion, but by a "coercive assimilation"
based upon beliefs that Asian culture was inferior.40  In support of her
conclusion, Chiu discusses the historical ordinances and statutes that
criminalized Chinese living arrangements in close quarters, regulated laundries
in wooden buildings, levied fines for laundry operators who did not use horse
teenagers who gave birth out of wedlock "to live with an adult and remain in school to continue
receiving benefits." Id. at 2186. The Report also states that "[wielfare... is converted to a work
program," and lauds both the expansion of current disqualification rules for failure to participate in
employment or training and the additional disqualifications built into the new (PRWORA) legislation.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 607 et seq. (2002) (both
establishing mandatory work requirements). See infra notes 386-97 and accompanying text for a
discussion of "welfare reform" and marriage.
37. Backer, Utah, supra note 18, at 42 (citing Paul Taylor, Carrots and Sticks of Welfare Reform,
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at A13 (noting comments of state assemblyman Wayne R. Bryant regarding
New Jersey's discussion to deny increase in welfare benefits to recipients upon birth of additional
children).
38. See Michiko Kakutani, Faith Base: As American as Second Acts and Apple Pie, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2001, § 4, at 1 (discussing "faith-based" initiatives proposed by Bush during his first weeks in
office); Marc Lacey, Bush Fleshes Out Details of Proposal to Expand Aid to Religious Organizations,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A15 (discussing details of President Bush's proposal to aid religious
organizations that provide social services to poor).
39. While Backer has argued that the current thinking about poverty is based upon Christian
ideologies including the sins of sloth and sex, the assignation of "public charity" to private religious
organizations removes even the minimum protections from coercive assimilation that occur when such
functions are governmental. See Backer, Utah supra note 18, at 34-35 (arguing that modern American
ideas about welfare are based on Christian ideals). As a recent report regarding Bush's "faith-based"
initiatives stated:
The cornerstone of the president's plan is that religious programs will not be required to
censor their religious teachings in order to receive government contracts.... While Mr. Bush
was governor of Texas, the state gave $8,000 to a job training program that required students
to study Scripture and taught them that accepting Jesus Christ as their savior would help
them prepare for employment.... The job training program in Texas was the only one in the
county....
Laurie Goodstein, In God We Trust. In Government We Hope for the Best., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001,
§ 4, at 3.
40. Chiu, supra note 20, at 1074-75.
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drawn carriages, effectively barred deceased Chinese from being returned to
China for burial, and prohibited Chinese from fishing.41 Importantly, however,
Chiu also stakes out an area of perhaps lesser egregiousness-guilty liberalism-
which she describes as a presumption of assimilation if there exists a coincidence
of interests. 42 For example, Chiu argues that although Asian-Americans may
seem to be "model minorities" who have adopted white American values of
"hard work and success," the root of Asian-Americans' behavior is not
"American values of individualism and self-reliance" but a "broader sense of
values set in a different context," including "enhancement of the family and
significant others. '43  In this instance, coercive assimilation functions not as
determinative of behavior, but as an interpreter of behavior. This may be
milder, but it remains coercive.
C. The Constitutional Interests of Equality
Third, assimilation implicates the constitutional interests of equality.
Assimilation's relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate against
denial of "equal protection of the law" is related to formal equality. As Julie
Nice explains, there is a foundational antimony in equal protection jurisprudence
between assimilation and anti-subordination principles. 4 The assimilationist
approach employed in equal protection doctrine protects the discrimination it
seemingly denounces by obscuring the existence of a dominant group that
functions as the standard. 45 The result of this approach is to ensure equality not
only based on the dominant group as the normative measure, but for members of
the dominant group as individuals.
Under the equal protection principle of consistency as articulated by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,46 the standard of
review under the equal protection clause does not vary depending upon whether
a disadvantaged group is benefited or burdened. 47 Thus, under current equal
protection doctrine, it is just as constitutionally egregious for a public university
to reserve one of its seats for an African-American as it would be to exclude all
African-Americans. 48
41. Id. at 1077.
42. Id. at 1081.
43. Id. at 1082-83 (citing Ronald Takaki, A Tale of Two Decades: Race and Class in the 1880s and
the 1980s, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 402, 408 (Herbert Hill & James E.
Jones, Jr. eds., 1993).
44. Julie Nice, Equal Protection's Antimonies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1394 (2000) (describing "foundational" antimony of equal protection
jurisprudence as being issue of whether equal protection's ultimate end should be to "eliminate
subordination or to promote assimilation").
45. See id. at 1395 (discussing progressive critiques of conservatives' "assimilationist" approach
to equal protection requirement).
46. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion).
47. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 229-30 (discussing standard of strict scrutiny applied to claims of
unequal protection by persons of any race).
48. As the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens in Adarand noted, this principle of consistency
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A strict assimilationist view denies the validity of equal protection classes;
there are only classifications. As Justice Scalia pronounced in Adarand, "[in the
eyes of the government, we are just one race here. It is American. '49 On this
view, the problem with the government's affirmative action program at issue in
Adarand is that it disrupts the assimilationist mandate. Such a governmental
interest might never be compelling 50 and might not even be legitimate enough to
satisfy the lowest rational basis review. This is consistent with the assimilationist
perspective of equal protection, which requires a neutrality that leaves dominant
social arrangements undisturbed.
While the focus of this Article is on equality concerns, assimilation also
invokes other constitutional considerations that may seem at odds with
equality.51  Notably, the First Amendment's clauses regarding freedom of
association and free exercise of religion 52 might be construed as anti-
assimilationist.
Freedom of association is one argument deployed by those who wish to
exclude minorities. This argument was unsuccessfully used by an all male club
disintegrates if the affirmative action remedy is directed at a nonracial group. Id. at 247 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For example, although the Fourteenth Amendment was undoubtedly intended to end
discrimination against former slaves, a public university's attempt to remedy discrimination against the
descendants of former slaves would be subject to strict scrutiny, while the school's attempt to remedy
discrimination against women would be subject to the lesser scrutiny accorded to gender
classifications. See id. at 247 (discussing inconsistency of utilizing intermediate scrutiny in gender
discrimination cases and strict scrutiny in racial discrimination cases). Thus, a public university that
desired to reserve a portion of its class for sexual minorities would have the lowest constitutional
obstacle-rational basis-needing to show only that it had a legitimate interest in seeking to remedy
discrimination against sexual minorities and that its reservation of a percentage of its seats was
rationally related to that interest.
49. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. Compare Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Adarand, where he "join[s] the opinion of the
Court... except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following: [i]n [his] view, government can
never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction," id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted),
with the plurality opinion in Adarand, stating:
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response to it .... When race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (plurality opinion).
51. See generally Jack Battaglia, Religion, Sexual Orientation, and Self-Realization: First
Amendment Principles and Anti-Discrimination Laws 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189, 191 (1999)
(outlining conflicts between equality and First Amendment and arguing for concept of "self
realization" as way to resolve conflict). See also Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating
Dissent for Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2000), for argument that "expressive
identity" is a way to resolve the conflict.
52. The First Amendment provides "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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resisting an application of a state prohibition of sex discrimination, 53 and more
successfully used by organizers of a St. Patrick's Day Parade 54 and the Boy
Scouts,55 both wishing to exclude sexual minorities. 56 The constitutional interest
in freedom of association can also protect minority groups who seek to avoid the
encroachment of majoritarian values. In fact, prohibitions against sex or sexual
orientation discrimination could be (re)interpreted as majoritarian values and
the all male clubs or other exclusionary institutions as beleaguered minorities
resisting "assimilation." 57
The First Amendment's protection of religion can also provoke a conflict
between religious and sexual freedom, as in cases in which landlords seek
constitutional insulation from state anti-discrimination housing laws.58 The
importance of the First Amendment's protection of religion is also evident in the
political arena, as in the exclusion of religious institutions from the proposed
legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. 59 Additionally, the First
53. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612 (1984) (upholding state statute
prohibiting sex discrimination against First Amendment challenge by all male club).
54. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995)
(holding that organizers of Boston's annual St. Patrick's Day Parade had First Amendment right to
exclude gay/lesbian group despite state law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination).
55. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that Boy Scouts had First
Amendment right to exclude gay men as members despite state law prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination).
56. See supra notes 54-55.
57. A fervent expression of this view occurs in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia characterizes Colorado's Amendment
Two, prohibiting localities or other governmental entities from adopting sexual orientation
discrimination, as a "Kulturkampf," and criticizes the Court for taking the side of the "Templars," "the
lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn." Id. at 636, 652.
58. See infra note 410 and accompanying text for a discussion of landlord cases.
59. The Employment Non Discrimination Act (ENDA) has been introduced in Congress several
times. See, e.g., S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996); S.
2238 103rd Cong. (1994) (available at http://thomas.loc.gov). ENDA was proposed as an alternative to
the failed attempt at amending Title VII to include sexual orientation and was designed to offer the
same protections as Title VII. See J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate
but Equal" Federal Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 154546 (2000) (discussing EDNA as alternative to failed attempts at amending
Title VII); Sharon M. McGowen, Recent Development. The Fate of ENDA in the Wake of Maine: A
Wake-Up Call to Moderate Republicans, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 623, 624-25 (1998) (discussing history
of EDNA in 104th and 105th Congresses). The statute itself is "simple and straight forward. A covered
entity may not use the fact of an individual's sexual orientation in making employment decisions."
Employment Non Discrimination Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 869 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 141 (1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Chai Feldblum,
Associate Professor of Law and Director of Federal Legislation Clinic, Georgetown University Law
Center)(discussing application of EDNA).
The religious exemption in ENDA, however, is far broader than that found under Title VII,
exempting all but solely for-profit activities. See S. 869, 105th Cong. § 9(a)-(b) (1997) (stating "this
Act shall not apply to a religious organization" unless "the duties of position pertain solely to activities
of the organization that generate unrelated business taxable income" under the Internal Revenue
Code); see also Hearings, supra (written Statement of Chai Feldblum). There is no requirement that a
particular sexual orientation be a bona fide occupational qualification and thus under ENDA religious
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Amendment is relevant to some claims regarding marital practices.60
If constitutional law embodies the national ideology,61  then the
jurisprudential contours of Fourteenth and First Amendment doctrine are
relevant to the discussion of assimilation. The task, however, is to untangle
constitutional doctrine as pronounced by the United States Supreme Court from
wider concerns regarding equality and assimilation. 62
D. Both Assimilation and Anti-Assimilation Can Be Repressive
Unfortunately, neither assimilation nor anti-assimilation is inherently
progressive. While liberals may tend to favor assimilation, it can be just as
coercive as anti-assimilation. Both assimilation and anti-assimilation are
ideologies that can be implemented in ways that are conservative and repressive.
For example, in the Native American context, the majoritarian quest for
assimilation led to the removal of Native American children from their homes in
an effort to "tame the savages." 63 This removal first occurred through explicit
groups would be free to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation unless the position is "solely"
one involved in a for-profit function of the religion or religious group.
60. See infra notes 274-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Mormon polygamy.
61. See Karst, supra note 20, at 373 (arguing Constitution reflects underlying values of American
civic culture).
62. It is interesting to compare the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provision, Const.
Act 1982, pt. I, § 15 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982,
ch. 11 (U.K.), reprinted R.S.C. 1985 Appo. II, No. 44 §§ 44, 35, 35(1), which provides for 'equality
without discrimination' and which includes a specific affirmative action provision. As Justice Claire
L'Heureux-Dub has explained, this has meant that the Canadian Supreme Court, unlike the United
States Supreme Court, has concluded that:
[E]quality isn't just about being treated the same, and it isn't a mathematical equation
waiting to be solved. Rather, it is about equal human dignity, and full membership in society.
It is about promoting an equal sense of self-worth. It is about treating people with equal
concern, equal respect, and equal consideration. These are the values that underlie equality.
These are the values that are offended when we discriminate, consciously or not.
Claire L'Heureux-Dub, A Conversation About Equality, 29 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65, 69 (2000).
This is not, however, to argue that the Canadian interpretation is the apex of equality, for it has
certainly been subjected to critiques, including the areas of sexuality and family law. See, e.g., Lori G.
Beaman, Sexual Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal Constructions of the "Normal" Family, 14
CAN. J.L. & SOC'Y 173, 181-87 (1999) (arguing that Supreme Court of Canada incorporates
assumptions about nature of family life as relevant factor in its assessment of meaning of word
"spouse"); Susan B. Boyd, The Impact of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms on Canadian Family
Law, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 293, 297, 313-27 (2000) (surveying impact of Charter which contains
government action requirement on "private" family law); Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in
the New Millennium, The Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 127-51
(2000) (discussing Charter challenges to privileging of marriage over cohabitation and problems with
incremental reform); Bruce Ryder, The Little Sisters Case, Administrative Censorship, and Obscenity
Law, 39 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 207, 208 (2001) (arguing that Supreme Court of Canada failed to
adequately protect sex equality concerns when it rejected Charter challenge to censorship of lesbian
and gay pornography).
63. See, e.g., Patrice Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United States, 16
B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 17, 22-30 (1996); Jose Monsivais, A Glimmer of Hope: A Proposal to Keep
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 Intact, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1997) (both discussing
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policies administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which forced Native
children to attend boarding schools for eight years, during which time the
children were not permitted to speak their native language, wear native clothes
or keep their hair long.64 State welfare agencies administered a later policy,
which removed children as abused and neglected, often based on poverty or
cultural practices such as extended kinship systems, which did not view parental
responsibility in the same terms as the dominant white culture. 65 Majoritarian
belief in the non-assimilability of "brave," "high-spirited," and "fierce" Native
Americans, however, gave the majority constitutional comfort when it denied
Native Americans the rights of property ownership. 66
Similarly, in the immigrant context, an assimilationist mandate can lead to
English-only policies.67 The Alabama state constitutional amendment declaring
English the official state language and interpreted as prohibiting the translation
of the written drivers license test is based upon a sentiment that one language
will foster unity.68 On the contrary, anti-assimilationist beliefs can lead to
history of forced child removal). As these articles note, the government has attempted to stop this
policy by passage of The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978).
64. See B.J. Jones, In Their Native Lands: The Legal Status of American Indian Children in North
Dakota, 75 N.D. L. Rev. 241, 247-48 (1999) (analyzing historical federal policy towards American
Indian children); Kunesh, supra note 63, at 23 (describing early assimilation politics of Bureau of
Indian Affairs).
65. See Kunesh, supra note 63, at 23-24 (discussing effect of federal policies on American Indian
families). The extent to which the state welfare practices have been ameliorated is doubtful; as one
recent commentator notes: "an Indian child in North Dakota is over eight times more likely to be
placed in foster care than a non-Indian child." Jones, supra note 64, at 246 (citing Indian/Non-Indian
Comparisons: By Several Demographic, Program, and Health Variables, A REPORT FROM THE NORTH
DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES AND STATISTICS 2,7 (1997)).
66. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589-90 (1823).
67. For discussions of English-only policies, see generally Raechel L. Adams, English-Only in the
Workplace: A New Judicial Lens Will Provide More Comprehensive Title VII Protection, 47 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1327 (1998) (exploring and defining national origin discrimination through English-only
rules); Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and
English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1996) (analyzing and proposing returns for
non-English-speaking consumer protection laws); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia
Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving
English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1347 (1997) (describing refusal of judicial system to recognize discriminatory nature of
English-only policies); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (analyzing potential application
of antidiscrimination law to accent-bias); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992)
(reviewing history of laws regarding American cultural groups' interactions involving language);
Madeleine Plasencia, "Suppressing the Mother Tongue"-Anti- Subordination and the Legal Struggle
Over Control of the Means of Communication, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989 (1999) (describing
interrelationship between language, identity, and self-esteem); John Hayakawa Torok, Finding the Me
in LatCrit Theory: Thoughts on Language Acquisition and Loss, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1019 (1999)
(discussing importance of language diversity through actor's personal and intellectual history).
68. Amendment 509 to the Alabama Constitution provides that English is the official language of
Alabama and empowers the state legislature to pass legislation to enforce the English language
mandate. ALA. CONST. amend. 509.
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immigration exclusions such as the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act 69 and
disparately low quotas. 70
Gender provides yet another example. The integration of women into the
professions, including the legal profession, is telling. The underlying basis for the
exclusion of women was that women had a "natural and proper timidity and
delicacy" that rendered women unfit "for many of the occupations of civil life,"
including the practice of law. 71 In short, women could not be assimilated to the
demands of legal practice. The removal of formal barriers, however, revealed a
different problem: an assimilationist program that requires women to conform to
male based standards of performance. 72
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the amendment could not be applied to testing
for drivers licenses based upon the State's receipt of federal funds. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,
487-88 (11th Cir. 1999). See Christian A. Garza, Note, Measuring Language Rights Along a Spectrum,
110 YALE L.J. 379 (2000), for a discussion of the case. The United States Supreme Court, granted
certiorari and reversed. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (rev'd). In an opinion
written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the prohibition in section 601 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (2001), which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in covered
programs and activities, prohibits only intentional discrimination. Id. at 280-81 (emphasis added). The
Court further held that the language of section 602, which commands the regulating agencies to issue
rules under which the Department of Justice prohibited employing methods that have a disparate
impact, does not contain a private right of action to enforce its prohibitions. Id. at 285-92. Scalia
reasoned that the statute provides for the enforcement of the regulations through the issuing agencies,
and that the language of section 602 "focuses neither on the individuals protected nor even on the
funding recipients being regulated but on the agencies that will do the regulating." Id. at 289.
69. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act of Dec. 17,
1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. Even the first naturalization acts were race-based. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 26,
1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (limiting naturalization to "free white person[s]"), amended by Act of July 14,
1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (extending naturalization to people of African descent). Immigration
was linked with citizenship, and in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Court upheld the exclusion of a
person born in the United States who was returning from China, based upon his Chinese ancestry as
an exclusion from eligibility for citizenship and, thus, rendering the Fourteenth Amendment
inapplicable. 169 U.S. 649, 650 (1898). For general discussions of the Chinese Exclusion Acts and
other anti-Asian immigration policies, see generally Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class,
Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882 - 1910,25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1
(2000); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century America:
The First Phase, 1850-70, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529 (1984); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and
Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55 (1996).
70. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1999), eliminated the
national quota system, largely in favor of a family-based preference system, which disproportionately
discriminates against sexual minorities who do not qualify for spousal preferences with their same-sex
partners. See generally Amy Brownstein, Why Same-Sex Spouses Should be Granted Preferential
Immigration Status: Reevaluating Adams v. Howerton, 16 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 763
(1994) (explaining how U.S. law approaches the issue of same-sex marriages for immigration
purposes); Christopher A. Duenas, Note, Coming to America: The Immigration Obstacle Facing
Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2000) (proposing removal of immigration
barriers faced by same-sex couples); Brian McGloin, Comment, Diverse Families with Parallel Needs:
A Proposal for Same-Sex Immigration Benefits, 30 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 159 (1999) (proposing creation
of new immigration status category for partners of same sex couples).
71. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
72. See generally LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN:
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Thus, neither assimilationist nor anti-assimilationist policies guarantee
liberation for minorities. Examined together, they send a message of the
necessity for conformity. Inclusion requires conformity; if one is perceived as
not conforming, one will be excluded.
E. Segregation and Separatism
Not only can the seemingly disparate strategies of assimilation and anti-
assimilation be used to accomplish the same ultimate goal, but anti-assimilation
itself is a divergent phenomenon. Depending upon the source of the anti-
assimilation impulse, it can include the apparent opposites of segregation and
separatism.
In the African-American context, segregation was most notoriously
exercised pursuant to laws that mandated its practice, for example, the Louisiana
statute upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson73 that required railroads to have separate
cars for whites and blacks. 74 The illusion of "separate but equal" was finally
dispelled by the Court's 1954 unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education,75 authored by Justice Earl Warren, which concluded that segregation
was unconstitutionally harmful, rejecting "[a]ny language in Plessy v. Ferguson
contrary to this finding. '76 The unremitting reality of segregation is generally
considered the basis for the Civil Rights Movement and for the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 77 Yet the benefits of integration for African-Americans are subject to
debate. For example, Sonia Jarvis argues that the implementation of Brown has
negatively affected African-American school children in terms of a deprivation
of role models, loss of self-esteem, biases in curriculum, racial tracking, and
other problems.7 8  In the university context, Jerome Culp discusses the
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL & INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997) (arguing how culture of legal education
alienates, demoralizes, and ultimately changes women).
73. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
74. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (upholding constitutionality of a Louisiana statute providing
separate but equal accommodations for white and African-American races).
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
77. The motivating purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to prohibit segregation, although
the statute uses the language of "discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal AntiDiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 487-88 (2000) (footnotes omitted)
(analyzing historical developments of Civil Rights Act of 1964 from Brown decision as an effort to
continue to reduce practices of segregation by "outlawing racial discrimination by business
establishments and employers").
78. Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1286-88 (1992).
Similarly Jerome Culp notes:
Forced desegregation of southern schools often resulted in the unnecessary elimination of
the jobs of excellent black teachers and all of the "black" cultural aspects of schools that had
been segregated for black children. The existing power structure viewed black teachers as
inferior and black schools as "too black" for white children. Black children were made to
bear a disproportionate share of the cost of integration-leaving their schools and friends for
what became, in many situations, hostile territory.
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controversy that occurred when black students at the University of North
Carolina wanted to create a black cultural center on campus.79 As Culp states,
"[b]lack students who sit together in an effort to create a community in a world
where their interests and views are often excluded are seen as the fundamental
problem preventing the success of integration on college campuses."80  In
theorizing separatism, Bill Ong Hing argues that it has a political or ideological
version and a sociological version. 81 In its ideological manifestation, separatism
means forgoing reliance on the power structure and engaging in political self-
help.82  The sociological version occurs when people simply feel more
comfortable in a separate community.83 Yet as Hing notes, these two strands are
not entirely distinct.84
Hing also raises the problem of separatism by racial minorities seeming to
exhibit an analogous preference as the one exercised by whites who may want to
"live among themselves." 85 This differentiation between justifiable separatism
and unjustifiable separatism also troubles another commentator:
In my view, the likelihood that people will flee to a new, homogeneous
community... correlates with nothing so much as their dislike for the
neighbors they leave behind. This point emerges with special clarity
from the most politically significant instance of "exit" in modern
America, "white flight" from the cities. Many whites left because they
distrusted or hated blacks .... There is nothing especially valuable
about the motives that bring racists together in homogeneous
communities. Of course, some insular communities (such as the Amish
or the Satmar Hasidim in Kiryas Joel) do reflect distinctive and
demanding world views. But not all separatist groups are ideologically
rich in this way, and not all ideologically rich groups are insular.
Separatism simply is not a reliable index of ethical integrity.8 6
Culp, supra note 11, at 671.
79. Id. at 666-67, 679-81.
80. Id. at 679.
81. Hing, supra note 13, at 890-91.
82. Id. at 895.
83. Id. at 897-98.
84. Id at 891-92 (using example of African-Americans in Prince George's County, Maryland).
85. Id. at 898. Hing resolves this tension with a resounding "perhaps," grounding the preference
of a minority group on the experience of oppression and using the example of Japanese-Americans,
including elders interned in World War Two. Hing, supra note 13, at 898.
86. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 87,
98-99 (1996) (commenting upon Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1996)). The Kiryas Joel controversy involved a religious enclave of Satmar
Hasidim, described as intensely pious and ultra-orthodox who, in addition to following all Jewish
precepts, remove themselves as much as possible from the outside world. See Judith Lynn Failer, The
Draw and Drawbacks of Religious Enclaves in a Constitutional Democracy: Hasidic Public Schools in
Kiryas Joel, 72 IND. L.J. 383, 386-87 (1997) (describing creation of Kiryas Joel enclave community). In
pursuing their separatism, the Satmar Hasidim moved to one subdivision in the relatively undeveloped
town of Monroe, New York in the early 1970's. Id. They ran afoul of local zoning laws, however, and
came into conflict with the Town Board of Monroe. Id. at 388. They then successfully petitioned to
incorporate the Village of Kiryas Joel composed of 320 acres owned and inhabited entirely by
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The implicit requirement for "justifiable separatism" in such a formulation
would not be the experience of oppression, but a "distinctive and demanding
world view" that exhibits "ethical integrity." The application of such a standard
is extremely troublesome.
An assimilationist perspective would most likely disapprove of both
segregation and separatism under a formal equality approach, which cannot
distinguish between exclusion of minority groups by dominant groups and the
exclusion of dominant groups by minority groups. A casual multiculturalism or
pluralism perspective might also view segregation or separatism with disdain.
Importantly, however, multiculturalism or pluralism logically depend upon the
existence of independent and identifiable separate cultures or entities-and thus
without separatism (or perhaps segregation), there can be no multiculturalism.
F. The Disagreement Within Communities
Last, and obviously, there is substantial disagreement within minority
communities about the advisability of assimilationist or anti-assimilationist
stances. Communities are diverse not only according to their ability to
assimilate, but also regarding their beliefs about the desirability of assimilation.
As Kevin Johnson notes, some "Latino intellectuals with high media profiles"
such as Linda Chavez, strongly encourage "Hispanics" to assimilate and criticize
leaders who they believe encourage ethnic separation. 87
Arguments among feminists over the strategies and meanings of
assimilation and equality have been plentiful. A state statute granting favorable
pregnancy leave for prospective mothers, but not to prospective fathers, caused a
division among feminist attorneys. One group argued that the statute was sex
discrimination akin to earlier protective paternalistic labor legislation. 88
Another group argued that the statute's recognition that women bearing
children were affected in a way that men were not was constitutionally
permissible.89 A similar division occurred regarding a suit against Sears for
gender imbalances in its job assignments.9" Sexual issues such as pornography
Satmars. Id. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 691 (1994)
(holding that creation of Kiryas Joel school district violated the Establishment Clause of First
Amendment).
87. Johnson, supra note 12, at 194. Johnson later discusses the fact that Chavez herself
experienced the "limits of assimilation" and resigned as president of an organization devoted to
ending bilingual education when a "crude anti-Latino memorandum written by the organization's
founder came to light." Id. at 196.
88. See Calif. Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 283-84, 290-91 (1987) (holding
that California statute did not compel employers to treat pregnant workers better than disabled
workers and only outlined minimum benefit standards). See Martha Minow, Adjudicating Differences:
Conflicts Among Feminist Lawyers, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 149, 150-51 (Marianne Hirsch &
Evelyn Fox Keller, eds., 1990), for a discussion of the opposing amicus briefs.
89. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 283-84, 288-89.
90. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding
employer did not discriminate against pregnant women but had proven "legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons" for statistical disparities in hiring practices). The trial involved the expert testimony of two
well-regarded historians, Alice Kessler-Harris for the EEOC, and Rosalind Rosenberg for Sears. Id.
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and prostitution have been so divisive as to be termed the "sex wars," with one
group claiming that pornography and prostitution are violence against women,
while another group argues that these practices are, or can be, liberating and
equalizing.91
In the African-American context, Justice Clarence Thomas has become a
focal point for assimilation discourse. One commentator defends his critique of
Thomas as being based upon Thomas' views rather than upon a
misinterpretation of Thomas as a "black [man] in white face. '92 Another
commentator defends Thomas himself by arguing against the common myths of
Thomas as inauthentically black because of Thomas' conservative positions. 93
at 1308, 1314. For discussions of the case, see Ruth Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12
FEMINIST STUD. 375, 394-95 (1986); Minow, supra note 88, at 150; Scott, supra note 25, at 138.
91. The origin of the debate over the so-called 'sex wars' dates back to the nineteen-eighties, but
the essence of the debate remains relevant and provocative to feminist legal scholars today. In its
simplest form, the debate revolves around the legal consequences of characterizing women as lacking
agency to control their own victimization by male aggression, and it has pitted the anti-pornography
camp (composed most notably of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin) against the Feminist
Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995); Lisa Duggan, An Historical
Overview, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 25 (1993); Margaret McIntyre, Sex Panic or False Alarm? The
Latest Round in the Feminist Debate Over Pornography, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 189 (1995); Carole S.
Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade after the Barnard Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 289 (1993); Robin West, The Feminist Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 681 (1987).
MacKinnon, a proponent of what has alternatively been called cultural feminism or dominance
feminism, argues that persistent inequality between men and women is manifested in the form of
pornography, violence against women, and sexual harassment of women by men. CARTHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 85-92 (1987). This sexualized
domination of women by men, she contends, makes it impossible for women to legitimately claim any
control over their bodies, sexual desires, or pleasure, since women's conceptions of themselves are
shaped pervasively by the culture of domination to which they are subject. Id. at 86-87. Dominance
feminism argues that it is meaningless to propose, as anti-censorship feminists do, that pornography is
capable of multi-layered interpretations which vary in the levels of harm that they inflict upon women.
Id. at 91-92. Instead, MacKinnon argues that pornography is indistinguishable from violence against
women, and should therefore be repudiated in its totality by feminists. See generally id. at 45-62.
Standing in opposition to this view are the anti-censorship feminists or feminist sex radicals, perhaps
most notably Nadine Strossen. See generally NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE
SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
The critiques of so-called "dominance feminism" argue that dominance feminism's willingness to
characterize all women's sexual experiences as dangerous or non-consensual is an oversimplification
that stifles debate about, and expressions of, women's sexuality and presents it as a two-dimensional
social construct. See Abrams, supra at 311 (discussing these critiques). This tendency, they argue, is
antiquated at the least, and dangerous at its worst, because it alienates those women whose chosen
sexual practices mirror the dominant paradigm and denies all women any agency over their own
sexuality. Id. As such, it runs the risk of promoting the very victimization it seeks to analyze and
dismantle. Id.
92. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637,
1647-48 (1999) (citing DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 128, 182 (1997)).
93. Stephen Smith, former law clerk to Justice Thomas, argues that Thomas has been unfairly
portrayed by the media. Stephen F. Smith, The Truth About Clarence Thomas and the Need for New
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Yet another scholar uses Thomas' concedingly conservative views to argue for an
Afrocentric pedagogy. 94
While such controversies often create "camps" that divide people, it is also
true that each of us, as individuals, might also experience ambivalence about the
advantages and disadvantages of assimilation. For example, it is easy to label
Justice Thomas as assimilationist and to contrast him with another African-
American jurist, Judge Higginbotham, who eloquently protested Justice
Thomas' nomination to the High Court.
As Margaret Chon describes Judge Higginbotham, the judge for whom she
clerked:
Like many lawyers who believed in the promise of the civil rights
movement, the Judge had a distinctly bifurcated vision of American
law. One vision was the promise of the founding documents of this
country, as symbolized by the formal, tidy, and assertive structures of
Independence Park. This is the vision of "we the people," of self-
evident truths that "all men are created equal." It is the vision of the
European Enlightenment, transplanted to America, the ideals of which
we are all taught as gospel in elementary school. This is the rational
part of the history of America.
The other vision was a profoundly different one, one that disturbs
and even enrages those who want to believe in the unsullied purity of
the first vision. This is the vision of "we the people of color," the one
that is symbolized by the urban decay just a few blocks away from the
Independence Hall. It is the vision that caused the Judge, over and
over again during his distinguished career, to ask the hard questions,
the questions many do not want to hear. This is the irrational history
of America, the America that is not taught at all in many cases, but
which affects all of us, even today. As the nation was celebrating the
constitutional bicentennial celebration with fanfare and self-
congratulation, the Judge asked "Did the Declaration of Independence
announce a self-evident truth or a self-evident lie?"
Black Leadership, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 513, 514 (2000). Smith argues that the bashing of Thomas
falls into one of three categories. First, is the argument of critics that Thomas is simply a "puppet" of
Justice Scalia, another conservative judge nominated by President Reagan. Id. at 514. Second, is the
argument that Thomas decides cases merely to harm those groups that opposed his nomination to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 514-15. Third, he is criticized for holding views that no "really black" person
could honestly hold. Id. One common thread between all these critics is that Thomas's views simply
do not matter, and should not be taken seriously. Id.
94. Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta" Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric
Academies, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 313 (2000). Brown proposes that:
Justice Thomas's exhortation to seek solutions that may lie within the black community is
not incompatible, in spirit, with Afrocentrists' goals to make blacks the subjects of history
and human experience. At first glance, this conflation of Thomas's views-often described as
conservative-with the theoretical project of Afrocentrism, which some liberal critics view as
radically separatist, may seem surprising. However, this Article contends that both
viewpoints represent a growing dissatisfaction with the integrationist ideal, as expressed by
black intellectuals at opposite extremes of the ideological spectrum.
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Such a question both affirms and critiques the prevailing wisdom,
for the answer, as the Judge knew, was not an either/or answer.95
Judge Higginbotham is justly admired for his great and enduring devotion
to equality,96 as well as his opposition to Clarence Thomas' appointment to the
United States Supreme Court.97 Yet as Margaret Chon portrays him, he had the
wisdom to acknowledge the contradictions not only among us, but within each of
US.
Thus, it seems to me that however vociferously we advocate either an
assimilationist or anti-assimilationist stance, critical theorists each recognize the
inherent contradictions in any position. The disagreements within communities
are projections of the disagreements within each of us. We recognize the
symbiotic relationship between segregation and separatism, even as we realize
that both assimilation and anti-assimilation can be exercised in a repressive
manner by the dominant culture. We have differing notions of coercion, the
constitutional dimensions of assimilation, and the constructions of the dominant
group. Recognizing the complexities of the assimilationist discourse in critical
theories-whether they be concerned with racial, ethnic, gender, or religious
categories-serves to illuminate the problems of assimilation as they appear in
lesbian legal theory. This investigation also assists in the identification of what
aspects of assimilation, if any, are problematic. The next section pursues these
95. Margaret Chon, A Symposium Tribute to Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: The Mentor and
his Message, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 973,980-81 (2000) (citations omitted).
96. At an event honoring Judge Higginbotham after his death, he was praised as the "peoples
lawyer" with President Clinton, Lyndon Johnson, and former South African President Nelson
Mandela, among other dignitaries, celebrating Higginbotham as one of the 20 'b century's great leaders
who spent his life applying the law in pursuit of civil rights and personal liberties. Marcella
Bombardieri, Notables Honor 'People's Lawyer', BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2000, at B3. Leon
Higginbotham, Jr. served as a federal district court judge and Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals before his death in 1998. Id. As well as numerous law review articles, his scholarly work
includes the books, SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (discussing that blacks have left behind midnight hour of slavery, traveled
through gray dawn of segregation, and are now in cloudy divide, poised between freedom and
inequality) and IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1978)
(discussing vacillation of court, state legislature, and even honest public servants in trying to decide
whether blacks were people).
97. On November 29, 1991, Higginbotham sent an "open letter" to Justice Thomas, which
implored the newly confirmed Justice to remember "the culmination of years of heartbreaking work
by thousands" of civil rights activists who preceded him. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter
to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1992),
reprinted in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER, ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 3 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992). Higginbotham
stated that after reading every article Justice Thomas had published and every speech he had given
before his confirmation hearing, Higginbotham stated that he "could not find one shred of evidence
suggesting an insightful understanding [by Clarence Thomas] on how the evolutionary movement of
the Constitution and the work of civil rights organizations [had] benefited [him]" on his rise to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 1011. He criticized Clarence Thomas for labeling himself as a "black
conservative", confessing that he [Higginbotham] was at a loss to understand, other than their own
self-advancement, what it was that the so-called "black conservatives" were "so anxious to conserve."
Id. at 1018.
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issues.
III. LESBIANS & AsSIMILATIONIsT/ ANTI-AssIMILATIONIST PERSPECTIVES
For lesbians within legal culture, the same dynamics as described above for
other groups are operative. There is a logical necessity for a dominant and
idealized group, although this group may change-at times being heterosexual
women, at other times heterosexual men, gay men, and even lesbians who
function as "but for" perfect lesbians.98 For lesbians, as with others, assimilation
can possess a coercive cast that implicates the constitutional interests of equality
and association.99 As with other groups, both assimilation and anti-assimilation
can be repressive and segregation and separatism co-exist. Lastly, there are
certainly vociferous disagreements among us regarding the virtues of
assimilation, and like Judge Higginbotham, I suspect that we each harbor our
individual conflicts, no matter how stridently we articulate our respective
positions.
Moreover, the entire question of assimilation, especially as it regards
sexuality, is inflected by Michel Foucault's theories positing the impossibility of a
non-assimilated stance. For Foucault, the subject who resists is a product of the
power and discourses that are being resisted: "Where there is power, there is
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position
of exteriority in relation to power."'0 Nevertheless, this observation does not
obviate the possibility of resistance. 10 1  Instead, as a form of intellectual
resistance, Foucault suggested a number of scholarly inquiries that might be
pursued regarding sexuality. 102
98. By this phrase I mean lesbians who "but for" their sexuality, are otherwise perfect; they are
the "whitest and brightest" among us. See SAPPHO supra note 5, at 30, 107 (describing "but for"
lesbians as perfectly assimilated except for their sexuality); Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality
and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories," 4 LAW & SEXUALITY 83, 93-94 (1994) (stating
that because antidiscrimination law is so limited in scope, sex discrimination has not been recognized
with reference to lesbians who are in privileged positions but for their sexuality); Julie Shapiro, A
Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 17, 20-21, 35-36
(1999) (expressing concerns that when lesbians use law they conform to ideals of dominant society).
99. Scholar Kenji Yoshino has compellingly analyzed what he terms in the "assimilationist bias"
of equal protection doctrine as it relates to the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding sexual
orientation. See Yoshino, Don't Ask, supra note 6, at 549 (arguing that military's policy of turning the
other way can be dangerous to homosexuals by making them less visible and less likely to achieve
heightened security in an equal protection analysis).
100. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 95 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books
ed., 1980).
101. Foucault's own practices illustrate the possibility of resistance. For example, he participated
in many demonstrations against current regimes, assisted refugees from then-Communist Eastern
Europe, participated in prison reform, observed the Iranian revolution, and made some excursions
into gay activism. See DIDIER ERIBON, MICHEL FOUCAULT (1991) for further discussion. See also
JAMES MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT (1993), for a full account of Foucault's life.
102. As Foucault stated:
To return to sex and the discourses of truth that have taken charge of it, the question that we
must address, then,... is rather: In a specific type of discourse on sex, in a specific form of
extortion of truth, appearing historically and in specific places (around the child's body,
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Although not strictly within Foucault's delimitations, this Article's
interrogation of the specific arguments surrounding same-sex marriage is
perhaps within Foucault's general preference for particularity. 10 3  Yet this
Article resists Foucault, or phrased more specifically, resists Foucault's
resistance to lesbians as distinct from gay men, 1°4 by seeking to place lesbians at
the center of the analysis.
Yet before turning to the specific, it is useful to posit a hypothetical stance
informed by the controversies in legal culture and oriented toward a general goal
of lesbian liberation, however ill-defined. Given the general contours of
assimilation, I harbor deep concerns about assimilation in the context of any
lesbian legal theory. As argued above, however, a simplistic position of anti-
assimilationism is equally problematic. Yet the anti-assimilationist label does
capture the three premises that arise from the previous survey of assimilation in
legal theory, which I map below. Thus, for lack of a better term, I shall use
"anti-assimilationist" to describe the stance developed by this Article. 10 5
apropos of women's sex, in connection with practices restricting births, and so on), what
were the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? How did they make
possible these kinds of discourses, and conversely, how were these discourses used to
support power relations? How was the action of these power relations modified by their
very exercise, entailing a strengthening of some terms and a weakening of others, with
effects of resistance and counter investments, so that there never existed one type of stable
subjugation, given once and for all? How were these power relations linked to one another
according to the logic of a great strategy, which in retrospect takes on the general aspect of a
unitary and voluntarist politics of sex?
FOUCAULT, supra note 100, at 97.
103. In one interview, Foucault expresses this method as "eventualization," defining it as a
"making visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an
immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all." MICHEL
FOUCAULT, Questions of Method (Interview), in POWER: THE ESSENTIAL WORKS OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT 1954-1984 226 (James D. Faubion ed., 1st U.S. ed. 2000).
104. In Foucault's works, lesbians are under-theorized and barely mentioned. In one interview,
the suggestion that lesbians had distinct sexual experiences from those of gay men caused Foucault to
respond, "[a]ll I can do is explode with laughter," although he did admit that "one would have to
speak about the different pressures experienced by men and women who are coming out or are trying
to make a life for themselves as homosexuals." James O'Higgins, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault
and Homosexuality, in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND CULTURE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1977-1984 291 (Lawrence Kritzman ed., 1988). Unfortunately, Foucault never did seem to "speak"
about these differences. As the feminist philosopher Jana Sawicki notes, "Foucault abandoned the
project of writing a history of women's bodies. In many of his later writings, the absence of specific
attention to women's sexual and procreative bodies as pivotal targets for the new described forms of
power that he described is glaring." JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT: FEMINISM, POWER,
AND THE BODY 68 (Routledge ed., 1991).
105. I avoid segregationist or separatist because of the negative valences those terms have
acquired. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the negative valence of
segregation. See SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 85, for a brief discussion of accusations of separatism
applicable to lesbian legal theory. See Margaret Davies, Lesbian Separatism and Legal Positivism, 13
CAN. J.L. & Soc'Y, Fall 1998, at 1, 1, for a more textured view of lesbian separatism in legal theory
contexts (comparing legal positivism and lesbian separatism). I also avoid diversity, multiculturalism,
and pluralism, because they imply that my theorizing is more broad than it is, however, I am using
"assimilation" in way that includes some of those positions, as well as being mindful of the inflection of
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First, it seems to me that an anti-assimilationist perspective would be one
that does not fetishize either equality or freedom of association, but looks to a
broader concept, perhaps liberation, which certainly includes sexual freedom but
is not limited to sexual matters. As such, this broader concept of liberation is not
confined by constitutional theories and doctrines and is willing and able to
address fundamental and structural change.
Second, an anti-assimilationist perspective would also recognize and reject
the coercive aspects of assimilation, even if the coercion takes the form of
positive rewards for those who assimilate. Such a perspective would not
privilege those members of the community who can, or do, assimilate or find
fault with those who do not assimilate for whatever reasons.
Finally, an anti-assimilationist perspective would insist that success is
defined by a marker other than assimilation. Liberation can be such a marker.
It is also important, however, to attempt to conceptualize beyond mere
liberation "from" the state. Thus, at its most fundamental, a lesbian legal theory
anti-assimilationist perspective would interrogate-to paraphrase Foucault-not
just how the state and its legal institutions repress individuals, but how our very
process of becoming individuals is linked to the state.10 6 In other words, when
taking as its subject our legal reform advocacy and theorizing, an anti-
assimilationist stance would take a hard look at how even our most cherished
conceptions of our "selves" are yoked to the state, particularly with the state's
expressions of its power through law.
With these three touchstones of an anti-assimilationist perspective, the next
and major portion of this Article considers same-sex marriage and similar legal
constructions of coupledom.
IV. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Same-sex marriage, domestic partnership, civil unions, and other
institutions applicable to lesbian coupledom have served as a focal point for
debates about assimilation in lesbian and other sexual minority communities.
Thus, same-sex marriage is a prime candidate to explore the development of any
anti-assimilationist stance, including one consisting of the three touchstones
articulated above.
After a brief introduction explicating same-sex marriage and domestic
partnership as they have developed in the United States, the next section
considers the constitutional contours implicated in this doctrine and theory.
social class. Cf. Anita Christina Butera, Assimilation, Pluralism, and Multiculturalism: The Policy of
Racial/Ethnic Identity in America, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 2-10 (2001) (distinguishing
assimilation, pluralism, and multiculturalism as theories and criticizing each for failing to take into
account social class and geographic space).
106. See Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, Afterword to HUBERT DREYFUS & PAUL
RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 216 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1982) (positing that "the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to
try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both
from the state and from the type of individualization that is linked to the state").
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Specifically, I examine the manner in which the constitutional concept of"equality" operates erratically with regards to the legal regulation of gender,
different-sex domestic partnership, polygamous marriage, and familial marriage
(incest). Thus, I conclude that equality is not a successful paradigm for achieving
lesbian liberation.
The next portion of the Article considers whether marriage for lesbians
possesses any coercive aspects. Because of the tangible economic and legal
benefits, as well as the rhetoric promoting marriage in the law and social realms,
I conclude that we presently exist under a regime of compulsory matrimony that
coerces individuals, especially women, to enter into the institution of marriage.
Finally, the Article considers the stake of the state in the marital relations of its
people, including lesbians, to interrogate the linking of lesbian identity with state
interests.
A. A Brief History of Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions
This section considers the complicated quest for the legal recognition of
same-sex couples in the United States. Of the legal demands being made by gay
and lesbian activists in the 1970s, perhaps none seemed as outrageous as
"homosexual marriage." Advocating same-sex marriage was viewed as being an
"antic" that could cost a person his livelihood. 0 7 The courts considering
107. In McConnell v. Anderson, the Eighth Circuit described McConnell's application for a
marriage license with his partner as an antic, and reversed the district judge's decision enjoining the
Minnesota Board of Regents from refusing to hire McConnell based upon his homosexuality. 451
F.2d 193, 195 n.4 (8th Cit. 1971). See McConnell v. Anderson, 316 F. Supp. 809, 815 (D. Minn. 1970)
(issuing injunction prohibiting Board of Regents from refusing to hire plaintiff based upon his sexual
orientation). McConnell, a librarian who was offered a position as head of the cataloging division of
the St. Paul campus of the University of Minnesota, had challenged the Board of Regents decision not
to approve his appointment. Id. at 810-11. In rejecting this argument, the court relied in large
measure upon the fact that James McConnell and his partner, Richard Baker, sued the county clerk of
Hennepin County, Minnesota for a marriage license. Id. (This case would eventually reach the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), discussed infra notes 108-
13). As expressed by the Eighth Circuit, McConnell desired to "foist tacit approval" of the "socially
repugnant concept" of homosexual rights upon the university, and the court ruled that there was
nothing to require the university to "accede to such extravagant demands." McConnell, 451 F.2d. at
196.
Similarly, the plaintiff in Singer v. Hara, 522 P. 2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974), discussed infra notes
114-19, suffered adverse employment consequences from his same-sex marriage activism. Singer was a
clerk typist with the EEOC, the federal agency charged with enforcing anti-discrimination laws based
upon numerous categories including "sex," although the EEOC took the position that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation was permissible because it was not included in the prohibition of
discrimination based upon "sex." See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination does not extend to include person's sexual
orientation). In 1972, the Seattle Office of the EEOC summoned John Singer, a clerk typist, to an
investigative interview regarding his homosexuality and the "wide-spread publicity" regarding his gay
activism. Singer v. Untied States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247,248-49 (9th Cir. 1976). Singer was
ultimately discharged pursuant to the federal civil service regulations because of his "immoral and
notorious disgraceful conduct." Id. at 249-50. Singer appealed the termination to the Civil Service
Commission and eventually brought suit in federal court. Id. at 250-51. Upon reaching the Ninth
Circuit, the court distinguished precedent that homosexuality alone was not grounds for dismissal. Id.
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challenges to marriage were unequivocal in their rejection. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson 10 8 held that although the marriage
statute did not explicitly prohibit same-sex marriage, the word "marriage" was
used in the statute as it was commonly used, "meaning the state of union
between persons of the opposite sex." 109 The court noted that the "statute is
replete with words of heterosexual import such as 'husband and wife' and 'bride
and groom'."'110 The Minnesota Supreme Court also denied the constitutional
challenge to the interpretation of the statute as being limited to heterosexual
pairs." r In so doing, the court relied upon the link between marriage and
procreation, citing the Bible's book of Genesis."1 2 The court was not troubled by
the fact that heterosexuals need not possess the desire nor the ability to
procreate in order to obtain a marriage license, concluding that a category may
be "theoretically imperfect" and remain valid."13
The Washington appellate court's opinion in Singer v. Hara1 4 is quite
similar, although the court had to grapple with the recent adoption of an Equal
Rights Amendment to the Washington state constitution. 115 The specter of
"homosexual marriage" was a subject being debated in the context of an Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) to the federal constitution, which conservatives used
effectively in their ultimately successful quest to defeat the amendment.1 6 Yet
at 252-54 (discussing Soc'y for Indiv. Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Norton
v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). Instead, the court declared that Singer was "not terminated
because of his status as a homosexual or because of any private acts of sexual preference," but because
he publicly flaunted his homosexual way of life while identifying himself as an employee of a federal
agency. Id. at 255. The court rejected Singer's First Amendment claims by concluding that the
government's interest in promoting the efficiency of public service outweighed Singer's interest in
flaunting and advocating homosexuality. Id. The United States Supreme Court would later vacate the
decision, Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977), and remand it to the
Ninth Circuit for "reconsideration in light of the position now asserted by the Solicitor General," with
Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Rehnquist dissenting. Id. at 1034.
108. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
109. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86.
110. Id. at 186 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 517.08 (1971)).
111. See id. at 187 (rejecting petitioner's equal protection argument that the state does not
impose requirement of "proved capacity.., to procreate" on heterosexual married couples).
112. Id. at 186.
113. Id. at 187.
114. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974).
115. Singer, 522 P.2d. at 1190. The Washington state ERA, adopted in 1972, provides "Equality
of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH.
CONST. art. 31, § 1 (2000).
116. For example, an advertisement by Maine STOP ERA, headed by the notorious Phyllis
Schlafly, showed "two men from New York's Gay Pride parade embracing" with text such as:
What does the word "sex" [in the language of the ERA] mean? The sex you are, male or
female, or the sex you engage in, homosexual, bisexual, heterosexual, sex with children.. or
whatever?.. .One thing is for sure: Militant homosexuals from all over America have made
the ERA issue a hot priority. Why? To be able finally to get homosexual marriage licenses,
to adopt children and raise them to get them to emulate their homosexual "parents," and to
obtain pension and medical benefits for odd-couple "spouses."
JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 137 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1986). However, as
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given the ruling in Singer, speculations that the ERA would require same-sex
marriage were ill-founded.117 The court stated that the majority of Washington
citizens who voted for the amendment did not intend that it include same-sex
marriage.11 8 Furthermore, the court held that the limiting of marriage to"opposite-sex" couples did not discriminate against the plaintiffs because of their
sex, but was simply a product of the state's recognition that the purpose of
marriage is procreation. 119
Thus, despite the promising precedent of Loving v. Virginia,120 in which the
United States Supreme Court finally declared anti-miscegenation marriage laws
unconstitutional,'12 and despite the promise of state-ERAs, the same-sex
Mansbridge also notes, such radical conservatism was not always welcome by those who were waging a
"tasteful" anti-ERA campaign, such as the president of Maine's Right to Life, who stated that
Schlafly's advertisement alienated "upscale better educated Republican types" and was unwelcome in
light of the "sentiment against homophobia" that was "running high" after two teenagers had "thrown
a homosexual man off a bridge, killing him." Id. at 136-37.
117. The argument that the ERA would guarantee same-sex marriages was most notably made in
Samuel T. Perkins & Arthur J. Silverstein, Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriages, 82 YALE L.J.
573 (1973), in which the student authors argued that the ERA would establish strict scrutiny for
gender classifications and, thus, marriage prohibitions based upon gender would be unconstitutional.
Jane Mansbridge provides an interesting analysis of the background of the scholarship and explains
how in making their argument, they discounted Senator Birch Bayh's statement that bans on same-sex
marriages were permissible under the ERA "so long as licenses were denied equally to both male and
female pairs." MANSBRIDGE, supra note 116, at 129.
118. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1194.
119. Id. at 1195.
120. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
121. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The Court's decision in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883),
was considered the precedent for allowing miscegenation statutes, and prior to Loving, the Court
three times declined to review constitutional challenges to miscegenation statutes. See Jackson v.
Alabama, 348 U.S. 888, 888 (1954) (memorandum opinion denying certiorari to Alabama Supreme
Court opinion, Jackson v. State, 77 So. 2d 114, 115 (Ala. 1954), upholding conviction for marital
miscegenation against a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment challenge); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891,
891 (1955) (holding that "inadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the parties to the
Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North Carolina and upon their return to
Virginia, and the failure of the parties to bring here all questions relevant to the disposition of the
case, prevents the constitutional issue of the validity of the Virginia statute on miscegenation tendered
here being considered 'in clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded' by such problems"); Naim, 350 U.S.
at 985 (1956) (memorandum opinion explaining that federal question not properly presented). Three
years before Loving, the Court declared unconstitutional a Florida statute criminalizing interracial
cohabitation. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (invalidating statute prohibiting
interracial cohabitation because Florida failed to show that statute was necessary component of state's
ban on interracial marriage).
Considering the applicability of Loving to same-sex marriage, the court in Baker v. Nelson noted
that Loving did not indicate that "all state restrictions upon the right to marry are beyond reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment" and further reasoned that "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense,
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon
the fundamental difference in sex." 191 N.W.2d at 187. Similarly, the court in Singer v. Hara rejected
the proffered analogy to Loving based upon their reasoning that "operative distinction lies in the
relationship which is described by the term 'marriage' itself, and that relationship is the legal union of
one man and one woman." 522 P.2d at 1191.
The precedential value of Loving to restrictions on same sex-marriage remains a topic of
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marriage argument suffered a judicial demise. The same-sex marriage issue was
subsequently relegated to the background, with nonjudicial strategies regarding
domestic partnership gaining prominence.1 22
In the mid-1990s, however, the issue of legalized same-sex marriage
regained vigor with the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin,12 3
holding that the denial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple must be
evaluated under the Hawai'i state constitution's equal protection clause, which
includes discrimination on the basis of sex.124 The Hawai'i Supreme Court
remanded the case for trial, finding that unless the state could prove a
compelling state interest, the denial of a marriage license to same-sex couples
constituted a denial of equal protection. At the 1996 trial, the Honorable Kevin
Chang found that the sex based classification in the Hawai'i marriage statute was
unconstitutional on its face and as applied under the state constitution's equal
protection clause. 125
The possibility of one state recognizing same-sex marriage raised the
probability that such marriages would be valid throughout the United States
under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 26 In light of this
contemporary debate. Compare David Oregon Coolidge, Playing The Loving Card: Same-Sex
Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201, 201-17 (1998) (arguing that Loving is apt
analogy), with Richard Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral
Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 250-301 (1998) (arguing that there are moral differences between
race and sexual orientation).
122. For a discussion of domestic partnership benefits, see, e.g., SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 115-16,
128, 139, 162-63; Raymond O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility 32 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 163 (1995); Alice Rickel, Extending Employee Benefits to Domestic Partners: Avoiding
Legal Hurdles While Staying in Tune with the Changing Definition of the Family, 16 WH1rrIER L. REV.
737 (1995). See also infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text for further discussion of domestic
partnership benefits.
123. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
124. Article I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides, "[n]o person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor
be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof
because of race, religion, sex or ancestry. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978). In addition to the equal
protection claim on which they prevailed, plaintiffs also argued that the denials of marriage licenses to
same sex couples was a denial of the right to due process under Article I, section 5, and a denial of the
right to privacy under Article I. section 6 of the Hawai'i Constitution which explicitly provides that
"the right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 50 (Haw. 1993) (quoting RAW. CONST. art. I,
§ 6 (1978)). The court, however, rejected both the due process and privacy claims, concluding that it
did not believe that "a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective
conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," or "that a right to same-sex
marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
it were sacrificed." Baehr, 852 P.2d. at 556-57.
125. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Cir. Ct. Haw. Dec. 3, 1996). Lawrence Miike
was substituted as the Director of the Department of Health, for the previous director, Lewin. Id. at
*1.
126. The Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. For a
discussion of the relationship between the full faith and credit clause and same-sex marriage in
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potential, individual states and then Congress began adopting statutes intended
to prevent recognition of legal same-sex marriages. Congress enacted the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 127 which provides that states need not
recognize same-sex marriages of other states 128 and further provides that the
federal government will only recognize marriages between members of "the
opposite sex."' 129 Likewise, individual states enacted laws that sought to defend
marriage as strictly a mixed gender enterprise. 130
Hawai'i, see generally Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: the Fundamental Right of Marriage
and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 247 (1994); Barbara J. Cox, Same-sex Marriage and Choice-of-law: If We Marry in Hawaii, Are
We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033 (1994) [hereinafter Cox, Return
Home]; Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith and
Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of
Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 (1994);
Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha Marriage? Constitutional and Choice of Law Arguments for
Recognition of Same Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1995).
127. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). For scholarly
discussions of DOMA, see generally Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's
Use of Narrative in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998) (looking at
Congressional use of narratives and rhetoric in debate over DOMA); Diane M. Guillerman,
Comment, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize
Same-Sex Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425 (1997) (examining both struggle for same-sex marriage in
homosexual community, and constitutionality of DOMA); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection
After Romer v. Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 175 (1997) (suggesting constitutional problems for DOMA due to Supreme Court Romer v. Evans
decision); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to
the States? 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 421-22 (1999) (concluding that although Section 3 of
DOMA purports to define "marriage" and "spouse" only for federal programs, in practice it
unconstitutionally imposes Congress' definitions of "marriage" and "spouse" on states).
128. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996) (refusing to recognize marriage entered
into by persons of same sex, even if marriage is recognized by another state or foreign jurisdiction,
refusing to enforce contractual rights granted by virtue of such marriage, and prohibiting same-sex
relationships from being entitled to benefits of marriage); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West
1998) (amending void and prohibited marriages section to include Subsection c which voids and
prohibits same-sex marriages) ; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 1997) (recognizing foreign and
out of state marriages with explicit exception of same-sex marriages); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101
(1997) (prohibiting and voiding marriages between persons of same gender in Subsection a, and
further qualifying in subsection d, which provides that marriage obtained or recognized outside State
between persons prohibited by subsection (a) of this section shall not constitute legal or valid marriage
within State); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West 2002) (refusing recognition of marriage between
persons of same sex, within or outside Florida, United States, or any jurisdiction, domestic or foreign,
for any purpose, and defining marriage for statutory purposes as legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (1997) (prohibiting issuance of marriage
licenses to persons of same sex); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (West 2001) (limiting issuance of marriage
licenses to male and female in § 595.2, and further providing in § 595.20 that out of state marriages that
do not meet requirements of § 595.2 will be deemed void); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1996) (defining
marriage as civil contract between two parties who are of opposite-sex, and deeming as void all other
marriages); 1998 Ky. Acts 258 (creating new section to make void any marriage between members of
same sex which occurs in another jurisdiction, rendering unenforceable any rights granted by such
marriage, and amending existing statute to prohibit as void marriage between members of same sex or
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The specter of same-sex marriage also had reverberations in Hawai'i. After
much turmoil, the Hawai'i Legislature amended the statute to be gender
specific 131 and approved a proposed constitutional amendment that gave itself
the power to decide whether to recognize same-sex marriage. 32 The voters
ratified the proposed amendment, which is now part of the Hawai'i
Constitution. 133 The trial court dismissed its pending case, 134 and it seemed that
the legacy of the same-sex marriage controversies in Hawai'i would only be the
federal and state statutes "defending" the institution of marriage against same-
between more than two persons); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1997) (prohibiting
persons of same sex from contracting marriage); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 551.1, 551.272 (West
1996) (stating "marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter
of public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique
relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and its
children" and invalidating marriage between individuals of same sex in state regardless of its being
legal in other state); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (West 1997) (prohibiting marriage between persons
of same sex, and further providing that marriage entered into by persons of same sex, either under
common law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign jurisdiction, is void in this state
and contractual rights granted by virtue of the marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this
state); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (1997) (stating marriage between persons of same gender is
prohibited and null and void from beginning, regardless of its being valid in other jurisdiction); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 451-022 (West 1997) (stating that it is state's public policy to "recognize marriage only
between a man and a woman" and prohibiting and invalidating same-sex marriages); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-401 (1997) (prohibiting marriage between persons of same sex); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2
(2002) (invalidating all same-sex marriages performed out of North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-03-01 (1997) (recognizing only marriages between male and female, and nullifying same-sex
marriages of North Dakota residents which take place out of state); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 3.1
(West 1997) (refusing to recognize same-sex marriages performed in any state); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1704 (West 1996) (stating it is public policy that marriage be between one man and one woman and
voiding same-sex marriages performed in another state); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op.
1996) (voiding same-sex marriages as against public policy of South Carolina); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
25-1-1 (Michie 1996) (stating "[m]arriage is a personal relation, between a man and a woman, arising
out of a civil contract to which the consent of parties capable of making it is necessary"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-3-113 (2001) (recognizing only marriages between one man and one woman as consistent
with public policy, voiding same-sex marriages that occur in another state and providing that
"Tennessee's marriage licensing laws reinforce, carry forward, and make explicit the long-standing
public policy of this state to recognize the family as essential to social and economic order and the
common good and as the fundamental building block of our society"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2
(1998) (prohibiting and declaring void marriage between persons of same sex); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-45 (Michie 2000) (prohibiting same-sex marriages and voiding same-sex marriages occurring in
another state); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West 2001) (stating "[i]t is a compelling interest
of the state of Washington to reaffirm its historical commitment to the institution of marriage as a
union between a man and a woman as husband and wife and to protect that institution); see also NEB.
CONST. art. 1, § 29 (2001) (allowing that only marriage between man and woman valid or recognized in
Nebraska).
131. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1999), was amended to provide that a valid marriage contract
"shall be only between a man and a woman."
132. The amendment to the Hawai'an Constitution included that "[t]he Legislature shall have
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws H.B. 117 § 2, at 1247.
133. RAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
134. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (dismissing action because ratification of state
constitutional marriage amendment reserving to Legislature power to define marriage as union of man
and woman merited such action).
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sex assaults. The Hawai'i Legislature, however, passed the Reciprocal
Beneficiaries Act, which grants some of the benefits of marriage to same-sex
couples. 135
The Vermont Supreme Court entered into this national fray at the end of
1999 in Baker v. State 36 by considering a challenge to the state's limitation on
marriage, which excluded partners of the same sex. 37 Three same-sex couples
had applied for marriage licenses and were denied by their respective town
clerks. 13 8 The first prong of the plaintiffs' challenge to this denial was the
statutory argument that the Vermont statutes do not limit marriage to opposite-
sex couples. 139 The court dispatched this contention with reference to dictionary
definitions, other gender-specific Vermont statutes, and the "common
understanding that marriage under Vermont law consists of a union between a
man and a woman." 140
The second and ultimately successful argument was that if the Vermont
statutes did limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, then the statutes were
unconstitutional, specifically violating Vermont's state constitutional "common
benefits" clause.' 4' In its lengthy opinion, the majority interpreted the common
benefits clause of the Vermont state constitution as independent of the equal
protection clause of the federal constitution,142 preceding it by nearly a century
135. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1-7 (2000). The Reciprocal Beneficiaries law states that its
purpose is "to extend certain rights and benefits which are presently available only to married couples
to couples composed of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying under state law."
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1.
136. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
137. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 868.
140. Id. at 868-69. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the court's previous decision
allowing a same-sex second-parent adoption, In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993), was authority
for an expansive interpretation of the marriage statutes. The court reasoned that its holding in
B.L.V.B. that the "spouse" exception in the Vermont statute allowing for an adoption which did not
terminate the "natural" parent's rights extended to the "natural" parent's same-sex partner was
consistent with the "general intent and spirit" of the adoption statute, while it was "far from clear that
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the Legislature's 'intent and spirit."' Baker, 744
A.2d. at 869.
141. The pertinent provision of the Vermont Constitution provides "[t]hat government is, or
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation, or
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of
persons, who are only part of that community .... VT. CONST. ch.1, art. 7. The court in Baker noted
that the plaintiffs raised additional arguments under both the state and federal constitutions, but that
the court's resolution of the issues under the common benefits clause obviated the need for their
consideration. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870 n.2.
142. Id. at 870 (noting that "it is important to emphasize at the outset that it is the Common
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution that we are construing, rather than its counterpart, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"). The
Vermont Supreme Court's explicitness is necessary to insulate its decision from United States
Supreme Court review under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), in which the Court stated that it
would take jurisdiction and assume there was a federal question when "it is not clear from the opinion
itself that the state court relied on an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly
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and differing "historically and textually. 1 4 3 The court also stressed the principle
that state constitutions may grant greater rights to individuals than required by
the federal constitution.1 "
The Vermont Supreme Court in Baker was thus able to disavow the tiers of
scrutiny relevant under a federal equal protection analysis, thus avoiding the
problems of sexual orientation being a classification that merited the lowest level
of protection, 145 and whether prohibitions of same-sex marriage were sexual
orientation or gender classifications.1 4 6 Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court
appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law." Id. at 1042. The Supreme
Court indicated that it would favor federal review if the state decision was ambiguous, for it believed
this approach would promote the development of the states' constitutional philosophies and yet
preserve the integrity of federal law. Id. at 1041. Under the "plain statement" rule, if it appears that
the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
the Court may reach the federal question on review unless the state court's opinion contains a plain
statement that its decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds. Id. at 1040-41. If
however, "the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona
fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds," the Supreme Court will not review the decision.
Id. at 1041. For critiques of Michigan v. Long, see Donald L. Bell, The Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine: Federalism, Uniformity, Equality, and Individual Liberty, 16 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 365, 380 (1988) (courting advisory opinions because "when the Supreme Court presumes
jurisdiction over state court case decided on ambiguous grounds, it trusts state court to accept its
advice," but "[w]hether the state court accepts offered advice or not, the Court's expositions on
federal law in such a case are merely advisory since they are not determinative of case's outcome");
Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent "Adequate and Independent State Grounds"
Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371, 378-79 (1991) (disrespecting federalism because "rather than
presuming that state judges have come to their own reasoned analysis of their own law, however
misguided their reliance on federal caselaw as persuasive authority might be, the Court will instead
presume that state court judges are simply too lazy to have really independently interpreted their own
laws").
143. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
144. Id. (citing State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982); State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235
(Vt. 1985); Hans A. Linde, First Things First, Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 381-82 (1980); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 717-19 (1983)).
145. Even under Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), sexual orientation classifications deserve
only rational basis review: there must be a legitimate government interest supporting the law and the
governmental classification must be rationally related to furthering that interest. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). While Romer, like Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc, 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985),
may be said to focus on the governmental animus to merit application of "heightened rational basis,"
or "rational basis with bite" or "rational basis with teeth," the scrutiny afforded remains on the lowest
tier. See, e.g., Raffi S. Baroutjian, Note, The Advent of the Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard of Equal
Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier Method of Analysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1277, 1314 (1997) (discussing Romer as rational basis with bite); Gayle Lynn
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779,
800-03 (1987) (criticizing "rational basis with bite" standard); see also William K. Kelley, Inculcating
Constitutional Values, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 161, 170 (1998) (suggesting that both Cleburne and
Romer would have been decided differently "if the Court had consistently applied the deferential
standard of rationality review"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST.
COMMENT. 397, 399 (1998) (suggesting that Court may sometimes employ "'rational basis with bite'
scrutiny").
146. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether or not gender
discrimination and sexual orientation are compelling, and if so, problems which arise from this
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was able to distance its state constitutional jurisprudence from the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process emphasis on history that proved so
devastating to the privacy arguments in Bowers v. Hardwick.147
classification.
147. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court applied the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive due process "twin star" test of "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
and "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" to Hardwick's claim that he possessed a
privacy right that was infringed by the Georgia sodomy statute. Id. at 191-92. Justice White's opinion
for the majority was exceptionally explicit in concluding that any contention that Hardwick's right was
"deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition" or as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
was "at best, facetious." Id. at 192-94 (supporting this conclusion with "background" of sodomy as
criminal offense: it was forbidden by original thirteen states in ratification of Bill of Rights, in 1868
when Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, thirty-two of thirty-seven states had criminal sodomy laws,
until 1961 all fifty states outlawed sodomy, and today twenty-four states and District of Columbia
criminalizes sodomy performed in private by consenting adults). Justice Burger, in a concurring
opinion, added "Western civilization" and Judeo-Christianity to the relevant history, by citing Roman
law, Henry VIII, and Blackstone as authorities. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing Code
Theod. 9.7.6; Code Just. 9.9.31; 25 Hen. VIII, ch. 6; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215).
While the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause does not require that the right
asserted be "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition," and the Court in Hardwick implicitly
stated that it was not reaching any equal protection issues, id. at 196 n.8, the due process conclusion of
Hardwick has been parlayed into a rationale for the denial of any sort of heightened scrutiny for
sexual orientation classifications. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(viewing Hardwick as "insurmountable barrier" to equal protection claims based on denial of position
as FBI special agent); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that although
Court decided Hardwick on due process and not equal protection, anything other than rational basis
for homosexuals would lead to "unjustified and indefensible inconsistency"); Woodward v. United
States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that after "Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted
that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm"); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating despite Hardwick's reliance on due
process grounds, it would be incongruous to accord heightened status under equal protection); Equal.
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining
how Hardwick's proscription of homosexual conduct forecloses suspect class status for practitioners of
such conduct). Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority's opinion for ignoring "inconvenient precedent" of Hardwick and arguing that Hardwick
supplies legitimate governmental interest in equal protection analysis).
For discussions of the relationship between Hardwick and equal protection pre-Romer, see Janet
Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36
UCLA L. REV. 915, 920 (1989) (distinguishing between identity and acts and arguing that Hardwick
only applies to acts); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay: Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1165-66 (1988)
(arguing that if status rather than acts are at issue, then Hardwick should not control); Tracey Rich,
Note, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Wake of Bowers v. Hardwick, 22 GA. L. REv. 773, 803
(1988) (contending that strict reading of Hardwick would allow necessary higher scrutiny for
persecuted class of homosexuals); Stephen Zamasky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and
Homosexuals' Right to Equal protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 250-53 (1993) (arguing that
Hardwick should not be bar to heightened equal protection of Colorado's Amendment Two).
For discussions of the relationship between Hardwick and equal protection post-Romer, see
Thomas Grey, Gay Rights and The Courts: The Amendment 2 Controversy: Bowers v. Hardwick
Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 373, 375 (1997) (contending that although Romer does not silently
overrule Hardwick, any reconciliation of two opinions diminishes Hardwick's authority); Katherine M.
Hamill, Note, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal Protection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 655, 681 (1997) (arguing that Romer vitiates power of Hardwick).
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Given its legal analysis, the conclusion seemed unavoidable that the state
marriage laws excluding same-sex couples violated the Vermont state
constitution. Yet the Vermont Supreme Court avoided precisely that
conclusion. Depending upon one's viewpoint, this failure to find a violation
could be characterized as either a politically savvy response similar to the
Hawai'i Legislature's reaction to Baehr148 or a mark of cowardice. 149 However
motivated, a majority of the Vermont Supreme Court held that the remedy for
the denial of "common benefits" to same-sex couples should be wrought by the
state legislature. 150
The decision in Baker thus led to the passage of Vermont's Civil Union
statute,151 which limits marriage to "one man and one woman,"'1 52 but provides
for a "civil union" in which "two eligible persons" may establish a relationship to"receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of
The Vermont Supreme Court's strategy is one of a unique distancing from these debates.
Without citing Hardwick, the court in Baker stated:
Finally, it is suggested that the long history of official intolerance of intimate same-sex
relationships cannot be reconciled with an interpretation of Article 7 that would give state-
sanctioned benefits and protection to individuals of the same sex who commit to a
permanent domestic relationship. We find the argument to be unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, to the extent that state action historically has been motivated by an animus
against a class, that history cannot provide a legitimate basis for continued unequal
application of the law. As we observed recently "equal protection of the laws cannot be
limited by eighteenth-century standards." Second, whatever claim may be made in light of
the undeniable fact that federal and state statutes-including those in Vermont-have
historically disfavored same-sex relationships, more recent legislation plainly undermines the
contention. [citing repeal of statute criminalized fellatio)]. In 1992, Vermont was one of the
first states to enact statewide legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing,
and other services based on sexual orientation. [citations omitted]. Sexual orientation is
among the categories specifically protected against hate-motivated crimes in Vermont.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, recent enactments of the General Assembly have removed
barriers to adoption by same-sex couples, and have extended legal rights and protections to
such couples who dissolve their "domestic relationship."
Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 885-86 (Vt. 1999) (citations omitted). The concurring opinion by Justice
Dooley reemphasizes the distinction between federal and Vermont law, chastising the majority for
relying on any federal law derivative of Bowers v. Hardwick because Vermont's "legal climate" is
vastly different from that considered by the Court in Hardwick. Id. at 891 (Dooley, J., concurring).
148. Baehr, 852 P.2d. at 44. The court in Baker notes that its "opinion provides greater
recognition of-and protection for--same sex relationships than has been recognized by any court of
final jurisdiction with the instructive exception of the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Baehr," and then cites
HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 for the overturning of Baehr. Baker, 744 A.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
149. Cf. Baker, 744 A.2d at 902, 904 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(criticizing court for relinquishing duty to remedy constitutional violations because of vague
disquietudes and personal speculations, and for abdicating its responsibility). But cf Barbara Cox, But
Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but
(Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REv. 113, 132-33 (2000) [hereinafter Cox, Separate but Unequal] (suggesting that
interest in maintaining heterosexual and male supremacy may have animated the justices).
150. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886-88.
151. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1206 (2002).
152. Id. § 1201(4).
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spouses." 153 To be "eligible" under the act, the parties must be of the same sex
and "therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this state." 154 The statute
also excludes from eligibility polygamous relationships 155 and incestuous
relationships. 156  The civil union statute lists the benefits, protections, and
responsibilities of the parties. 157 The Vermont statute further provides that
153. Id. §1201(2).
154. Id. § 1202(2).
155. Section 1202(1) provides that the parties "not be a party to another civil union or a
marriage." Id. § 1202(1).
156. Section 1203 provides:
(a) A woman shall not enter a civil union with her mother, grandmother, daughter,
granddaughter, sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister or mother's sister.
(b) A man shall not enter a civil union with his father, grandfather, son, grandson, brother,
brother's son, sister's son, father's brother or mother's brother.
(c) A civil union between persons prohibited from entering a civil union in subsection (a) or
(b) of this section is void.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1203 (2002).
157. Section 1204, entitled "Benefits, Protections and Responsibilities of Parties to a Civil
Union," provides:
(a) Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities
under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common
law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.
(b) A party to a civil union shall be included in any definition or use of the terms "spouse,"
"family," "immediate family," "dependent," "next of kin," and other terms that denote the
spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the law.
(c) Parties to a civil union shall be responsible for the support of one another to the same
degree and in the same manner as prescribed under law for married persons.
(d) The law of domestic relations, including annulment, separation and divorce, child
custody and support, and property division and maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil
union.
(e) The following is a nonexclusive list of legal benefits, protections and responsibilities of
spouses, which shall apply in like manner to parties to a civil union:
(1) laws relating to title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession, waiver of will,
survivorship, or other incidents of the acquisition, ownership, or transfer, inter vivos or at
death, of real or personal property, including eligibility to hold real and personal property as
tenants by the entirety (parties to a civil union meet the common law unity of person
qualification for purposes of a tenancy by the entirety);
(2) causes of action related to or dependent upon spousal status, including an action for
wrongful death, emotional distress, loss of consortium, dramshop, or other torts or actions
under contracts reciting, related to, or dependent upon spousal status;
(3) probate law and procedure, including nonprobate transfer;
(4) adoption law and procedure;
(5) group insurance for state employees under 3 V.S.A. § 631, and continuing care contracts
under 8 V.S.A. § 8005;
(6) spouse abuse programs under 3 V.S.A. § 18;
(7) prohibitions against discrimination based upon marital status;
(8) victim's compensation rights under 13 V.S.A. § 5351;
(9) workers' compensation benefits;
(10) laws relating to emergency and nonemergency medical care and treatment, hospital
visitation and notification, including the Patient's Bill of Rights under 18 V.S.A. chapter 42
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modification of the terms of civil unions is allowable only to the extent of
permissible antenuptial or other marriage agreements, 58 and that dissolutions of
civil unions shall "follow the same procedures and be subject to the same
substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution of
marriage." 159
Amongst lesbians and other sexual minorities, Vermont's statutory scheme
of civil unions is generally considered a positive development. 16° To the extent
that there is criticism, it is that the "civil union" imposes a dual system inferior to
marriage. 161 While there has certainly been debate regarding the advisability of
and the Nursing Home Residents' Bill of Rights under 33 V.S.A. chapter 73;
(11) terminal care documents under 18 V.S.A. chapter 111, and durable power of attorney
for health care execution and revocation under 14 V.S.A. chapter 121;
(12) family leave benefits under 21 V.S.A. chapter 5, subchapter 4A;
(13) public assistance benefits under state law;
(14) laws relating to taxes imposed by the state or a municipality;;
(15) laws relating to immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communication
privilege;
(16) the homestead rights of a surviving spouse under 27 V.S.A. § 105 and homestead
property tax allowance under 32 V.S.A. § 6062;
(17) laws relating to loans to veterans under 8 V.S.A. § 1849;
(18) the definition of family farmer under 10 V.S.A. § 272;
(19) laws relating to the making, revoking and objecting to anatomical gifts by others under
18 V.S.A. § 5240;
(20) state pay for military service under 20 V.S.A. § 1544;
(21) application for early vote absentee ballot under 17 V.S.A. § 2532;
(22) family landowner rights to fish and hunt under 10 V.S.A. § 4253;
(23) legal requirements for assignment of wages under 8 V.S.A. § 2235; and
(24) affirmance of relationship under 15 V.S.A. § 7.
(f) The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the
natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married
couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural parent during the
marriage.
Id. § 1204.
158. Id. § 1205.
159. Id. § 1206.
160. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Gay Couples are Welcoming Vermont Measure on Civil Union,
N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2000, at A7 (reporting general positive response and quoting one person who
had objection to marriage as "very patriarchal" but civil unions as "a completely level playing field");
Carey Goldberg, Gay and Lesbian Couples Head for Vermont to Make it Legal, But How Legal Is It?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A12 (describing positive response to civil unions); E. J. Graf, Civil
Unions are Homemaking Here for a Reason, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2001, at E3 (noting that
Vermont's civil union legislation has led to change in social climate, and prophesying that New
England will lead movement towards greater acceptance of civil unions); Elizabeth Mehren, A Historic
Day in Vermont as Civil Unions Become Legal, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at Al (stating "scores of
couples from around Vermont, and some from outside the state, will descend on town halls" on first
day civil union is available); Neil Miller, For Better, For Worse: Vermont's Civil Union Legislation has
been a Book to Gay Couples, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2001 (Magazine), at 13 (reporting that
according to Vermont Department of Vital Statistics, in eleven months law has been in effect, 2,043
civil unions have been validated).
161. See Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 136-46 (recognizing that Vermont
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same-sex marriage as a liberatory goal,1 62 the controversy has become less
pronounced in recent years. 163 Certainly, there is merit in the argument that
marriage is a civil right, 164 even if one does not accept the argument that the right
to marry will necessarily guarantee equality in other areas of civil and social
life.165
Yet I remain suspicious of marriage and the statutory creature of civil
unions. My hesitancy to embrace marriage and civil unions springs from an anti-
assimilationist perspective that problematizes equality in the context of
marriage, interrogates the coercive aspects of the phenomenon of marriage, and
questions the manner in which our individualization is linked to the state. These
inquiries will be examined in turn.
statutory structure creates a dual, unequal system); Andrew Sullivan, State of the Union, NEW
REPUBLIC, May 8, 2000, at 18, 22 (proposing that because institution of civil unions essentially creates
two-tiered system, with one marriage model clearly superior to other, it is halfway measure that
perpetuates discrimination). Another criticism voiced by some would-be participants is the state's
potential misuse of the information. See, e.g., Mubarak Dahir, State of the Unions, THE ADVOCATE,
May 23, 2000, at 56 (quoting Vermont lesbian as saying civil union law "codifies us as second-class
citizens" and expressing "reservations about registering with the government as queer").
162. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Introduction to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON xvii, xix-
xxvi (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (presenting debate over same-sex marriage); Barbara J. Cox, The
Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage as an Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L.
REV. 155, 162-67 (1997) (advocating same-sex marriage); Paula Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment
on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 130-38 (1996) (arguing against same-sex
marriage as means to liberation); Steven K. Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505, 529 (1993) (arguing against same-sex marriage as means to liberation); Nancy D. Polikoff,
We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the
Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1541-48 (1993) (arguing against
same sex marriage as means to liberation); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 567, 581-610 (1994) (discussing controversy and defending same-sex marriage as appropriate
goal).
163. Accord Carey Goldberg, Gay and Lesbian Couples Head for Vermont to Make it Legal, But
How Legal Is It?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 23, 2000, at A12 (describing change in lesbian and gay
communities' attitudes toward marriage and civil union).
164. As I have previously quoted, "[flrom the perspective of the state, marriage is a civil relation
of the highest order; withholding marriage is thus an indication of the status of any persons for whom
marriage is not legally available." SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 143.
165. Compare Evan Wolfson, supra note 162, at 581 (noting how "Baehr shifted the very ground
underlying gay people's second-class status, and one of the, if not the major, barriers to our full and
equal citizenship has cracked wide open"), with Laura F. Edwards, "The Marriage Covenant is at the
Foundation of all Our Rights": The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina after Emancipation,
14 LAW & HIST. REV. 81, 85 (1996) stating:
Conservative white lawmakers saw marriage as a way to consolidate state power over freed
people and compel them to fulfill domestic obligations, but African-Americans saw marriage
as an effective way to protect the institutional integrity of their families and buttress their
claims to a range of public fights .... The laws governing marriage and the family formed
the central support in a patriarchal legal framework that had justified the subordination of
poor white and African-American men as well as women before the war and could still be
mobilized to serve the same ends.
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B. Questions of Equality
Constitutional and political interests in equality are integral to the
arguments about same-sex marriage and civil unions. Litigation and scholarship
advocating same-sex marriage has relied upon equal protection principles with
varying degrees of success. A close examination of these constitutional
arguments, however, reveals some of the ruptures in the respect and recognition
they actually afford to sexual minorities.
Moreover, despite pronouncements of interests in a rigorous application of
equal protection doctrine and theory, the advocacy of same-sex marriage has
failed to adequately explain or address the exclusion of others from the
institutions of marriage or quasi-marital institutions. The first exclusion occurs
on the basis of gender, for just as same-sex couples are excluded from marriage,
in many instances different-sex couples are excluded from quasi-marital
institutions meant to apply to same-sex couples. Equal protection doctrine and
our notions of equality have not proved capable of the task of divorcing
considerations of gender from marital and quasi-marital institutions. The next
subsection thus considers the problem of sex-equality.
Additional ruptures in equal protection doctrine and theorizing in the
context of marriage are also evident with regard to two long-standing
prohibitions: marriage between relatives and polygamous marriages. These
prohibitions are interestingly continued in same-sex marriage regimes, which
continue to prohibit marriage between same-sex relatives and limit same-sex
unions to two people at one time. Although same-sex marriage advocates have
attempted to articulate distinctions between same-sex unions and incestuous or
polygamous unions, notions of equal protection and equality are applicable to all
of these relationships. Separate subsequent subsections consider prohibitions on
marriage between relatives and prohibitions of polygamous marriages.
1. Sex-Equality
When considering the relationship between gender equality and sexual
orientation equality, it is important to note that there are serious arguments
concerning whether or not sexual orientation discrimination and gender
discrimination are commensurate. 166 Nevertheless, even if one believes that
166. Sexual orientation discrimination as gender discrimination scholarship asserts that
contemporary condemnation of homosexual behavior is directed primarily at the violation of
prescribed gender roles, not at sexual acts. See Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning
of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 188, 196 (noting that "[h]omosexual relationships challenge
dichotomous concepts of gender.... [t]hese relationships challenge the notion that social traits, such
as dominance and nurturance, are naturaly linked to one sex or the other"). The relationship
between sexual orientation and gender discrimination is most explicitly theorized by Andrew
Koppelman. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 202 (1994) (stating that "[t]he effort to end discrimination
against gays should be understood as a necessary part of the larger effort to end the inequality of the
sexes"). Historically "sex," "gender," and "sexual orientation," have been conflated, something that
Francisco Valdes argues has "worked for the good of the few and to the detriment of the many." See
Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual
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sexual orientation discrimination is best theorized as gender discrimination, or
actually flows from gender discrimination, many problems are apparent. For
example, the Hawai'i Supreme Court's recognition of same-sex marriage was
predicated entirely upon the rationale of gender equality, but it would be
difficult to argue that the court's disavowal of sexual minorities in a torturous
and disingenuous footnote is an expression of equality. 167 Under the Hawai'i
Supreme Court's opinion, lesbianism is an inconvenient aspect of the case, not
something that merits equal treatment.
The Vermont Supreme Court in Baker is somewhat more forthright in its
recognition and consideration of equality for sexual minorities. Nevertheless,
the court primarily uses the language "same-sex couples," although this term is
irrelevant given its rejection of the notion that the marriage statute makes a
gender classification.1 68 Most importantly, however, the court's solution is to
decide that sexual minorities are entitled to the state-awarded benefits but not
the status of marriage, an institution that remains reserved for heterosexuals. As
Barbara Cox has argued, this is a Plessyesque separate but (un)equal
jurisprudence. 169 Yet the Vermont Supreme Court would presumably reject any
Orientation To Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 161-62 (1996) (tracing and criticizing early
formalization of Euro-American sex/gender system). However, I do not believe that this means that
sexual orientation is commensurate with gender any more than it means that gender is commensurate
with sexual orientation. See SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 81-83 (summarizing propositions that conflating
gender with sexual orientation could result in profound legal progress for sexual minorities, or
alternatively, that it could result in denial of significant legal protection to sexual minorities and to
women).
167. The Baehr court stated:
"Homosexual" and "same-sex" marriages are not synonymous; by the same token, a
"heterosexual" same-sex marriage is, in theory, not oxymoronic. A "homosexual" person is
defined as "[o]ne sexually attracted to another of the same sex." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 839 (16th ed. 1989). "Homosexuality" is "sexual desire or behavior
directed toward a person or persons of one's own sex." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 680 (1989). Conversely,
"heterosexuality" is "[s]exual attraction for one of the opposite sex," TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 827, or "sexual feeling or behavior directed toward a person or
persons of the opposite sex." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE at 667. Parties to "a union between a man and a woman" may or
may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be either
homosexuals or heterosexuals.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51 n.ll.
168. The majority opinion in Baker takes pains to disagree with the concurring and dissenting
opinion of Justice Johnson that gender discrimination is an appropriate analysis, concluding that the
statute is facially gender-neutral that cannot be traced to a discriminatory purpose. Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999). As the court states, "It is one thing to show that long-repealed marriage
statutes subordinated women to men within the marital relation. It is quite another to demonstrate
that the authors of the marriage laws excluded same-sex couples because of incorrect and
discriminatory assumptions about gender roles or anxiety about gender-role confusion." Id.
169. See generally Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149. Cox analogizes the Vermont civil
union statute to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). She argues that just as Justice Harlan,
dissenting in Plessy, noted that the "thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad
coaches will not mislead anyone," so too, the "joy of receiving long-withheld governmental
recognition and protection cannot lessen the harm caused by the 'thin disguise' of equality the
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analogies to Plessy on the basis that sexual orientation discrimination is not as
"evil" as race discrimination.1 70  Indeed, Barbara Cox would agree that
"compulsory heterosexuality"'' 71 and racism are not the same,'172 as would many,
if not most, legal scholars. 173 Yet to recognize that race and sexuality have
different valences, histories, and experiences, which overlap and coalesce in a
variety of ways in specific individuals, 174 is not to accept the court's rationale for
Vermont Legislature created by segregating those relationships into the separate institution of civil
unions." Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 126-27 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). Furthermore, Cox points to two separate instances in which the separate
institution of civil unions is not equal to marriage: civil unions are not recognized by other states and
civil unions are not recognized by the federal government. Id. at 137-46. Of course, Professor Cox
recognizes that under DOMA and state DOMAs, the federal government and many states would not
recognize any marriages that Vermont may have permitted between same-sex couples, but she argues
that the civil union solution may prevent DOMA and state DOMAs from being challenged. See Cox,
Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 140, 145-46. See also supra notes 126-30 and accompanying
text for a discussion of DOMA.
A similar argument was made pre-Baker by same-sex marriage advocate Evan Wolfson, in the
context of comparing marriage to domestic partnerships, noting that domestic partnership is "second
class" and is "unequal to marriage in the sense that 'separate but unequal"' is "inherently unequal,"
and further that the benefits of domestic partnerships are not equal to those provided married
partners. Wolfson, supra note 162, at 606-07 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)).
170. Baker, 744 A.2d at 887. The court was responding to the invocation by Justice Johnson of a
passage from a case involving the racial desegregation of public parks and recreational facilities, in
which the Court declared that the "basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the here and
now," which should be "promptly fulfilled." Id. at 897 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963)). The majority in Baker stated that the
analogy between racial discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination "is flawed. We do not
confront in this case the evil that was institutionalized racism, an evil that was widely recognized well
before the Court's decision in Watson and its more famous predecessor Brown v. Board of
Education." Id. at 887 (citation omitted).
171. See infra notes 345-469 and accompanying text for a discussion of compulsory matrimony.
172. See Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 128 n.70 (stating "[n]othing in this essay is
meant to imply that racism and heterosexism/homophobia are the same" and noting that African-
Americans experience generational effects of slavery and Jim Crow laws, while such generational
effects are not experienced by lesbians and gay men, whose parents were most likely heterosexual, and
that gay men and lesbians are ostracized by their families in ways that African-Americans are not).
173. Cf Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561, 586, 603-04 (1997) (criticizing William
Eskridge's recent works on same sex marriage as "a perfect example of gay and lesbian essentialism
and the problematic impact it has upon theory" and Marc Fajer's lack of discussion of racial
backgrounds of individuals whose stories he re-tells as implying "a unitary gay experience, one
unaffected by racial differences").
174. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Beyond the Rhetoric of "Dirty Laundry":
Examining the Value of Internal Criticism Within Progressive Social Movements and Oppressed
Communities, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 185 (1999) (discussing internal criticism in progressive political
movements for equality); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" For "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual
Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000) (commenting that sexual
orientation discrimination is not treated as racial discrimination even though it should be); Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and
Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (addressing issue of "heternormativity" and dismissal of
sexualization of race); Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 673 (2000) (focusing on racial dominance and its interplay with equality of gender and sexual
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
relegating sexual minorities to a separate institution. Professor Cox's analysis of
the separate and "parallel" educational institution offered women by Virginia in
VMI, and rejected by the Supreme Court, is apposite. 75
The court in Baker would also reject any analogies to Plessy on the basis of
intent. As the court stated: "Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the exclusion
of same-sex couples from the definition of marriage was intended to discriminate
against women, or lesbians, or gay men, as racial segregation was designed to
maintain the pernicious doctrine of white supremacy."' 176 While the question of
intent is certainly arguable, 177 even a concession regarding this issue does not
orientation); Peter Kwan, Invention, Inversion and Intervention: The Oriental Woman in The World Of
Suzie Wong, M. Butterfly, and The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, 5 AsIAN L.J. 99 (1998)
(denouncing chronic subordination of Asian women in American films); Francisco Valdes, Queer
Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of
"Sexual Orientation", 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (1997) (expressing need to "collectively and mutually"
embrace "engagement of race and ethnicity" as sexual orientation legal theory continues to develop);
Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities & Inter-
Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995) (concluding that legal theorists
involved in sexual minority scholarship "must learn to negotiate sex and race, as well as sexism and
racism"). See also Barbara Smith, Where's The Revolution? Lesbian and Gay Movement, THE
NATION, July 5, 1993, at 12, noting:
'Queer' activists focus on 'queer' issues, and racism, sexual oppression and economic
exploitation do not qualify, despite the fact that the majority of 'queers' are people of color,
female or working class. When other oppressions or movements are cited, it's to build a
parallel case for the validity of lesbian and gay rights or to expedite alliances with
mainstream political organizations. Building unified, ongoing coalitions that challenge the
system and ultimately prepare a way for revolutionary change simply isn't what 'queer'
activists have in mind.
Id.; see also Letters to the Editor, SF WEEKLY, Feb. 14, 2001, at 20 (writing that "[w]hen our
'community' is wrought with racism, sexism, gender bias, classism, ableism, etc., it is crucial that we
take a step back and focus on breaking down these systems of oppression within our movement,
before we can begin to focus on fighting the conservative right").
175. See Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 128-31 (citing United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515 (1996). See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for additional discussion of VMI.
Her analysis does not escape the racial paradigm of equal protection, however, as Professor Cox
emphasizes Justice Ginsberg's comparison in VMI between the separate military institution created
for women by Virginia and the separate law school established for African-Americans by Texas,
previously held unconstitutional by the Court. Cox, Separate but Unequal, supra note 149, at 129-30
(quoting VMI, 518 U.S. at 553-54 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)). Cox argues:
By excluding women from VMI, the government of Virginia encouraged its citizens to
believe that they had no place in a school as rigorous as VMI. By excluding people of color
from the University of Texas Law School, the government of Texas encouraged its citizens
to believe that they had no place in a school as demanding as the University of Texas. By
excluding same-sex couples from marriage, the government of Vermont is encouraging its
citizens that they have no place in an institution as central to society as marriage.
Id. at 130. For Cox, Justice Ginsberg's observation that the arguments for preserving all-male
educational institutions were "uncomfortably similar" to the arguments for preserving all-white
educational institutions, should be extended to a recognition that the arguments for preserving all-
heterosexual marriage are also "uncomfortably similar" to the arguments for preserving both the all-
male and all-white institutions. Id. at 131 (citing VMI, 518 U.S. at 535 n.8).
176. Baker, 744 A.2d at 887 (emphasis added).
177. As Judge Freeman stated in Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 360 (D.C. App.
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address the problem. The Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans178 noted that
animosity toward a specific group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
purpose. 179  Absent such specificity as the Court found in Colorado's
Amendment Two,180 however, present equal protection doctrine does not focus
on the protection of members of those groups that have borne the brunt of
animus by dominant society, but considers "classifications" rather than classes of
oppressed peoples. 181
An "affirmative action" statute for marriage, perhaps one allowing
members of racial minority groups to prove age eligibility under a relaxed
standard, would be subject to the same level of scrutiny under current doctrine
as the miscegenation statute at issue in Loving. The Court's determination in
Loving that the Virginia statute was a measure "designed to maintain White
Supremacy" 182 supported the Court's conclusion not only that the racial
classification drawn by the miscegenation statute was "invidious
discrimination," 183  but that the state could not satisfy the necessary
governmental interest necessary to sustain the racial classification. 184
1995) (concurring in part and dissenting in part), "the fact that the legislature, in adopting the
marriage statute, did not have homosexuals in mind does not mean the state lacks a discriminatory
purpose; an absolute prohibition, whether explicit or implied, resulting in discrimination in fact, has an
inherent discriminatory purpose, even if the legislature did not recognize it."
178. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
179. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
180. As the Court interpreted it, Colorado's Amendment Two made "a general announcement
that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law" and that this inflicted
"immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may
be claimed for it." Id. at 635.
181. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Equal Protection's lack of
protection to oppressed groups.
182. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 8. The state of Virginia argued that "because its miscegenation statutes punish equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their
reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race." Id.
The Court "reject[ed] the notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial
classifications is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription
of all invidious racial determinations." Id.
184. The Court's analysis is not a model of clarity in this regard. The Court criticizes the state's
reliance upon a previous state court decision by stating, "the state court concluded that the State's
legitimate purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption
of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride,' obviously an
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy." Id. at 7 (citing Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756
(Va. 1955)). The Loving Court's citation does not include the subsequent history of Naim, which
would reveal a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S.
891,891 (1955) (citing Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct., 331 U.S. 549, 584 (1947)). Rescue Army held that:
[Ilnadequacy of the record as to the relationship of the parties to the Commonwealth of
Virginia at the time of the marriage in North Carolina and upon their return to Virginia, and
the failure of the parties to bring here all questions relevant to the disposition of the case,
prevents the constitutional issue of the validity of the Virginia statute on miscegenation
tendered here being considered in clean-cut and concrete form, unclouded by such
problems.
Naim, 350 U.S. at 891 (citing Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 584) (memorandum opinion stating that federal
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The Court's view in Loving that the "clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States,"1185 has been banished by the more recent
formulation by the Court in Adarand. Adarand asserted that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "persons, not groups"'186 and the standard of review cannot
depend upon the impossible task of distinguishing between "invidious" and
"benign" classifications. 187 Thus, unless a statute is neutral and seemingly makes
no classification 188-a construction of the Vermont marriage statute that the
Vermont Supreme Court in Baker rejected 189-any legislative intent is relevant
only to assessing the potency of the governmental interests and the manner in
which they are served by the means chosen. 190 Under Adarand, a "bad" intent,
question not properly presented).
The Court in Loving also states that its rejection of the "'equal application"' argument is a
rejection of the rational basis test in favor of the "most rigid scrutiny." Loving, 388 U.S. at 8, 11
(quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)), and that there is "patently no
legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification." Id. at 11 (Stewart, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 10 (citing, chronologically, The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)).
186. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
187. Justice O'Connor, this time writing for the majority, quotes from her plurality opinion in
Croson that "there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics." Id. at 226 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion)). Justice Stevens, dissenting, argues with this premise:
The Court's explanation for treating dissimilar race-based decisions as though they were
equally objectionable is a supposed inability to differentiate between "invidious" and
"benign" discrimination. But the term "affirmative action" is common and well understood.
Its presence in everyday parlance shows that people understand the difference between good
intentions and bad.
Id. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. The problem of a neutral statute which has a discriminatory impact was addressed by the
Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), in which the Court considered a challenge to a
District of Columbia test for police officers which had a disproportionate failure rate for minority
applicants when compared to non-minority applicants. The Court held that in order to state an equal
protection challenge, evidence of discriminatory intent was required in addition to discriminatory
impact. Id. at 239-42. Accord Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14
(1977) (noting in addition to impact, there must be invidious discriminatory purpose, although
deciding whether such purpose was motivating factor "demands a sensitive inquiry").
189. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868-69 (Vt. 1999). See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying
text for a discussion of how the Vermont Supreme Court avoided an equal protection analysis in
considering same-sex marriage.
190. The Court in Adarand justified its use of the "consistent" standard of strict scrutiny for all
racial classifications, whether arguably benign or invidious, by stating that the "point of carefully
examining the interest asserted by the government in support of a racial classification, and the
evidence offered to show that the classification is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from
illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228. Thus, on this
view, the government's intent and motives are not relevant to determine the level of scrutiny, but only
to assess whether the government's asserted interests satisfy the compelling standard and whether the
racial classification narrowly serves those interests. Importantly, however, this is not the majority view
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such as the maintenance of white supremacy or discrimination "against women
or lesbians and gay men,"1 91 should be relevant only to assail the veracity of any
governmental interests proffered by the state. 192
In sum, constitutional equal protection doctrine raises real doubts regarding
Vermont's civil union solution. Moreover, these doubts arise from notions of
formal equality that admittedly have great appeal. 193 Yet the preoccupation with
one's own equality measured against a dominant majority, here sexual minorities
measured against heterosexuals, skews our theorizing. One need not abandon
equal protection and equal theorizing to gain a different perspective; merely
shifting the focus of interrogations regarding equality provides a very different
analysis.
While the Vermont Civil Union statute includes sexual minorities, it
excludes others through its requirements for civil union status. First, the statute
excludes heterosexual couples because they are qualified for marriage under the
marital statutes. 194  Whether or not heterosexual couples desire to avail
themselves of marriage is irrelevant under the statute. For example, if a
heterosexual couple believed that marriage is objectionable because of its
patriarchal history, but decided that because a civil union did not partake of that
particular history it was a better institution to foster equality among the
parties, 9 5 that belief is not honored under the civil union scheme. Likewise,
of the Court, for Justice Scalia joined in the Court's opinion "except insofar as it might be
inconsistent" with his concurring opinion. Id. at 204. Scalia's concurring opinion is inconsistent on
precisely this point, stating that in his view "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction." Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
191. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 887 (commenting on flawed analogy made by plaintiffs comparing
sexual discrimination to racism discrimination as means of subordination).
192. Thus, the intent of white supremacy would be relevant to expose the falsity of the state of
Virginia's asserted interest in maintaining racial purity of all races, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7
(1967), as the intent of discrimination against lesbians and gays would be relevant to expose the falsity
of the state of Vermont's asserted interests in "furthering the link between procreation and child
rearing," Baker, 744 A.2d at 884, "'promoting child rearing in a setting that provides both male and
female role models', minimizing the legal complications of surrogacy contracts and sperm donors,
'bridging differences' between the sexes, discouraging marriages of convenience for tax, housing or
other benefits, maintaining uniformity with marriage in other states, and generally protecting marriage
from 'destabilizing changes."' Id. at 884.
193. Using an automobile as an emblem for marriage, the argument might be as follows. One
might criticize the Ford Pinto for its design flaws which caused injuries and accidents resulting in
protracted litigation, see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Gary
T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991), and refuse to
purchase a Ford Pinto. It is easy to imagine, however, one's reaction to a legal system which limited
the availability of Ford Pintos to a certain select group. For those outside the group, the Ford Pinto
would become a symbol of their exclusion. See SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 149. See infra note 371 for an
argument using the automobile analogy in the context of coercion in marriage.
194. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (1999). The statute provides that for "a civil union to be
established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that the parties to a civil union satisfy" criteria including,
in subsection (2), that the parties "[b]e of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws
of this state." Id.
195. See infra notes 345-469 and accompanying text for a discussion of compulsory matrimony.
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despite the court's emphasis on tangible benefits, 196 if there were tangible
benefits that would be lost if the parties married but not if they entered a civil
union, 197 that interest is not accommodated. Regardless of whether the parties
can articulate any particular injury, the civil union exclusion of heterosexual
couples should offend our notions of formal equality in the same manner that the
marital exclusion of lesbian and gay couples offends us. The equal protection
principle of "consistency," as articulated in Adarand, requires that we be just as
affronted when members of dominant groups are discriminated against as when
members of minority groups are discriminated against. 198
The exclusion of heterosexual couples by Vermont's Civil Union scheme is
not unique. For example, after the Hawai'i legislature reserved marriage for
male-female couples, 99 it enacted the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which
extends protections to same-sex couples and to some others who are prohibited
from entering into marriage, but excludes those who can legally marry.2 00
196. The court in Baker concluded that the "legal benefits and protections flowing from a
marriage license are of such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on
public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the deprivation cannot
seriously be questioned." Baker, 744 A.2d at 884. Specifically mentioning that benefits under
Vermont law such as the right to receive a portion of the estate of a spouse who dies intestate and
protection against disinheritance through elective share provisions; preference in being appointed as
the personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate; the right to bring a lawsuit for the wrongful
death of a spouse; the right to bring an action for loss of consortium; the right to workers'
compensation survivor benefits; the right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public
employees, including health, life, disability, and accident insurance; the opportunity to be covered as a
spouse under group life insurance policies issued to an employee; the opportunity to be covered as the
insured's spouse under an individual health insurance policy; the right to claim an evidentiary privilege
for marital communications; homestead rights and protections; the presumption of joint ownership of
property and the concomitant right of survivorship; hospital visitation and other rights incident to the
medical treatment of a family member; and the right to receive, and the obligation to provide, spousal
support, maintenance, and property division in the event of separation or divorce. Id. at 883-84
(citations to statutes omitted).
197. The California domestic partnership scheme takes a different approach. CAL. FAM. CODE §
297(6) (West Supp. 2002), which states the requirements for domestic partnership, allows the
satisfaction of one of the criteria as being met by either "[b]oth persons are members of the same sex"
or:
One or both of the persons meet the eligibility criteria under Title II of the Social Security
Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for old-age insurance benefits or Title XVI of the
Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1381 for aged individuals.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, persons of opposite-sexes may not
constitute a domestic partnership unless one or both of the persons are over the age of 62.
Id. This provision thus recognizes that under the present federal social security regulations, a party
could lose certain survivor benefits if she or he remarries.
198. See supra notes 4649 and accompanying text for a discussion of current articulations of the
level of scrutiny afforded equal protection analysis.
199. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Hawai'i has
considered the question of same-sex marriage, both statutorily and in caselaw.
200. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1-572C-7 (2000). The Hawai'i legislature stated in its findings of
the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act that:
[T]here are many individuals who have significant personal, emotional, and economic
relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by such legal restrictions from
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Likewise, domestic partnership ordinances and policies can limit protection to
persons of the same sex,20 1 although this seems to be the exception rather than
the rule.2°2
The exclusion of opposite-sex couples from quasi-marital relations raises
the same sort of equality issues as limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and
has been subject to similar litigation. 20 3 For example, the City of Chicago's
exclusively same-sex domestic partnership policy has been challenged,
unsuccessfully, on at least two occasions. In Cleaves v. City of Chicago,2 4 Mr.
Cleaves was terminated from his employment for unauthorized leave and false
statements after he took leave to attend the funeral of a man whom he described
as his "father-in-law," but who was actually the (step)father of his female
marrying. For example, two individuals who are related to one another, such as a widowed
mother and her unmarried son, or two individuals who are of the same gender. Therefore,
the legislature believes that certain rights and benefits presently available only to married
couples should be made available to couples comprised of two individuals who are legally
prohibited from marrying one another.
Id. § 572C-2. This extension, however, is explicitly limited by another subsection which provides, in
part, that "[in order to enter into a valid reciprocal beneficiary relationship, it shall be necessary that:
(1) Each of the parties be at least eighteen years old; (2) Neither of the parties be married nor a party
to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship." Id. § 572C-4.
201. For discussions of this problem, see generally Dee Ann Habegger, Living In Sin and the
Law: Benefits For Unmarried Couples Dependent Upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REv. 991
(2000); Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex-Discrimination
Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561 (2000); William V. Vetter, Restrictions On Equal
Treatment Of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (1995); Renee M. Scire and
Christopher A. Raimondi, Note, Employment Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357 (2000); Debbie Zielinski, Note, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Why
Not Offer them to Same-Sex Partners and Unmarried Opposite Sex Partners?, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 281
(1999).
202. See Scire & Raimondi, supra note 201, at 369 (citing Shawn Zeller, All in the So-Called
Family, NAT'L J., September 19, 1998, at 2180-81) (stating "[a]pproximately seven municipalities,
including Baltimore, Chicago, New Orleans, and Philadelphia, have allowed only same-sex couples to
be covered under domestic partnership benefits. On the other hand, at least thirty-four municipalities,
including New York and Detroit, now offer health care benefits broadly to both same-sex and
opposite-sex unmarried couples").
203. Municipal domestic partnership policies and ordinances have also been attacked more
broadly, by persons who are seeking to have the provision declared invalid rather than to be included
within its protections. See, e.g., Atlanta v. Morgan, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997) (holding valid revised
Atlanta ordinance extending employee benefits to "dependents," which may include domestic
partners, as within city's authority); Atlanta v. McKinney, 454 S.E.2d 517 (Ga. 1995) (holding invalid
original Atlanta ordinance extending employee benefits to "domestic partners" of city employees as
exceeding city's authority); Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding invalid City Council resolution granting reimbursement for domestic partners' medical costs
as exceeding city's authority); Slattery v. City of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (upholding New York City's domestic partnership ordinance as within city's power and not
encroaching on state's exclusive power to regulate marriage).
204. Cleaves v. City of Chicago resulted in two reported opinions, Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 68
F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 1999) [hereinafter Cleaves II]; Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 21 F. Supp. 2d 858,
961 (N.D. I11. 1998) [hereinafter Cleaves 1]. See Paul R. Lynd, supra note 201, at 593-96, for a cogent
discussion of Cleaves H.
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domestic partner.2 5 Acknowledging that Cleaves would have been entitled to
leave if his domestic partner was a man, and therefore within the City of
Chicago's same-sex domestic partnership ordinance, the district court
nevertheless rejected the argument that the termination was sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII. 206 The court's reasoning-that the ordinance treats men
and women precisely the same-echoes the reasoning of judicial rejections of
challenges to marriage by same-sex couples. 20 7
More recently, in Irizarry v. Board of Education, the Seventh Circuit
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Chicago Board of Education's same-sex
domestic partnership policy.2 8  Richard Posner's opinion for the panel is
characteristically filled with rhetorical flourish and social policy, while somewhat
scant on legal reasoning. Applying the rational basis test for equal protection
because "heterosexuals cohabitating outside of marriage" have not been subject
to irrational or invidious discrimination-supported by the "history of
disapproval of (nonmarital) cohabitation, and some states still criminalize
it" 2 9-Posner finds many rational purposes for the policy, including limiting
costs,210 efficiency, 21 and "the nationwide policy in favor of marriage. '" 212
205. Cleaves II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 966-67.
206. Id. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, prohibits discrimination
based upon sex, but the court noted that it does not prohibit discrimination based upon marital status,
unless the marital status is combined with sex, as in the case of an airline rule prohibiting female flight
attendants from being married, but allowing males to be married. Cleaves II, 68 F. Supp. at 967 (citing
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cit. 1971)).
In a similar challenge to a private employer's domestic partnership policy limited to same-sex
couples, the court concluded that discrimination on the basis of ability to marry one's partner rather
than discrimination on the basis of sex, was at issue and therefore the policy did not violate Title VII.
Foray v. Bell Atlantic, 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
207. Compare Cleaves II, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (providing that excluding unmarried heterosexual
couples from domestic partner programs does not violate Title VII because male and female
unmarried heterosexual are treated alike), with Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d. 1187, 1190-91, 1195 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1974) (holding that denying marriage license to homosexual does not violate state Equal
Protection clause because male and female homosexuals are treated alike), and Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 2-12 (1967) (using similar logic to declare miscegenation statute unconstitutional).
208. 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001).
209. Id. at 610 (citations omitted).
210. In fact, for the year and a half the policy had been in effect, "only nine employees out of
some 45,000 had signed up for domestic-partner benefits." Id. at 607. As Judge Posner expresses it:
[b]ecause homosexuals are a small fraction of the population, because the continuing stigma
of homosexuality discourages many of them from revealing their sexual orientation, and
because nowadays a significant number of heterosexuals substitute cohabitation for marriage
in response to the diminishing stigma of cohabitation, extending domestic-partner benefits to
mixed-sex couples would greatly increase the expense of the program.
Id.
Yet costs are not automatically correlated with number of persons enrolled. As Debbie Zielinski
notes, while a company's choice to extend benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic
partners will increase enrollment in a range of one to ten percent, program costs will nevertheless vary,
and costs for domestic partners tend to be lower than those for married counterparts, perhaps because
of relative youth, better health, and fewer children. Zielinski, supra note 201, at 293.
211. While Judge Posner does not use this term, he states that it was "rational for the board to
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Preserving the primacy of marriage is the most popular rationale for
excluding opposite-sex couples, who can presumably marry, from domestic
partnership or similar arrangements. 2 13 For Posner, the importance of marriage
predictably inheres in its tangible benefits.21 4 For others, including one gay
advocate, the significance of marriage as a "bedrock institution, unique among
all other forms of interpersonal relationship," is attributable not to the concrete
benefits, but to a shared recognition of its value as a "good. ' 2 15 Equality is not
refuse to extend domestic-partnership benefits to persons who can if they wish marry and by doing so
spare the board from having to make a factual inquiry into the nature of their relationship." Irizarry,
251 F.3d. at 610.
212. Id. at 607.
213. Accord Habegger, supra note 201, at 1009-10 (discussing conservative argument that
bestowing benefits on unmarried heterosexual couples would weaken marriage); Scire & Raimondi,
supra note 201, at 370 (discussing various proponents of this view including Massachusetts governor
Paul Celluci).
214. Posner emphasized a cost-benefit analysis of sex. See RICHARD POSNER, SEX & REASON
(1992) (applying "positive economic theory of sexual behavior" by discussing sexuality and sexual
practices in terms of their costs, such as search costs, and benefits, such as procreation, hedonism, and
sociability). This outlook is evident in Irizarry:
[S]o far as heterosexuals are concerned, the evidence that on average married couples live
longer, are healthier, earn more, have lower rates of substance abuse and mental illness, are
less likely to commit suicide, and report higher levels of happiness-that marriage civilizes
young males, confers economies of scale and of joint consumption, minimizes sexually
transmitted disease, and provides a stable and nourishing framework for child rearing.
Irizarry, 251 F.3d. at 607 (citations omitted).
215. James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to Same-Sex
Couples, 8 LAW & SEX. 649, 652 (1998). Given his view regarding the "superior status" of marriage,
id. at 654, Mr. Donovan is understandably less than sympathetic to heterosexuals who seek domestic
partnership rather than marriage. Responding to the argument that some heterosexuals might not be
"ready" to marry, Donovan describes these people as "pathetic" and "overaged children" who "want
the perks without the works." Id. at 662. Donovan similarly discounts any philosophical objections
based upon the sexist history of the institution, saying that marriage is "decided today by the
participating parties" and that "[n]o one forces any couple to structure its private relationship along
gender-stereotypical lines." Id. at 663.
This is not to imply, however, that most queer advocates agree with Mr. Donovan's position. For
example, in Irizarry, the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed an amicus brief supporting
Ms. Irizarry's challenge to Chicago's same-sex domestic partnership policy. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 608-
09. Judge Posner explains the situation thusly:
The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund has filed an amicus curiae brief surprisingly
urging reversal-surprisingly because Lambda is an organization for the promotion of
homosexual rights, and if it is the law that domestic-partnership benefits must be extended to
heterosexual couples, the benefits are quite likely to be terminated for everyone lest the
extension to heterosexual cohabiters impose excessive costs and invite criticism as
encouraging heterosexual cohabitation and illegitimate births and discouraging marriage and
legitimacy. But Lambda is concerned with the fact that state and national policy encourages
(heterosexual) marriage in all sorts of ways that domestic-partner health benefits cannot
begin to equalize. Lambda wants to knock marriage off its perch by requiring the board of
education to treat unmarried heterosexual couples as well as it treats married ones, so that
marriage will lose some of its luster. This is further evidence of the essentially symbolic or
political rather than practical significance of the board's policy. Lambda is not jeopardizing a
substantial benefit for homosexuals because very few of them want or will seek the benefit.
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only a lesser benefit or good under these theories, but inequality in the form of
exclusionary practices is necessary to maintain the special status of marriage.
2. Familial Marriage (Incest)
Civil union and domestic partnership schemes may not only contain gender
exclusions, but also incorporate exclusions based upon familial relationships. 216
These exclusions mirror state statutory schemes regulating marriage, which
typically declare incestuous marriages void.217 Additionally, states generally
criminalize incestuous marriages and sexual relations. 218
Id. This explanation does not comport with Lambda's "Marriage Project" or its positions as co-
counsel or amicus challenging the statues and seeking same-sex marriage in Hawai'i and Vermont. See
Lambda Legal, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited June 1, 2001) (providing legal
news regarding Lambda's role in granting homosexual couples civil union rights).
216. See supra note 156 for a discussion of Vermont Civil Union statute's prohibition of
incestuous marriages. But c.f. supra note 200 and accompanying text for a discussion of reciprocal
beneficiaries. Similarly, and typically, the relevant portion of the New York City domestic partnership
ordinance provides that to be eligible to register for a domestic partnership:
3. Neither of the persons is married; 4. Neither of the persons is a party to another domestic
partnership, or has been a party to another domestic partnership within the six months
immediately prior to registration; 5. The persons are not related to each other by blood in a
manner that would bar their marriage in the state of New York.
NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. CODE § 3-241 (2001).
217. For example, California provides that:
Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and
between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and
nieces or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship is legitimate or illegitimate.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2200 (West 2001). Similarly, New York law provides:
A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate
between either:
1. An ancestor and a descendant;
2. A brother and sister of either the whole or the half blood;
3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew.
If a marriage prohibited by the foregoing provisions of this section be solemnized it shall be
void, and the parties thereto shall each be fined not less than fifty nor more than one
hundred dollars and may, in the discretion of the court in addition to said fine, be
imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months. Any person who shall knowingly and
willfully solemnize such marriage, or procure or aid in the solemnization of the same, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined or imprisoned in like manner.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 5 (Consol. 2001).
218. The California Penal Code criminalizes incestuous marriages:
Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by
law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or
adultery with each other, are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (West 2001). As an unspecified felony, the punishment could be up to three
years in the state prison, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (West 2001).
In New York, the crime of incest is a class E felony which is punishable by a term not to exceed four
years, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(e) (Consol. 2001) and is defined as:
A person is guilty of incest when he or she marries or engages in sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse with a person whom he or she knows to be related to him or her,
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State statutes differ, however, regarding the type of incestuous marriages
and sexual relations prohibited. 2t 9  Marriages between persons related by
blood-consanguineous relations-are the most uniformly proscribed, though
states vary on the degree of relation at which consanguinity becomes irrelevant.
For example, the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker found it worthwhile to note
that Vermont allowed "first-cousin marriages, not uniformly sanctioned in other
states." 220 On the other hand, state laws generally prohibit marriage to one's
parent, grandparent, brother or sister, and aunt, nephew, uncle, and niece, 22l
although the prohibition may contain some specific exceptions. 222 Also subject
to variation are situations involving partial consanguinity or so-called "half-
blood. ' 223 Even more problematic than relations by consanguinity are relations
by affinity. States lack consensus on whether and to what degree persons related
by marriage should be prohibited from marrying each other, as commentators
arguing against such prohibitions have noted.2 2 4 An additional complication for
either legitimately or out of wedlock, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either
the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.25 (Consol. 2001).
219. See Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free
to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 298-309 (Appendices) (1984), for a survey of state statutes.
220. Baker, 744 A.2d at 885 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1-2 (2000). The point was made in
contradiction to the state's asserted substantial governmental interest in "maintaining uniformity with
other jurisdictions." Id., 744 A.2d at 885. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act eliminates the
prohibition against marriages between cousins. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207 (1998)
(noting that Act adopts recent trend of legalizing first cousin marriages).
221. See Bratt, supra note 219, at Appendix 302-09 (Appendix B and C) (charting relationships
covered in each state's civil and penal codes); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207(a)
(listing types of prohibited marriages).
222. For example, Rhode Island permits "any marriage which shall be solemnized among the
Jews, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-
4 (1996). This presumably refers to Jewish law which not only does not prohibit uncle/niece marriages,
but encourages them. MIAMONIDES, THE LAWS OF PROHIBITED RELATIONS, Chapter 2, Law #14
(stating "it is a positive Talmudic commandment that a man should marry the daughter of his sister,
and the same commandment applies to the daughter of his brother"). I am appreciative to Salomon
(Shlomo) Davis for his translation from the Hebrew of this text.
In a somewhat similar vein, the Uniform Act's prohibition against uncle/niece aunt/nephew
marriages contains an exemption for "aboriginal cultures," UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT §
207(3), which the comment explains is intended "to save those special customs of Indian tribes, of
Alaskan natives of various ethnic origins, and of Polynesians, which may not accord with the incest
taboos of Western culture." Id.
223. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 442 P.2d 675, 678 (Cal. 1968) (holding that statutory construction
revealed legislative intent to limit crime of incest between uncle and niece to whole blood); Singh v.
Singh, 569 A.2d 1112, 1121 (Conn. 1990) (describing that because "common meaning" of term uncle
and niece encompasses relationship of half-blood as well as whole blood, marriage was void); State v.
Skinner, 43 A.2d 76, 77 (Conn. 1945) (providing that word "brother" included brother of half blood,
and word "sister" included sister of half blood); State v. Allen, 304 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1981)
(holding that defendant's sexual relations with half-blood sister of his wife fell within criminal incest
prohibitions which bars sexual acts between persons related by degrees of consanguinity and affinity).
224. See Martha Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest
Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 21, 27 & Appendix (1993) (noting relative consensus among states
banning incest among close biological relationships and relative lack of consensus regarding other
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both consanguinity and affinity relations occurs when the relation is by
adoption.225
The uncertainties in marital incest doctrine reflect the dissonant sources of
the prohibitions. American proscriptions generally trace their provenance
through English common law226 back to the Bible's book of Leviticus,227
although the Biblical treatment of incestuous relations is not consistently
relationships); Christine McNiece Metteer, Some "Incest" is Harmless Incest: Determining the
Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 262, 263-65 (2000) (noting lack of consensus on incest laws to argue that
states do not have strong interest in denying adults related by affinity right to marriage). See also
Bratt, supra note 219, at 298-302 (Appendix 1) (charting relationships covered in each states' civil and
penal codes).
225. See, e.g., Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1977) (holding that statute could not
withstand minimum scrutiny because state did not have legitimate state interest in prohibiting
marriage between siblings related by adoption); State v. George B., 785 A.2d 573, 584-85 (Conn. 2001)
(interpreting criminal statute prohibiting sexual intercourse between individuals of certain degrees of
kinship to encompass adopted as well as blood relatives, because statute prohibiting sexual intercourse
between related individuals incorporated degrees of kinship from marriage prohibition statute, which
prohibited grandfathers and granddaughters from marrying); Ex Parte Bourne, 2 N.W.2d 439, 440
(Mich. 1942) (finding that statute limiting crime of incest to sexual relations between those related by
ties of consanguinity meant sexual relationship between stepfather and his stepdaughter was not
incestuous); Miesner v. Geile, 747 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (construing marriage statute which
prohibited marriage between uncle and niece to allow marriage between uncle and niece by adoption);
In re Matter of Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529-31 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981)
(holding that because incest statute was inapplicable to parties without blood ties, adoption
proceeding by two homosexual adults wishing to establish legally cognizable relationship was
allowable); State v. Bale, 512 N.W.2d 164, 166 (S.D. 1994) (determining that legal relationship created
by adoption is not one of consanguinity, therefore, sexual relations with adoptive daughter did not
constitute incest).
Note, however, that adoption may not sever the ties with the biological family for incest marriage
prohibitions. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6 (1998) (stating that upon entry of adoption
decree, "all rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent
shall... except as regards marriage, incest or cohabitation, terminate between the child so adopted and
his natural parents and kindred") (emphasis added).
226. English common law, however, did not punish incest as a crime; the criminalization
component was a statutory innovation in the United States. See People v. Baker, 442 P.2d 675, 678 n.3
(Cal. 1968) (noting "incest was first made a crime in England in 1908") (citing Punishment of Incest
Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 45 (Eng.)); Singh v. Singh, 569 A.2d., 1112, 1115 (Conn. 1990) (stating "initial
departure of the American jurisdictions from the English law was to declare incest a crime"). Any
punishment for incest in common law England was "left entirely to the ecclesiastical courts." Id. at
1115.
227. The Book of Leviticus mandates:
None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him, to uncover their nakedness: I
am the Lord. The nakedness of thy father, or the nakedness of thy mother, shalt thou not
uncover: she is thy mother; thou shalt not uncover her nakedness. The nakedness of thy
father's wife shalt thou not uncover: it is thy father's nakedness. The nakedness of thy sister,
the daughter of thy father, or daughter of thy mother, whether she be at home, or born
abroad, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover. The nakedness of thy son's daughter,
or of thy daughter's daughter, even their nakedness thou shalt not uncover: for their
nakedness is thine own nakedness.
Leviticus 18:6-10 (King James).
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condemnatory. 228 Co-existing with the Biblical tradition, some anthropologists,
most notably Claude Levi-Strauss, opine that the "incest taboo" is universal to
all cultures. 229 The modern science of genetics is atavistically supportive of the
Biblical and tribal customs. 230 Lastly, more abstract notions of family unity are
blended with the foregoing rationales. 231
Constitutional challenges to incest statutes are relatively rare. One
successful challenge involved a state statute that included relations by adoption.
In Israel v. Allen,232 the Colorado Supreme Court declared the provision
unconstitutional, holding that the state did not have a legitimate interest in
prohibiting the marriage, and thus the statute did not meet minimal
constitutional review. 233 More typically, statutes have withstood constitutional
challenges premised on equal protection 234 as well as on an individual's right to
privacy. 235 For example, in State v. Benson,236 the Ohio Appellate Court held
that there is no fundamental right under the United States Constitution to
engage in private acts of consensual sexual intercourse. Thus, a statute
prohibiting incest and defining the crime as a sexual contact by a natural parent
with a child, by a stepparent with his stepchild, by a guardian with his ward or by
a custodian or person in loco parentis with his charge, is not facially
unconstitutional as a denial of substantive due process. 237 In the absence of a
228. Apart from the mysterious sources of the spouses for Adam and Eve's children, as one
commentator notes, there are a "remarkable number of liaisons between close kin in the early
narratives of the Bible." Calum Carmichael, Incest in the Bible, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 125 (1995).
The focus of Carmichael's piece, however, is an incident of stepmother-stepson incest in the New
Testament. Id. at 123. Cf. supra note 222 (discussing uncle/niece marriages in Jewish law).
229. CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, The Family, in MAN, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 261, 276-78
(Shapiro ed., 1956).
230. In his discussion of incest in the Bible, Carmichael notes that a common explanation for
incest rules is that incest leads to "defective offspring," but that such an explanation is not supported
by ancient sources or anthropological evidence. Carmichael, supra note 228, at 125-26.
231. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 cmt. 2 (1986), for a discussion of these rationales and the
state rationales in promoting family unity.
232. 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978).
233. Israel, 577 P.2d at 764. To the contrary, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act includes the
prohibition of sibling-by-adoption marriages, supporting this with the statement that there is a "social
interest in prohibiting such romantic attachments even if there is no genetic risk." Id.
234. See, e.g., State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861, 864 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (holding government statute
which criminalizes intercourse between step-father and consenting step-daughter over age of eighteen
is rationally related to legitimate government purpose of protecting family); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d
839, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that inclusion of sexual intercourse with stepchildren
under 18 years old within incest prohibition is rationally related to legitimate government objectives of
protection of family and does not violate stepparent's right to equal protection).
235. See, e.g., Buck, 757 P.2d at 863-64 (rejecting argument that incest statute violates "federal
right to privacy," reasoning that cases relied upon for argument such as Roe, Loving, and Griswold
"protect the family" as does criminal incest statute); Byrom v. State, 648 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) (rejecting argument that state incest statute is unconstitutional because it is "an
unwarranted Governmental interference in the private sexual relations of its citizens" as "repugnant
and without merit").
236. 612 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
237. Benson, 612 N.E.2d at 339-40.
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fundamental right, the statute was subject to only minimum judicial scrutiny.238
Perhaps in part because of the general lack of success in constitutional
challenges against incest prohibitions, same-sex marriage advocates seem to view
incest prohibitions, like those against bigamy and polygamy,239 as lying at the
bottom of a slippery slope that must be avoided. 240 The lucid, if relatively few,
arguments in legal scholarship directed at challenging incest prohibitions2 41 have
not been generally accepted. Moreover, when there is some relaxation of the
incest regime, as in the reciprocal beneficiary schemes enacted in Vermont and
Hawai'i that include familial relationships, 242 such an inclusion may be harshly
judged as devaluing intimate same-sex relationships. 243
Rather than distance ourselves from restrictions on familial marriages, such
prohibitions need to be rigorously examined. The proffered explanations for
incest prohibitions should be deeply problematic for any same-sex marriage
advocate. The citation of Leviticus, the same book of the Bible that courts and
conservatives use to deprecate lesbians and gay men, 244 should immediately be
238. Id.
239. See infra notes 294-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of same-sex marriage
advocates' attempts to provide basis for legal distinction between homosexuality and bigamy.
240. See, e.g., John Corvino, No Slippery Slope, GAY & LESBIAN REV., Summer 2000, at 37
(discussing persistency of poor argument that approval of homosexuality is tantamount to approval of
polygamy, bestiality and incest); Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr, and the Right to Marry: On Legal
Argumentation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NOVA L. REV. 769, 787-88 (2000) (noting that slippery
slope argument was made by those arguing against interracial marriages with regard to incest and
polygamy). See infra notes 267-344 and accompanying text for a discussion of polygamy.
241. For examples of these arguments see Bratt, supra note 219; Mahoney, supra note 224;
Meteer, supra note 224.
242. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (1)-(7) (Michie 2000) (see supra note 135 for text); 15 VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1301-1305 (2000) (see supra notes 155-57 for text). Additionally, Colorado has
been considering a reciprocal beneficiary bill. A Bill for an Act Concerning Probate Procedures for
Reciprocal Beneficiaries, S.B. 111, 62d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000).
243. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16
LAW & INEQ. 1, 15 (1998) (arguing that inclusion of couples who are related to each other under the
schemes undermines recognition of same-sex committed relationships).
244. The pertinent passage in Leviticus, 20:13 (King James), provides "[i]f a man also lie with
mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination." Id.; see, e.g., U.S.
v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (citing Leviticus to show repugnance of sodomy and
balancing state's interest of regulating activities in prison against right of privacy in upholding
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's criminal sodomy statute); Doe v. City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975) (citing Leviticus when upholding constitutionality of Virginia's criminal
sodomy statute, and asserting historical roots of law as satisfying legitimate state's interest); Ex parte
H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 33 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring) (citing Levitcus to reaffirm traditional
notion that homosexuality is intolerable evil and denying mother's petition for custody modification
because exposure to her homosexual conduct is detrimental to her children); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d
638, 648 (Alaska 1969) (referring to Leviticus in rejecting claim that state sodomy statute
unconstitutional because of its vagueness and stating "sodomy" sufficiently precise to withstand
constitutional attack); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J.
specifically concurring in part; dissenting in part) (giving reference to Leviticus in explaining that
lesbian mother not fit for visitation because her conduct could contaminate the children but affirming
restricted visitation rights); see also Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498, 1499 (9th Cit. 1997) (deciding
First Amendment controversy involving statements made by conservative Reverend who used
[Vol. 75
2002] ASSIMILATION, MARRIAGE, AND LESBIAN LIBERATION 763
discounted, lest arguments against the Biblical references in conservative anti-
gay opinions such as Bowers v. Hardwick become ludicrous. 245 The question of
universal taboo should likewise be suspect by same-sex marriage advocates, most
trenchantly on the basis that tribal customs should not govern our current
cultural mores and constitutional notions any more than Leviticus should prevail.
Moreover, the very "universality" of incest prohibitions is questionable-the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act itself contains an exemption for "aboriginal"
cultures within the United States whose customs may not accord with the "incest
taboos of Western culture." 246 Furthermore, any appeal to the incest taboo in
the work of anthropologists such as Claude Levi-Strauss must be tempered by
the work of anthropologist and feminist Gayle Rubin, who persuasively argues
that the incest taboo is the origin of gender and sexuality inequality. 247 The
Leviticus to condemn homosexuality and was removed from human rights commission); Okwedy v.
Molinari, 150 F. Supp. 2d 508, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (deciding First Amendment controversy which
involved Leviticus quote on billboard that expressed opinion against homosexuality).
245. The Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, rejecting a challenge to Georgia's sodomy statute, relied
upon the fact that "proscriptions" against sodomy have "ancient roots." 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986).
Justice Burger stressed that "condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian
moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
On the contrary, the dissenting justices spurned the "assertion that 'traditional Judeo-Christian
values proscribe' the conduct involved" as "an adequate justification" for the state sodomy statute,
reasoning that the government's "invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's
heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines" the argument that the sodomy statute
"represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power." Id at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 207(3), cmt. (1973).
247. Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy of Sex," in TOWARD
AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157, 176-77 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975). Gayle Rubin develops a
compelling theory of the development and significance of the incest taboo in pre-state cultures arguing
that the incest taboo, a rule which divides the universe into categories of permitted sexual partners and
prohibited sexual partners, is the origin of the sexual inequality. Id. at 173-77. She concludes that in
pre-state societies, anthropologists study and conceptualize kinship systems as the structure of
organization within a society. Id. at 169. The term 'kinship systems' is shorthand for systematic forms
of social interaction which encompasses the economic, political, ceremonial and sexual activity of a
society. Id. It contains the rules that govern the social interactions among members of a group. Id. It
is within this system of societal organization that Rubin theorizes the incest taboo developed. Rubin,
supra, at 173-83. By way of explanation, anthropologists have long theorized about the importance of
gift exchange between families and groups in these early cultures. Id. at 170. The societal significance
of the gift exchange lies not in any material benefits conferred, but in the social bond created and
affirmed by the exchange between two groups. Id at 173. This culture of gift exchange and
reciprocity is then translated to societal rules concerning marriage. Id. Marriage is viewed as the most
basic form of gift exchange, in which women are the gift. Id. Women are transacted by the men of
their family. Rubin, supra, at 174. In this regard, the incest taboo is to be understood as a mechanism
to ensure such exchanges take place between families and between groups. Id. at 176-77. The incest
taboo forbidding marriages between father and daughter, brother and sister can be viewed in the
inverse: it is a rule compelling the mother, sister, or daughter to be given to others. Id. at 173. The
intermarriage then creates bonds between families that can overcome the interpersonal clashes that
might otherwise cause the disintegration of the relationship. Id. at 173-74. The blood that flows in the
descendants then ties the two groups. Id. at 173. The bonds created between the families allowed for
the development of larger, more complex societies. Rubin, supra, at 174. In this way, the defeat of
women at the hands of their male relations is viewed to be a prerequisite for the development of the
complex state culture. Id.
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possibility that the incest taboo also supports compulsory heterosexuality should
also be entertained.2 48
While seemingly more objective than Biblical or anthropological rationales,
the genetic grounding for incest prohibitions is likewise faulty. It is subject to
criticism as post-hoc,24 9 scientifically unsupportable, 250 and only partial since it is
inapplicable to relations by affinity or adoption. 251 Most importantly for same-
sex advocates, however, the genetic justification depends upon identity between
marriage and procreation-the same logic that is used to resist same-sex
marriage.252
The final rationale in support of familial marriage prohibitions is a broad
argument in favor of family cohesiveness and integrity. Yet such a principle is
enervated by its application. For example, in Rhodes v. McAfee, 253 the
Tennessee Supreme Court decided that a marriage between a former stepfather
and stepdaughter was invalid. 254 This fourteen-year marriage that had produced
three children was before the courts because the husband had died without a will
and the former wife was claiming property rights. In declaring the marriage void
and disinheriting the wife, the Tennessee Supreme Court opined:
This case is a good example of why such marriages are prohibited. The
stepdaughter lived in the home with the mother and stepfather from
the date of the marriage of the mother and stepfather until their
divorce, with the exception of two years when she lived with an uncle.
The stepdaughter's status in this family would be closely akin to the
natural children of a mother and stepfather, who, in fact, were her half
brothers and sisters. If there were no statutes prohibiting such
marriages, there not only could but very likely would result in discord
and disharmony in the family. 255
248. Judith Butler tantalizingly notes that the incest taboo raises the question of whether the
taboo has been "mobilized to establish certain forms of kinship as the only intelligible and livable
ones," noting that arguments against same-sex marriage and parenting appeal to claims made on the
level of the symbolic family, the lack of which will threaten psychosis. JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE'S
CLAIM: KINSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 70 (2000).
249. See Carmichael, supra note 228, at 125-26 (arguing that although ancients prohibited incest,
they did not make causal connection between incest and genetics).
250. See Bratt, supra note 219, at 267-76 (arguing that dangers are not only "minimal" but are
exceeded by the genetic dangers involved in matings of other social populations").
251. See Metteer, supra note 224, at 274 (concluding that genetic theory of recessive genes is
"obviously not an interest at all" applicable to persons related by affinity); see also Mahoney, supra
note 224, at 28 (stating that biomedical concern regarding recessive genetic abnormalities, premised on
"the common genetic makeup of close biologic relatives, obviously has not application to persons"
who "are not related by blood").
252. For example, the "principal purpose the State advances in support of excluding same-sex
couples from the legal benefits of marriage is the government's interest in 'furthering the link between
procreation and child rearing."' Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. The Vermont Supreme Court found that the
statutory exclusion of same-sex couples was "significantly underinclusive" with regard to this purpose
because "many opposite sex couples marry for reasons unrelated to procreation." Id.
253. 457 S.W.2d 522 (Tenn. 1970).
254. Rhodes, 457 S.W.2d at 524.
255. Id.
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Contrary to the court's description of this as a "good example," it seems
equally true that the case is a bad example to support familial marriage
prohibitions.256 The court sacrifices a family that existed for fourteen years in
favor of the divorced former spouse in order to uphold formalistic notions
requiring protection of the family.
The court's emphasis on the fact that the wife had once lived in a household
as the husband's child, however, elucidates a central concern in incest
prohibitions: the protection of children. Yet this concern is often inadequately
served by marital incest prohibitions that function only when the parties are
adults with the capacity to marry under the relevant state statutes. 257 Thus,
marital incest prohibitions operate as a lifetime bar, despite the fact that the
premise of protecting the child is no longer operative because the child has
become an adult. 258 Moreover, if the state's interest is to protect the young, then
"sexual relationships between the same household unit ought to be proscribed
regardless of the precise legal nomenclature describing the relationships. '259 In
fact, sex abuse of children is criminalized in all states, 26° encompassing a wider
range of sexual activity with children, 261 and not dependent upon the formalistic
existence of a particular familial relationship.262 While the term "incest" may be
confused with the sexual abuse of children, the terms are not co-extensive and
should not be conflated.263
256. Cf Mahoney, supra note 224, at 34 (noting that opinion did not address countervailing
consideration of serious hardship imposed upon wife and children).
257. All states set a minimum age for marriage. Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 629 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), affd, 669 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that "age attainment requirement for marriage is
established in every American jurisdiction" and rejecting constitutional challenge to New York's
parental consent provision for minors). Cf. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACr § 208 (1973)
(providing for declaration of invalidity for minors).
258. Accord Bratt, supra note 219, at 292 (stating that "in reality.., ban does little to deter
family romances between adults").
259. Id. at 290 (emphasis in original).
260. See Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1501, 1580-1640 (1998) (listing both
familial prohibitions and adult sex with children prohibitions for all states).
261. As Bratt points out, the definition of sex abuse encompasses a broader range of activity,
while criminal incest statutes typically forbid only sexual intercourse or marriage. Bratt, supra note
219, at 294. For example, New York's rape statute provides that rape in the third degree requires the
"actor" to be 21 or over and the victim less than 17. N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.25(2) (McKinney 1998).
Rape in the second degree requires the "actor" to be 18 or over and the victim less than 14. Id. §
130.30. Rape in the first degree requires the "actor" to be male and the victim less than 11. Id. §
130.35(3). Another provision of the New York Penal Code, section 70.07, criminalizes a "sexual
assault against a child" as a felony offense. Id. § 70.07(2). The essential elements of the offense are
that the child be under the age of fifteen, and the commission or attempted commission of "sexual
conduct" which is defined in section 130 as "sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated
sexual contact, or sexual contact," with "sexual contact" being defined in subsection 3 of section 130 as
"any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person" including "the touching of the actor
by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing."
Id. at § 130.00(10).
262. For example, the step-parent and step-child relation is prohibited in a minority of states.
Mahoney, supra note 224, at 33.
263. But cf Bienen, supra note 260, at 1509 (arguing that although incest is "archaic and
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Thus, if we are truly interested in equality, we need to consider whether
familial marriage merits our attention. The Vermont scheme, which creates
separate but unequal2 64 regimes for heterosexuals and for lesbians and gay men,
actually creates a tripartite system: marriage for heterosexuals, civil union for
lesbians and gay men, and reciprocal beneficiary status for those barred from
either marriage or civil union because they are related.265 Rather than object
that the very inclusion of familial relationships is an affront to same-sex
relationships, 266 we need to be examining whether this tripartite system conforms
to our notions of equality.
3. Plural Marriages
While gender exclusions and incest exclusions are well established, their
dominion may be wavering with the advent of contemporary marital-like
devices, including those established in Vermont and Hawai'i that recognize
same-sex and familial relationships. No such amelioration, however, is occurring
with regard to another important marriage requirement that likewise implicates
equality concerns: the limitation of the marital relation to two persons at a
time.267 Marriage statutes,268 the Vermont and Hawai'i schemes, 269 and domestic
distorted diction," changing it has "potential to distract").
264. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Vermont's reciprocal
beneficiary scheme.
265. See supra note 155-57 and accompanying text for a full version of the Vermont statute.
266. See supra note 239-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on how some same-sex
marriage advocates want to distance themselves from incest restrictions.
267. Generally speaking, proscriptions against bigamy or plural marriages only pertain to
contemporaneous marriages; one may marry as many times as one wishes during her lifetime assuming
that each marriage is legally terminated, as by divorce or death. See, e.g., infra note 268 for the text of
two typical statutes proscribing plural marriages. However, the contemporaneous requirement for
bigamous marriages has sometimes been vitiated in cases of adultery. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Miller, 179
So. 430, 431-32 (La. 1938) (construing article 161 of Civil Code which provided "in case of divorce, on
account of adultery, the guilty party can never contract matrimony with his or her accomplice in
adultery, under the penalty of being considered and prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and
under the penalty of nullity of the new marriage"); People v. Faber, 92 N.Y. 146, 150-51 (1883)
(construing section 59 of the New York Divorce Act which prohibited one who has been divorced, on
account of his or her adultery, from marrying again until the death of complainant).
268. The statutes of California and New York are typical. The California statute provides:
Bigamous and polygamous marriages; exceptions; absentees
(a) A subsequent marriage contracted by a person during the life of a former husband or
wife of the person, with a person other than the former husband or wife, is illegal and void
from the beginning, unless:
(1) The former marriage has been dissolved or adjudged a nullity before the date of the
subsequent marriage.
(2) The former husband or wife (i) is absent, and not known to the person to be living for the
period of five successive years immediately preceding the subsequent marriage, or (ii) is
generally reputed or believed by the person to be dead at the time the subsequent marriage
was contracted.
(b) In either of the cases described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), the subsequent
marriage is valid until its nullity is adjudged pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2210.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2201 (West 1994).
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partnership provisions 270 all insist that each person can have a legal marital or
quasi-marital relationship with only one other person, whether the person be
denominated as spouse, partner, or reciprocal beneficiary. Moreover, being
married to more than one person simultaneously continues to be criminalized,271
in addition to being a bar to immigration. 272
Although bigamy has a colonial history,27 3 for Americans, the notion of
plural marriage is inextricably intertwined with the Mormon religion as it
appeared in the antebellum nation.274 The history, influence, and perceived
threat of Mormonism explain the prohibitions against polygamy that appear in
The New York statute similarly provides that:
A marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former
marriage is living, unless either:
1. Such former marriage has been annulled or has been dissolved for a cause other than the
adultery of such person; provided, that if such former marriage has been dissolved for the
cause of the adultery of such person, he or she may marry again in the cases provided for in
section eight of this chapter and such subsequent marriage shall be valid.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6 (McKinney 1999).
269. See supra notes 135 and 151-57, for a discussion of the reciprocal beneficiary schemes of
Hawai'i and Vermont, respectively.
270. For example, the New York City domestic partnership ordinance provides that registration
for a domestic partnership requires that "neither of the persons is married" and "[n]either of the
persons is a party to another domestic partnership, or has been a party to another domestic
partnership within the six months immediately prior to registration." NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE § 3-241(3)-(4) (1998).
271. For example, in California, penal law bigamy is defined as "every person having a husband
or wife living, who marries any other person," CAL. PENAL CODE § 281(a) (West 2003). This rule does
not extend to "any person by reason of any former marriage whose husband or wife by such marriage
has been absent for five successive years without being known to such person within that time to be
living," or "any person by reason of any former marriage which has been pronounced void, annulled,
or dissolved by the judgment of a competent court." Id. § 282. Section 283 of the Penal Law punishes
bigamy by a fine not to exceed $10,000.00 or " by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year
or in the state prison." Id. § 283. In addition, California criminalizes marrying the husband or wife of
someone else when a person "knowingly and willfully marries the husband or wife of another, in any
case in which such husband or wife would be punishable under the provisions of this chapter, is
punishable by fine not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state
prison." Id. § 284.
New York provides that "a person is guilty of bigamy when he contracts or purports to contract a
marriage with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living
spouse." The same statute defines bigamy as a class E felony. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.15 (McKinney
2000).
272. The United States Code provides that "any immigrant who is coming to the United States to
practice polygamy is inadmissible." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (2002).
273. In Pennsylvania, a court in 1893, noted that the Commonwealth had proscribed bigamy "as
early as 1705," providing punishment by "whipping on the bare back with thirty-nine lashes, and
imprisonment for life at hard labor, and declaring the second marriage void" commenting that "the
rigid moralists of those days put the act of bigamy on a level with adultery." Ralston v. Ralston, 2 Pa.
D. 241, 243 (Phila. County Ct. 1893). See infra notes 275-294 and accompanying text for further
discussions of bigamy in the United States.
274. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (2002), for an excellent and
comprehensive treatment of polygamy and the Mormon religion in America.
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
federal statutes275 and state constitutions, 276 in addition to their more usual
placement in state statutory schemes regulating marriage or crime.
The status of polygamy-or more accurately polygyny 277-as a religious
practice 278  accounts for constitutional arguments that raise the First
Amendment. 279 In 1879, the United States Supreme Court decided Reynolds v.
United States, 28 0 a "test case" in which Mormon leaders had a "reasonable hope"
of vindicating their First Amendment claims. 281 The Court, however, held that
the constitutional limitation of congressional power to make laws that would
prohibit the free exercise of religion did not encompass laws against the practice
of polygamy. The doctrinal distinction, the Court pronounced, was that the free
275. The first federal legislation, The Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act, Act of July 1, 1862, ch.126, §1,
made polygamous marriages a crime in the Territories and provided for its punishment. 12 Stat. 501,
501-02 (repealed 1910). It was followed by the Edmunds Act of 1882, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 397 §§ 1,
13, 17, 24, which sought to remedy the enforcement problems of the Act of July 1, 1862 by
disenfranchising Mormons, making "unlawful cohabitation" criminal and, if they did not swear to
abide by the laws against bigamy, making them ineligible for public office and jury duty. 24 Stat. 635,
637-38 (repealed 1978). The Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, Act of Mar. 3,1887, ch. 397, §§ 1, 9, 11,17,
13, 17, made unrecorded marriages felonies, forced wives to testify against husbands, disinherited
children of polygamous marriages, and allowed for confiscation of virtually all Mormon church
property. 24 Stat. 635, 637-38 (repealed 1978).
276. Utah and states bordering Utah have provisions in their state constitutions. See UTAH
CONST. art. III, para. 1 (ensuring that "[p]erfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed ....
[nlo inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode
of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited"). See also ARIZ.
CONST. art. 20, para. 2 (stating that "[p]olygamous or plural marriages, or polygamous cohabitation,
are forever prohibited within this State"); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4 (stating that "[bligamy and
polygamy are forever prohibited in the state, and the legislature shall provide by law for the
punishment of such crimes"); N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 (stating "[p]erfect toleration of religious
sentiment shall be secured, and no inhabitant of this state shall ever be molested in person or property
on account of his or her mode of religious worship. Polygamous or plural marriages and polygamous
cohabitation are forever prohibited"); OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating "[p]olygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited").
277. While "polygamy" denotes simultaneous marriages to more than one partner (from the
Greek for many marriages), "polygyny" refers to a man having many women partners, derived from
the Greek "gune" or "gyn" for women. "Polyandry" refers to a woman having many male partners.
NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 737-38 (1981)
278. While not one of the original tenets of the faith as contained in the 1830 text BOOK OF
MORMON, the practice of polygamy, modeled on the Biblical character of Abraham, was pronounced
by Mormonism's founder, Joseph Smith, in the 1843 document, "Revelation of Celestial Marriage."
GORDON, supra note 274, at 20-23.
279. The so-called religion clauses of the First Amendment provide that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. For contemporary discussions of polygamy prohibitions under the First Amendment, see
generally Keith E. Seating, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 691 (2001) (arguing that free exercise clause should protect polygamy); Richard A. Vazquez,
Note, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace?
Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 225 (2001-2002) (arguing that Utah's commercial bigamy statute continues to be constitutional).
280. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
281. GORDON, supra note 274, at 113-15.
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exercise of religion pertains only to religious beliefs, not religious acts.282 Yet
the belief/conduct bifurcation only partially explains the Court's conclusion.
Importantly, the Court stated that while "Congress was deprived of all legislative
power over mere opinion," Congress was "left free to reach actions which were
in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. 2 83 The post-Civil War
Court noted that polygamy had always been "odious" among the "northern and
western nations of Europe" and, until the Mormons, "almost exclusively a
feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people," 284 thus implicitly finding
that polygamy was no mere difference of opinion.
The Court in Reynolds linked the forms of marriage with the forms of
government 285 and arguably deemed polygamy inconsistent with democracy
itself.286 This sentiment was echoed a few years later in Murphy v. Ramsey,287 in
which the Court upheld the denial of civil rights such as voting to polygamists, 288
282. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The Court found historical precedent for this distinction in the
preamble of a statute drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the Virginia legislature stating:
[T]hat to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to
restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a
dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty... that is time enough for the
rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break into
overt acts against peace and good order.
Id. at 163 (quoting 1 Jefferson Works 45 (N.Y. 1853)) (emphasis added). This belief/act principle
persists in first amendment free exercise doctrine. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (popularly known as "the peyote case" which upheld criminalization of use
of peyote in challenge by members of Native American Church who used peyote as religious practice).
283. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
284. Id. As Sarah Gordon observes, the "invocation of race in a polygamy case had special
meaning," because after the Civil War "polygamy's racial overtones migrated away from the
slaveholders and onto those who had been enslaved." GORDON, supra note 274, at 142. The sexual
activities of former slaves interested government officials, who urged monogamy, while also
prohibiting miscegenation. Id. Thus, the analogy between Mormons and peoples from Asia and
Africa "carried racial and racist messages as well as religious ones." Id.
285. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66 (stating "in fact, according as monogamous or polygamous
marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the people, to a greater
or lesser extent, rests").
286. The Court referred to Professor Lieber for the proposition that "polygamy leads to the
patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary
despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy." Id. at 166. Francis
Lieber was "widely known as a dedicated antipolygamist." GORDON, supra note 274, at 140. As Keith
Sealing recently noted:
Because the Court apparently took Professor Lieber's conclusion as a given, the Court made
no attempt to explain why Mormon polygamy led to patriarchal system of social
organization, why patriarchies are bad (or at least constitutionally infirm) or why polygamy
leads to despotism.. .Lieber believed women in polygamous families failed to fully develop
their individuality, and that the patriarchal structure of polygamous households led to an
acceptance of state tyranny.
Sealing, supra note 279, at 713.
287. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
288. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 36-37. The Court observes, in respect to Utah's bid for statehood:
For certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding
of a free, self-governing commonwealth,.., than that which seeks to establish it on the basis
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and in Davis v. Beason,289 in which the Court upheld Idaho Territory's "test
oath," requiring potential voters to swear they were not advocates of plural
marriage.2 90 The Court in Murphy found the denial of voting an efficacious and"suitable" effort to "withdraw all political influence from those who are
practically hostile to its attainment, '291 while the Court in Davis concluded the
test oath was necessary to "prevent persons from being enabled by their votes to
defeat the criminal laws of the country." 29  Thus, the threat of polygamy to
democracy could be constitutionally addressed through anti-democratic
means.293
Just as the notion of the importance of monogamy to American culture
persists,294 so too do the strategies the government might use to disenfranchise
groups with minority sexual practices. The laws targeting Mormons reverberate
in the efforts against gays and lesbians that culminated in Colorado's
Amendment Two, 295 declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and
one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble
in our civilization.
Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
289. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
290. Davis, 133 U.S. at 346-47. The statute forbade bigamists, polygamists, or members of an
organization that advocated such marriages to vote, and required an oath by the voter that he was not
a member of an order that teaches the commission of these crimes. Id. at 335-36 (quoting IDAHO REV.
STATS. 1887, § 501 (now codified at Idaho Code § 34-403 (2002)). In its discussion of polygamy, the
Court stated that "few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society," Davis, 133 U.S at
341, quoted from Reynolds the language that governmental allowance of monogamous or polygamous
marriages is related to the "principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or less
extent, rests," id. at 344 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66), and quoted from Murphy v. Ramsey,
the language that monogamous marriage is the "sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization." Davis, 133 U.S at 345 (quoting Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45).
291. Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45.
292. Davis, 133 U.S. at 348.
293. As Sarah Gordon notes, because the voting franchise was the "epitome of political
expression," the Court in Davis held that a "propolygamy vote, a form of expression contrary (and
dangerous) to legitimate political goals" would "pervert liberty into license by twisting freedom to
produce despotism." GORDON, supra note 274, at 227. Yet such reasoning displays a "fundamentally
antidemocratic logic" because the criminal law is insulated from change by voting. Id. at 228. The
Court precluded any democratic alteration of the anti-polygamy laws "on the theory that the moral
difference of Mormonism was itself evidence of the perversion of democracy." Id.
294. For example, in the latter part of this century, a federal appellate court rejected a challenge
to Utah's polygamy laws and, relying on Reynolds, opined that monogamy is the bedrock upon which
our society is built. Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating "[m]onogamy
is inextricably woven into the fabric of our society. It is the bedrock upon which our culture is built").
295. The state constitutional amendment, entitled "No Protected Status Based on Homosexual,
Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation" provides:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
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Romer.296 Justice Scalia noted the similarity in his acrimonious dissenting
opinion.297 For Scalia, polygamy and homosexuality are analogous, 98 and since
the Court has found that the perceived social harm is a sufficiently legitimate
government concern to render the targeting of polygamists constitutional, 299 the
government should have the power to similarly address the perceived social
harm of homosexuality by insulating local laws from the concentrated political
power of sexual minorities.300
Conservative comparisons between polygamy and homosexuality have been
vociferous 301 and have troubled same-sex marriage advocates, 3° 2 some of whom
have taken pains to distinguish between the two.30 3 In one of the most cogent
and comprehensive arguments, Maura Strassberg relies upon Hegelian theories
of marriage to argue that polygamy is inherently inconsistent with the modern
respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (enjoined 1993) (2001) (although amendment was declared
unconstitutional, it remains in text of Colorado Constitution).
296. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
297. Id. at 636, 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Commentators have described Scalia's dissent in
Romer in similar terms. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden, A Tale of Two Cities in the Gay Rights
Kulturkampf" Are the Federal Courts Presiding Over the Cultural Balkanization of America?, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 295, 296 (2000) (describing Scalia's dissent as "acerbic"); Michael L. Closen, The
Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS: Denial of Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases and its
Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61 ALB. L. REV. 897, n.228 (1998) (describing it to be
"inflammatory"); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 B.U. L.
REV. 1089, 1096 (1997) (describing Scalia's dissent as "caustic"); Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual
Discrimination and Gender: Was Romer v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W. L.
REV. 271, 303 (1999) (describing Scalia's dissent as "bitter"); Martha M. Ertman, Sexuality:
Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENy. U. L. REV.
1107, 1136 (1996) (describing Scalia's dissent as "vitriolic" and "blustery"); H.N. Hirsch, Levels of
Scrutiny, the First Amendment, and Gay Rights, 7 LAW & SEX. 87, 87 (1997) (describing Scalia's dissent
as "blistering"); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Closet Case": Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and the
Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 123 (2001)
(describing Scalia's dissent as "stinging"); Keith E. Sealing, Proposition 209 as Proposition 14 (As
Amendment 2): The Unremarked Death Of Political Structure Equal Protection, 27 CAP. U. L. REV.
337, 356 (1999) (describing Scalia's dissent as "scathing"); David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy,
LesBiGay Identity as Commodity, 90 CAL. L. REV. 223, 228 (2002) (describing Scalia's dissent as
"stinging").
298. Romer, 517 U.S. at 648.
299. Scalia quotes from both Murphy v. Ramsey and Davis v. Beason. Id. at 649, 651-52.
300. Id. at 645-46, 648-51.
301. See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 56-60
(1997), for a discussion of how the polygamy issue was thrust upon same-sex marriage advocates
arguing against DOMA.
302. Carlos Ball argues that the polygamy argument is especially vexing to political liberals
because polygamous and same-sex marriages cannot be distinguished with reference to liberal notions
such as equality, tolerance, and privacy, but can only be distinguished by reference to normative
arguments regarding the value of marriage. Carlos Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-
Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1878-79 (1997).
303. For examples of comparisons between polygamy and homosexuality see Corvino, supra note
240; Strasser, supra note 240.
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liberal state while same-sex marriage is consistent. 3°4  On this view it is
monogamy, rather than gender disparity, that is most essential for "the
transcendent unity of marriage," which "in turn grounds the transcendent unity
of the state." 30 5 Yet as Strassberg candidly notes, Hegelian theorizing regarding
the relation between the state and marriage is suspect on two grounds: Hegel's
antidemocratic tendencies and sexism.30 6  While Strassberg defends Hegel
against claims of totalitarianism, which she refers to as "communitarianism," 30 7
she admits Hegel's anti-feminism, 30 8 but concludes it is merely attributable to the"realities" of his time.309 Such a conclusion, however, begs the question of why
Hegel's sexism should be discounted as relative while his views on monogamy
should be accorded objective status.
Moreover, Hegel's opinions on marital forms should be examined with
reference to Hegel's very pronounced views on religion and race. In his
penultimate work, The Phenomenology of Mind,310 Hegel describes the
evolution of "Mind" 31' as religion through the stages of primitive "natural
religions" such as "Oriental religions" to aesthetic religions, culminating in
"Revealed Religion," which is Christianity. 312 As noted Hegel scholar Walter
Kaufmann observes, Hegel considered Christianity supreme among religions,
and the references to Judaism and Islam are as "patently unjust" as those of
other writers of the period.313 Likewise, Hegel's racial views are no more
enlightened than other European Enlightenment thinkers. Hegel's Philosophy
of History relegates Africans to a pre-political and prehistoric state since"universal spiritual laws (for example, that of the morality of the Family)" are
not present in Africa. 314 Hegel's exile of Africa from the "scope of the modern
political imaginary' 315 and his elevation of Christianity as the most lofty and
304. Maura Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997).
305. Id. at 1529.
306. Id. at 1536-56.
307. Id. at 1537-47. See KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES, VOL. II. 27-88
(1966), for the most passionately made argument that Hegel's theorizing is inextricably linked with
totalitarianism, including the rise of German nationalism.
308. Strassberg, supra note 304, at 1547 (noting that Hegel posited that difference between
women and men was similar to difference between plants and animals).
309. Id. at 1553.
310. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (J.B. Baille trans., Harper Torchbooks
1967) (1807).
311. The German term used by Hegel is "Geist," which may also be translated as "Spirit," as it is
in Miller's subsequent translation. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (A.V. Miller
trans., Oxford University Press 1967) (1807).
312. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, supra note 310, at 685-85.
313. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: REINTERPRETATION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARY 273
(Walter Kaufmann trans., 1965). Kaufman further argues, however, that despite Hegel's elevation of
Christianity among religions, religion qua religion is subordinate to philosophy itself. See id. at 273-74
(noting that religion compared to philosophy is a "child compared to a man").
314. PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE 56 (2000) (quoting G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 96 (trans., J. Sibree 1956)).
315. GILROY, supra note 314, at 65.
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evolved of religions is consistent with his preference for monogamy as a marital
form. Polygamy, as the province of Africans and non-Christians, 316 is not
surprisingly maligned in favor of monogamy, the predominant form among white
European Christians. The cultural bias of such a conclusion is apparent.317
Similarly, an argument that polygamy is objectionable as patriarchal is
suspect. 318 The condemnation of polygamy as patriarchal by the United States
Supreme Court in Reynolds in 1879-while the Court was upholding the
disenfranchisement of women 319 and the exclusion of women from the practice
of law32 0-suggests a startling hypocrisy. Any judicial favoring of a
nonpatriarchal society of gender equality seems ludicrous when the Court soon
thereafter pronounced it constitutionally permissible to construe the word
"person" as being limited to males.321
Traditional Mormon polygamy may, in fact, be patriarchal,322 but traditional
monogamous marriage is likewise patriarchal. The unity of monogamous
marriage may result in a single entity, but that entity is the man. As William
Blackstone phrased it in his influential Commentaries, "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage." 323 This regime of
coverture resulted in the lack of a married woman's ability to own property, until
state legislatures gradually began to implement changes in the antebellum
years,324 often motivated by desires other than gender equality325 and provoking
316. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
317. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia to Black
America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First Century, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 811 (2001), for some preliminary work attempting to interrogate global polygamy from
a critical race feminist perspective.
318. See Strassberg, supra note 304, at 1617 (stating "the patriarchal doctrines underlying
polygamy and its practice perpetuate inequalities of power between men and women," although
admitting that some "vestiges of patriarchy" persist in contemporary heterosexual marriages); see also
Ball, supra note 302, at 1900 (stating that normative argument against polygamy is its historical
association with subordination of women to interests of men).
319. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 n.4 (1875).
320. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873).
321. Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (rejecting constitutional challenge to Virginia's
policy of excluding women from practice of law, holding that state courts could construe word
"person" in state statute "confined to males").
322. See RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 89-102 (2d ed. 1989),
for a balanced view of the legal and practical effects of traditional Mormon polygamy on women.
323. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442.
324. The gradual nature of these changes is illustrated by Isabel Marcus in her excellent history
of marriage and divorce reform in New York. Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections
on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BuFF. L. REV. 375,390-414 (1989). New
York's original 1848 Married Women's Property Act was limited in its applicability to the "small
segment of married women in New York who were the daughters of the landed elite." Id. at 402.
Thereafter, "incremental legislative activity" extended the rights of married women to convey and
devise real and personal property (1849), individually own savings deposits (1850), and vote as
stockholders in elections (1858). Id. at 402 (citations omitted). The 1860 amendments greatly
expanded married women's property rights to include the ability of women to sue in their own names,
to conduct separate businesses and contract with respect to them, and to keep their own earnings. Id.
at 403.
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anxiety about the consequences of women's financial independence. 326 Even
after married women were able to own property, the vestiges of coverture
continued for more than a century in legal customs and rules regarding
surnames,3 27 domicile,3 28 and availability of credit.329 More devastating for this
325. The insulation of property from the husband's creditors could be accomplished by
transferring the property into the married woman's name. The 1848 New York Married Women's
Property Act, codified as N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 50 (McKinney 1999), was introduced "by a
conservative judge from St. Lawrence who wanted to safeguard his wife's property from his creditors."
Marcus, supra note 324, at 401 n.94, (citing Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1839-1865:
Reform, Reaction or Revolution, 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 69,
78 (D. Weisberg ed., 1982)). As another commentator states: "It is worth noting that the two major
[Married Women's Property] statutes of 1848 and 1860 followed the depressions of 1839-43 and 1857.
Married women's property laws, like laws easing bankruptcy, carried the possibility of saving some of
the family's assets." NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK 122 (1982).
In his comprehensive work with a national focus, Professor Chused similarly links the first wave
of married women's property acts throughout the nation with the harsh economic climate of the 1840s,
interestingly noting that acts which concerned women's ownership of real property were passed in
agricultural states and women's interest in slaves was included in Southern states, while statutes in
urbanized states covered women's property more generally. Richard Chused, Married Women's
Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L. J. 1359, 1400-04 (1983).
326. The consequences of the ability of married women to own property included the breakdown
of the family, with women leaving their husbands on a "whim." See, e.g., Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md.
294, 307-08 (Md. 1858) (quoted in Marcus, supra note 324, at 405-06 n.116) (asking rhetorically
"[w]ould not every wife, with property enough to sustain herself independently of her husband, when
becoming impatient of his restraint and control, however necessarily exercised over her, take the
refuge such a law would give her, and abandon her husband and her home?").
327. The legal requirements of married women adopting their husbands' names continued until
the 1970s. Compare Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972)
(upholding as reasonable constitutional regulation requiring married female drivers to use their
husband's surname as their legal name, because state has significant interest in overseeing its licensees
and state has rational basis-administrative convenience-for such regulation), with Walker v.
Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (rejecting as unconstitutional state constitutional
provision which required female voters to prefix their names with either "Mrs." or "Miss" and
interpretation of that provision as requiring married women to use their husband's surnames as a
violation of Equal Protection clause).
The custom among married women continues to dominate. See, e.g., Kif Augustine-Adams, The
Beginning of Wisdom is to Call Things by their Right Names, 7 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 1,
11 (1997) (describing her own experiences and noting that eighty to ninety percent of young women
expect to take their husband's surnames upon marriage). This is, perhaps, linked to issues pertaining
to the naming of the couples' children. See, e.g., Beverly Seng, Like Father, Like Child: The Rights of
Parents in Their Children's Surnames, 70 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1323-30 (1984) (discussing and criticizing
paternal surname presumption).
For an excellent overview of the historical basis for married women adopting their husband's
surnames, the feminist litigation against this practice, and the continued legal and social problems
regarding paternal naming of children, see Omi [Morgenstern Leissner], The Name of the Maiden, 12
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 253 (1997); Omi [Morgenstern Leissner], The Problem That Has No Name, 4
CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 321 (1998); Esther Suarez, A Woman's Freedom to Choose her Surname: Is it
Really a Matter of Choice?, 18 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 233 (1997).
328. It was not until 1988 that the American Law Institute revised the common law position that
married women's domicile was not dependent upon that of her husband. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 (1998). Courts, however, had earlier invalidated restrictions on married
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patriarchal argument against polygamy, however, is the fact that current
marriage statutes, the Vermont civil union statute, and domestic partnership
ordinances and policies are not specifically aimed at polygamy, but likewise
prohibit polyandry. Under the current laws, the same consequences flow no
matter the gender of the person who claims multiple spouses or partners. There
is no room for any notion that links patriarchy to enforced monogamy for
women. 330
Additionally, it is important to consider proscriptions against multiple
marriages as separate from the controversial history of polygamy. "Simple
bigamy" has its own politics. For one scholar, bigamy is a "crime of mobility"
that was fostered by mass immigration to the United States and then migration
during the westward expansion.331  This phenomenon was not merely
geographical; it brewed in a cauldron of individualism, class relations, and
gender roles, 332 as illustrated by one of the Supreme Court's most quoted cases
on the sanctity of marriage, Maynard v. Hill.333 Racism also inflected bigamy.
As Katherine Franke has demonstrated, the enforcement of marital monogamy
against freed slaves during Reconstruction was a means of domesticating
African-Americans and controlling their presumed "primitive" sexuality.334
Perhaps due to the political importance of preventing bigamy, technicalities
women's domiciles. See, e.g., Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(declaring unconstitutional in-state tuition determination that made married woman's domicile
dependent on husband's domicile).
329. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of vestiges of coverture and
availability of credit for women.
330. Such a view might rest upon theories regarding the historical interconnections between the
rise of monogamous formations, patriarchy, and capitalism. As most famously expressed by Engels:
[Monogamy] was the first form of the family based not on natural but on economic
conditions, namely, on the victory of private property over original, naturally developed,
common ownership. The rule of man in his family, the procreation of children who could
only be his, destined to be the heirs of his wealth .... it appears as the subjection of one sex
by the other.
FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 98-99
(Pathfinder Press 1972) (1884). See GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986), for a
more sophisticated and anthropologically sound view, which is nevertheless largely consistent with
that of Engels' hypothesis.
331. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 193 (1993).
332. Id. at 193-201 (discussing "crimes of mobility" generally and bigamy in particular).
Friedman divides Nineteenth Century bigamists into two broad categories: the swindlers, who married
women for money, and the "restless or faithless husbands" who left their unsatisfying first marriages
and moved on. Id. at 198. Friedman notes that although there were a few cases of women as
bigamists, for the most part, women were victims of bigamy because of their limited social roles, which
valued domesticity and female chastity. Id. at 199-201.
333. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). Although not discussed by Friedman in this context, this appeal from
the Territory of Washington arises from Maynard's leaving his wife of twenty-two years in Vermont,
moving west, claiming land as a married man, and then receiving a territorial divorce decree and
marrying another woman. See infra notes 416-32 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Maynard.
334. Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 252 (1999).
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often prevail over subjective intentions. In the Reconstruction context, a former
slave could be unknowingly deemed "ipso facto married" to the person with
whom he or she was living on a statute's effective date; a marriage to another
person constituted the crime of bigamy. 335 In addition to the irrelevancy of not
knowing one was married, one's belief that the previous marriage had been
terminated might also be irrelevant. For example, in its 1945 decision in
Williams v. North Carolina,336 the United States Supreme Court upheld
convictions for bigamy regardless of the couple's belief in the validity of their
Nevada divorces. 337 While this imposition of strict liability in the criminal
context continues, it remains controversial and unsettled. 338 Civil repercussions
for bigamy, which result in a void marriage and thus a disentitlement to financial
benefits of marriage, persist unabated.
33 9
Finally, it is significant that the prohibitions against bigamy and polygamy
do not currently encompass sequential bigamy and polygamy.340 One may marry
as many times during one's life as one desires-as a substantial proportion of
Americans do 341-as long as each previous marriage has been dissolved through
335. See id. at 287-88 (discussing State v. Melton, 26 S.E. 933 (N.C. 1897), and bigamy in the
emancipated slave context); Kirk v. State, 65 Ga. 159 (1880) (discussing bigamy connections of two
former slaves who married women other than those they were living with on "effective date" of state's
marriage law).
336. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
337. Williams, 325 U.S. at 238. As the Court stated, by traveling from North Carolina to Nevada
to divorce their respective spouses and then returning to their previous home in North Carolina, the
petitioners "assumed the risk that this Court would find that North Carolina justifiably concluded that
they had not been domiciled in Nevada." Id. at 238. In his vigorous dissenting opinion, Justice Black,
joined by Justice Douglas, criticized the majority's decision as one which would "cast a cloud over the
lives of countless numbers of the multitude of divorced persons in the United States." Id. at 262
(Black, J., dissenting).
338. In addition to the disagreement voiced within the opinions of State v. Williams, Justice
Traynor's influential opinion for the California Supreme Court in People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850 (Cal.
1956), declared a good faith belief that the previous marriage had been terminated to be a defense to
the state bigamy statute, a conclusion disputed by the dissenting justice who opined that "specific
intent to commit the crime of bigamy is not required by statute expressly nor by reasonable
interpretation .... a person remarries at his peril." Id. at 857 (Shenk, J., dissenting). Compare Stuart
v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 533, 533-34 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that defendant's reasonable
belief that his prior marriage was ended by divorce is not defense to bigamy because statute under
which he was convicted does not contain language requiring proof of specific intent to violate
prohibitions), with State v. Seek, 37 P.3d 339, 342-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing bigamy
conviction after examining legislative intent of statute and finding that statute's intent provision is
ambiguous and thus rule of lenity applies).
339. For example, in Croskey v. Ford Motor Co.-UAW, 28 Employee Benefits Cas. 1438, 2002
WL 974827 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2002), the district judge denied motions for summary judgment in a
dispute regarding the payments of pension benefits to the surviving spouse when two women claimed
that status. Id. at *2. What becomes clear from the opinion is that although each of the women seems
to have viable claims to the benefits, any sort of equitable distribution or division is unthinkable.
340. But see supra notes 267-68 for a description of common law statutes that declare bigamous
any remarriage of party guilty of adultery until death of spouse, even in cases of legal divorce.
341. According to government statistics, of the total of 2,443,489 couples who married in the
United States in 1990, almost half-forty-six percent-included a person who was not marrying for the
first time. In twenty percent of the total number of marriages, both spouses were previously divorced.
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death or legal proceedings.
In sum, from an equality perspective, same-sex marriage advocates should
not seek distance from plural marriage or bigamy. It may be understandable
that same-sex quasi-marital devices would seek to emulate marriage as closely as
possible, yet this emulation raises serious equality concerns. Most obviously, the
historical confluence of proscriptions against polygamy as practices of Mormons
and "Asiatic and African people," 342 raises religious, racial, and national origin
categories that would merit strict scrutiny under traditional equal protection
doctrine and to which sexual minorities should be sympathetic. Perhaps more
importantly, however, is that a more expansive notion of equality requires that
when we advocate for relationship law reform, whether these reforms take the
configuration of marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, or other forms,343
we must measure the success of our efforts in terms of who and what we are
excluding.
In the realm of intimate relations, the exclusion of heterosexuals, those who
may be related to each other, and simultaneous relations engender the same
degree of equality problems as does the exclusion of lesbians and other sexual
minorities. To reach such a conclusion is not necessarily to accept Adarand's34
ahistorical and individualistic version of equality or to adopt a stewardship of
other disfavored groups. Instead, our reforms should embrace all of us-
including the bisexual feminist with a political objection to marriage, the lesbian
who wants to marry her aunt, and the three lesbians in a "collective." Equality
amongst all disfavored groups is as important as our equality with heterosexuals.
C. Compulsory Matrimony
The unequal exclusion from marital and quasi-marital forms might not be
relevant if such legal relationships did not bestow a variety of benefits. Indeed,
the recitation of the tangible and intangible benefits of marriage is an integral
part of the argument for same-sex marriage. The legal benefits of marriage
constituted the grounding of the Vermont Supreme Court's rationale that denial
of marital advantages to same-sex couples violated the state constitution's
common benefits clause.345  The benefits of marriage support numerous
Sally Clarke, Advance Report of Final Marriage Statistics, 1989 and 1990, 43 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT No. 12(S) 1-5 (Jul. 14, 1995).
342. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
343. An exemplary model is Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 123-31 (2001). Suggesting corporate models for intimate
relationships, Martha Ertman analogizes limited liability companies to polyamorous relationships,
importantly seeking to denaturalize heterosexual marriage and provide morally neutral rules for
forming and dissolving relationships. Id.
344. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for discussions of
Adarand.
345. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of Baker v. State. See also
Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 437 (Or. App. 1998) (holding that denial of
benefits to domestic partners of employees violated Article 1, section 20, of Oregon Constitution,
which forbids inequality of privileges or immunities not made available upon same terms to any citizen
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arguments for same-sex marriage and quasi-marital remedies,346 including
conservative ones.34 7  In addition to tangible benefits, the social value of
marriage sustains the arguments by some same-sex marriage theorists that
anything other than marriage is less than marriage and thus unacceptable. 348
Obviously, legally sanctioned benefits and social approval for marriage entails
corresponding legal disadvantages and social disapproval for the unmarried. In
this way, marriage is coercive.
Like compulsory heterosexuality, compulsory matrimony "needs to be
recognized and studied as a political institution."349 While advocates of same-sex
or class of citizens).
346. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (The Free
Press 1996) 66-70 [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE] (listing benefits of marriage and arguing that
"when the state denies lesbian and gay couples a marriage license" it is "denying those couples dozens
of ongoing rights and privileges that are by law associated with marriage"); Report, Same-Sex Marriage
in New York, 52 THE RECORD (Committees on Lesbians and Gay Men in the Profession, Civil Rights,
and Sex and Law, of the Bar of the City of New York), 1997, at 343, 345, 358-64 (arguing in favor of
same-sex marriage and noting that benefits and burdens of marriage are of great significance and
including "catalogue" of rights and responsibilities of marriage); David L. Chambers, What I?. The
Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 447, 485-91 (1996) (discussing benefits and regulations of marriage and concluding that they
should apply to long term gay and lesbian couples); Debbie Zielinski, Domestic Partnership Benefits:
Why Not Offer Them to Same-Sex Partners and Unmarried Opposite Sex Partners, 13 J.L. & HEALTH
281, 296-98 (1999) (setting forth list of rights and tangible benefits available automatically to married
couples and contrasting this list with schemes of benefits currently offered through many domestic
partnership benefits programs); Carey Goldberg, Gay Couples are Welcoming Vermont Measure on
Civil Union, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2000, at Al (quoting one gay man as saying there has been shift
towards marriages because "people realize there are real legal tangible benefits").
347. See, e.g., Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & Economics
Defense of Same-Sex Marriage 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 115, 117 (2001) (arguing that marriage is
economic relation "like other market transactions upon which [law and economic] scholars-"and
conservatives generally"-prefer to leave as unregulated as possible).
348. See Cox, Return Home, supra note 126 and accompanying text; Wolfson, supra note 162 and
accompanying text for discussion of same-sex marriages and their Constitutional implications. See also
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Political
Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1930 (1997) (stating "[g]ays and lesbians seek not only the tangible
benefits that would accompany a recognition of same-sex marriage, but also the societal
acknowledgment of the humanity and normative goodness that they believe inheres in many of their
relationships"); Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some
Thoughts on the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 319, 320 (1998)
(arguing that although material benefits are compelling reason for gays and lesbians to seek marriage
rights, material benefits not primary reason this right being sought).
349. See ADRIENNE RICH, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in BLOOD,
BREAD, AND POETRY: SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985, 23, 51, 57 (1986) (defining "compulsory
heterosexuality" as heterosexuality that "has been both forcibly and subliminally imposed on women"
and that women's resistance to it can be described along "lesbian continuum"). The term "compulsory
heterosexuality" has been adopted by legal scholars working on a wide array of sexuality issues. See,
e.g., Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody and Same-
Sex Relationships, 23 STETSON L. REV. 701, 730-31 (1994) (arguing "biases against same-sex
relationship are part of system of compulsory heterosexuality" because homosexual relations do not
have traditional female subordinate roles); Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience,
and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 43, 71 (1994) (arguing that 'compulsory
heterosexuality' is certainly part of sexist oppression of women so long as women are constructed as
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marriage may "feel they are, in their personal experience, the precursor of a new
social relations," Adrienne Rich's call to heterosexual feminists regarding
compulsory heterosexuality is apposite. 350 It is important to acknowledge that
sexual objects (or breeders) for men, "and [ciompulsory heterosexuality is simply one of tools used to
construct house of patriarchy"); Cheshire Calhoun, Denaturalizing and Desexualizing Lesbian and
Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1859, 1873-75 (1993) (discussing lesbian continuum and resistance to
compulsory heterosexuality in context of same-sex romantic love); Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights,
Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1493 n.109 (2000) (stating that exclusion of gay men
and lesbians from military is part of "a disciplinary regime of compulsory heterosexuality"); Ruth
Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: a Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 217, 257-59 (1988) (book review) (discussing compulsory heterosexuality and authenticity and
concluding that heterosexual relations can be authentic choice for women); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial
Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1380-81 (2000) (arguing that compulsory heterosexuality undermines
women's sexuality); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One Size
Does Not Fit All, 64 ALB. L. REV. 905, 908 (2001) (discussing resistance of lesbians in 1970s to
compulsory heterosexuality); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183 (2001) (stating "degree to which social preferences and
prohibitions-otherwise known as compulsory heterosexuality-contribute to the 'fact' stated by the
first proposition has become relatively accepted within feminist, and certainly queer, theory circles");
Kris Franklin & Sarah E. Chinn, Lesbians, Legal Theory and Other Super Heroes, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 301, 310 n.42 (1999) (book review) (discussing Rich's argument that women resisted
compulsory heterosexuality by creating primary relationships with women along lesbian continuum);
Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornography after Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium: A Call
for Gay Male Cooperation in the Struggle for Sex Equality, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 21, 49 (1997)
(questioning gay male pornography's abilities and inabilities to combat "compulsory
heterosexuality"); Tamara Packard & Melissa Schraibman, Lesbian Pornography: Escaping the Bonds
of Sexual Stereotypes and Strengthening Our Ties to One Another, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 299, 315-16
(1994) (arguing "[f]rom birth, dominant culture indoctrinates women into compulsory heterosexuality
through fairy tales, television, movies, and mainstream pornography" and that lesbians have struggled
and continue to struggle regarding sexuality, but criticizing lesbian continuum notion for denying
lesbian sexuality); Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in the
Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 512 (2000) (noting relationship between compulsory
heterosexuality and gender identity); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1431, 1467 (1992) (stating "[h]omophobic violence aims to regulate the erotic economy of
contemporary American society, or more specifically, to enforce the institutional and ideological
imperatives of what Adrienne Rich has termed 'compulsory heterosexuality"); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual
Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 234 (1995) (comparing Native
American "pan-sexuality" with Euro-American "compulsory heterosexuality"). See also Andrew
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 197, 247 (1994) who states:
A lesbian fails to provide the emotional nurturance and solace from the difficult world of
maleness that, many men feel, women exist in order to provide; she signifies that there is no
way back from that world. The prohibition of lesbianism has an unmediated, direct relation
to gender inequality. Adrienne Rich argues that this prohibition is best understood as one
item in an arsenal of male-created institutions that enforce "compulsory heterosexuality,"
institutions that have the purpose and effect of guaranteeing that men will continue to have
physical, economic, and emotional access to and control over women.
350. See Rich, supra note 349, at 35 (discussing importance of examining heterosexuality as
"political institution"). Rich seeks to "encourage heterosexual feminists to examine heterosexuality as
a political institution that disempowers women-and to change it." Id. at 23. She argues that "when
we look hard and clearly at the extent and elaboration of measures designed to keep women within a
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matrimony, like heterosexuality, may not be a "preference at all but something
that has had to be imposed, managed, organized, propagandized, and maintained
by force." 351 While some same-sex marriage advocates have theorized same-sex
marriage as an antidote to compulsory heterosexuality, 352 the compulsory nature
of matrimony itself remains disputed 353 or unacknowledged. 354 Yet the failure to
examine matrimony, like the failure to examine heterosexuality "as an institution
is like failing to admit that the economic system called capitalism or the caste
system of racism is maintained by a variety of forces." 355
The most obvious of these forces cohere into a legal regime that provides
benefits to marital partners. While the Vermont Supreme Court listed numerous
tangible benefits, 356 one of the most pronounced benefits occurs because of the
perverse system of health insurance in the United States that links medical
benefits with employment.3 57 Given the importance of health care, same-sex
male sexual purlieu, it becomes an inescapable question whether the issues feminists have to address is
not simple 'gender inequality' nor.., mere 'taboos against homosexuality,' but the enforcement of
heterosexuality for women as a means of assuring male right of physical, economic, and emotional
access." Id. at 49-50.
351. Id. at 50. Rich argues that for women, heterosexuality must be "imposed, managed,
organized, propagandized and maintained by force." Id.
352. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 346, at 65 (stating that "[m]arriage, in short, is
the last legal bastion of compulsory heterosexuality") (emphasis in original); Barbara J. Cox, The
Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage as an Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L.
REV. 155, 162-65 (1997) (arguing that "equal marriage" displaces compulsory heterosexuality and that
"[e]very time I assert that I am married, I am claiming that the norm of heterosexuality cannot control
me").
353. See, e.g., TESS AYERS & PAUL BROWN, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY
WEDDINGS 5 (1994) (stating "[niobody's saying that if you're allowed to get married, you have to get
married"); E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 189 (Beacon Press 1999) (arguing that "opening
marriage to same-sex couples would scarcely force marriage on all lesbians and gay men"); Greg
Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15, 58 (2000) (noting
that within confines of institution like marriage, "the lesbian and gay community can chart its own
course").
354. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 346, at 66 (noting that state "encourages"
marriage, but not considering whether this encouragement might amount to compulsion); Cruz, infra
note 453 and accompanying text for a discussion of marriage as expressive conduct.
355. See Rich, supra note 349, at 51 (noting that questioning heterosexuality would be
rewarding).
356. See Baker, 744 A.2d at 883-84 (listing benefits of marriage).
357. The vast majority of Americans, roughly two-thirds of the population, pay for heath care
with the assistance of some private third party financing scheme, generally purchased through their
employment under the incentives of federal tax exemption for those benefits. Kenneth R. Wing,
Health Care Reform In The Year 2000: The View From The Front Of The Classroom, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 277, 286 (2000) (citing Health Care Fin. Admin., National Health Care Expenditures
Projections: Table 3b, National Health Care Expenditures, Percent Distribution and Per Capita
Amounts by Source of Funds available at http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/NHE-Proj/proj1998/
tables/table3b.htm (last modified July 12, 1999)). Although Professor Wing does not use the term
perverse, he characterizes the United States health care system thusly:
We are Americans and we have a uniquely American way of delivering and financing health
care, both in the sense that our way is unlike that in any other country, and in the sense that
it reflects some very basic American characteristics. We are Americans and not Canadians
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marriage and domestic partnership advocacy has understandably focused on the
injustice of not allowing a same-sex partner of an employee to have the same
access to health benefits as would a legal spouse of the employee.35 8 Yet the
larger injustice-the lack of universal health care-remains largely
imperceptible. 359 Instead, the imposition of matrimonial devices becomes the
proposed-and very partial-"solution" for the travesty of the health care
system.36° Marriage is the "cover," which is itself an assimilationist demand that
obscures the realities of deeper inequalities.36t Although the remedy of marriage
or Swedes or inhabitants of any of the multitude of countries that accept socialized health
care more readily. We are Americans and not free marketeers or libertarians, at least not to
the extent that we could ever buy and sell health care in the same way we are told we would
buy and sell widgets. No one set out to create American health care delivery and financing
the way that it is today. It can not be justified in terms of any one person's theoretical model
or any organized set of principles.
Id. at 292.
358. See, e.g., Univ. of Alaska v. Tumeo, 933 P.2d 1147, 1152 (Alaska. 1997) (holding that
University's health benefits program unlawfully discriminated on basis of marital status because, by
providing added health care coverage for married employees but not for unmarried employees,
University compensates married employees to greater extent than it compensates unmarried
employees); ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 346, at 67 (noting that "especially employer spousal
benefits" are tangible economic advantages associated with same-sex marriage); Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 142-43
(1996) (stating "[domestic partnership] establishes a civil rights remedy to the pervasive practice of
disproportionately providing married employees with health insurance, paid bereavement, family sick
leave and other 'family' based benefits that are denied to unmarried employees and their families");
Jonathan Andrew Hein, Caring For the Evolving American Family: Cohabiting Partners and Employer
Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REv. 19, 39 (2000) (asserting that equitable considerations
mandate extension of benefits to domestic partners and pointing out that failure to extend health care
benefits to committed, unmarried partners violates the principle of equal compensation for equal
work).
359. Cf. Wolfson, supra note 162, at 605 (stating that "we can, and should, advocate for universal
health care alongside marriage, as well as alongside domestic partnership").
360. For example, although "up to 70 million Americans may lack health insurance," and without
insurance health care is largely unavailable, "domestic partner benefits, although applicable to a
proportionately small segment of society, provide a significant means of reducing the economic burden
presented by the uninsured." Hein, supra note 358, at 25-26 (emphasis added).
361. As Kenji Yoshino explains it, the assimilationist strategy of "covering" is different from
"passing" or "converting" because in "covering" a "group is permitted both to retain and articulate its
identity as long as it mutes the difference between itself and the mainstream." Yoshino, Don't Ask,
supra note 6, at 500. For example, "covering" occurs when "a black woman is told that she is 'too
black' or 'too feminine."' Id. at 501. This demand to cover has a subtle and pervasive presence in
equal protection doctrine. Id. at 502. Further:
It is not captured in any discrete factor, but rather in a classification-based-as opposed to
class-based-view of equal protection. A classification-based view of equal protection seeks
to treat all classes created by a classification the same, while a class-based view privileges the
disadvantaged class(es) created by a classification. Because it tends to ignore differences
between the classes created by a classification, the classification-based view often results in
the demand to cover. The ideal of 'color blindness' is perhaps the best example of such a
classification-based view. In attempting to be color-blind, the judiciary often garners results
that not only ignore the real disparities between whites and blacks but evaluate blacks by
implicitly white standards. In order to succeed, blacks are forced to meet those standards,
and thereby must mute any cultural and historical differences between whites and blacks. In
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is individualized, that does not mean marriage is not "imposed, managed,
organized" with reference to political institutions such as matrimony, capitalism,
and the liberal state.362
The tangible benefits of matrimony 363 accrue not only when there is a
medical problem, 364 but also when the relationship is terminated, either by
death 365 or separation. 366 Although not all matrimonial benefits are economic, 367
for the most part, legal benefits arose from the premise of marriage as a
relationship of economic dependency and on society as one of capitalist
inequality. 368 The idea of matrimony as an "economic partnership," if not always
such a scenario, blacks are not being asked to convert or to pass, but they are being asked to
cover.
Id. at 502-03 (footnotes omitted).
362. For a critique of health care reform and the liberal state, see Kevin P. Quinn, S.J., Viewing
Health Care as a Common Good: Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 285
(2000), arguing that "true reform will require looking beyond individual choices made by bargain-
hunters in the medical marketplace and beginning to think in the 'first person plural,"' rejecting
among other things, the concept of the neutral liberal state which allows market forces to regulate
access to goods.
363. This is not to imply that the "benefits" of matrimony are always subjectively experienced as
positive. If one party is economically advantaged in divorce or other termination of the relationship
proceedings, this occurs in relation to the other party, who is necessarily economically disadvantaged.
Moreover, third parties, such as creditors, may seek to become akin to third party beneficiaries to the
marital contract. See, e.g., Queen's Med. Ctr. v. Kagawa, 967 P.2d 686, 700-01 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that woman who filed for divorce was nevertheless liable to hospital for medical treatment
costs incurred by her husband before his death based on theory that marriage is economic
partnership); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and Divorce: the Gap Between
Reality and the Internal Revenue Code, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 421, 429-33 (1996) (discussing
difficulty of proving one is "innocent spouse" and thus not liable for tax consequences on joint return).
364. In addition to health care costs, other health care issues include access and decision-making.
The court in Baker specifically included the right to hospital visitation and other rights incident to the
medical treatment of a family member. Baker, 744 A.2d at 884.
365. These benefits include the right to receive a portion of the estate of a spouse who dies
intestate and protection against disinheritance through elective share provisions; preference in being
appointed as the personal representative of a spouse who dies intestate; the right to bring a lawsuit for
the wrongful death of a spouse; the right to bring an action for loss of consortium; the right to workers'
compensation survivor benefits; and the right to spousal benefits statutorily guaranteed to public
employees, including health, life, disability, and accident insurance. Id. at 883-84.
366. For the court in Baker, these benefits are phrased as "the right to receive, and the obligation
to provide, spousal support, maintenance, and property division in the event of separation or divorce."
Id. at 884.
367. One of the most interesting arguably non-economic benefits is the spousal testimonial
privilege, which protects and can even prohibit one spouse testifying against the other. See id. at 884
(listing as benefit "the right to claim an evidentiary privilege for marital communications"). See also
MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANINGS OF MARRIAGE 89-135 (1999),
for a doctrinal and theoretical discussion of the testimonial privilege in the context of the marital
relationship.
368. Indeed, Martha Ertman has argued that there should be a debtor/creditor relationship
between the spouses that would value homemaker contributions to family wealth governed by Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for
Valuing Women's Work Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17, 19-20 (1998).
See also Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75 DEN. U. L.
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an equal one, is the prevalent modern view.369
One of the consequences of this view is that those who do not participate in
the "economic partnership" of matrimony may suffer financially. This financial
disadvantage may occur through the workings of capitalism or it may be more
directly influenced by the state. For those who are employed, the substantial
portion of wages paid in "fringe" benefits-up to forty percent of total
compensation 370 -is considerably lessened if one does not have a partner or
dependents eligible for these benefits. On this view, those who are unmarried do
not receive equal pay for equal work.371 Rather than prohibit this inequality, the
REV. 1215, 1226-50 (1998) (discussing proposal for premarital security agreements from perspectives
of queer theory).
369. Accord In re Marriage of Heupel, 936 P.2d 561, 570 n.l (Colo. 1997) (noting that marriage
is "an economic partnership" and "deferred compensation, such as retired pay, by its nature requires
that former spouses extend their economic partnership beyond the date of dissolution"); Queen's Med.
Ctr., 967 P.2d at 699-700 (stating marriage is "economic partnership" and duties and obligations of
parties terminate only when partnership legally terminates and not upon filing of divorce); Dejesus v.
Dejesus, 687 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (N.Y. 1997) (acknowledging "the contemporary view of marriage as an
economic partnership, crediting each party's contributions, whether monetary or not, to the growth
and value of the marriage"); Roane v. Roane, 407 S.E.2d 698, 701 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that
equitable distribution of property upon divorce "is predicated on the philosophy that marriage
represents an economic partnership requiring that upon dissolution each partner should receive a fair
proportion of the property accumulated during marriage"); S. REP. No. 98-575, 1 (1984), reprinted in,
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547 (noting that the Retirement Equity Act is intended to amend ERISA to
account for "the status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to
that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home"); UNtF. MARITAL PROPERTY
ACT, Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 104 (1998) (stating "it has become increasingly recognized in the
realities of American family living... [that] [m]arriage is partnership to which each spouse makes a
different but equally important contribution); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 general cmt., 8
U.L.A. 93 (1998) (stating "main purpose of the revisions is to bring elective-share law into line with
the contemporary view of marriage as an economic partnership"); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance
and the Modem Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 148-63 (1994) (discussing view of marriage as
economic partnership); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: the Impact of New York's
Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 624 (1991) (noting that
divorce reform was based upon the "the modem view of marriage as an economic partnership of
equals"); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family Income-Sharing and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 73 (1993) (noting modern tax law assumes "an economic
partnership" model); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2356-60 (1994) (discussing and criticizing "influential metaphor" of
marriage as economic partnership); Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed
Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689, 695-96 (1990) (discussing and critiquing economic partnership
theory of marriage and its relation to divorce reforms); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-
Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223,
236, 236 n.38 (1991) (discussing marriage as "economic partnership" and noting that "[o]ne of the
earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of marriage appears in the 1963 Report of the
Committee on Civil and Political Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women").
370. See Heidi Eischen, Survey, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to
Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 531 (2000) (pointing out that fringe
benefits can comprise up to 40% of employee's compensation); Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic
Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less Than Perfect
Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 337, 342 (1998) (discussing studies indicating
fringe benefits are between thirty and forty percent of total compensation).
371. See Thomas F. Coleman, The High Cost of Being Single, American Association for Single
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government encourages it through tax policies applicable to both employer and
employee. 372 This government subsidy of the marital relation is most obvious
when employers provide compensation in the form of domestic partnership
benefits that do not receive this favorable tax treatment and are taxable as
income to the employee. 373  Importantly, however, employees without
dependents and without a partner, whether a legal spouse or domestic partner,
do not receive this compensation at all.
Tax subsidies of the marital relation are not limited to employee benefits.
The federal income tax system is weighted in favor of the married, especially
those whose income patterns follow the traditional model of dependency and
disparate income. 374  Despite the much discussed "marriage penalty" '375
addressed by the recent Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act,376
People, available at http://www.singlesrights.com/cost-discrimination.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
Coleman also discusses discrimination against unmarried persons in the form of higher taxes, higher
insurance rates, especially automobile insurance, credit discrimination, housing discrimination,
disparity in consumer discounts (such as "family" discounts in auto clubs, airport, health, and country
clubs), and disadvantages in child custody, will challenges, and survivor's rights. Id.
372. As Nancy Knauer explains, these benefits are deductions to the employer as salaries or
other compensation, but excludable from the gross income of the employee. Nancy J. Knauer,
Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 129, 169 (1998) (citing I.R.C. §132
(1994) and I.R.C.§ 162(a) (1994)).
373. See id. at 169-70 (discussing tax consequences and citing applicable IRS private letter
rulings).
374. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
787, 788-90 (1997) (demonstrating that marriage penalty is greatest when total household income is
split equally between spouses and marriage bonus is greatest when total household income is earned
by only one wage earner, but noting that these bonuses or penalties are not distributed evenly and
marriage penalty does not begin until one spouse earns twenty percent of what other spouse earns);
Amy C. Christian, Legislative Approaches to Marriage Penalty Relief: The Unintended Effects of
Change on the Married Couple's Choice of Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 303, 321-26
(1999) (demonstrating that because of tax code's combination of income aggregation and income
splitting, the greater the difference in incomes of spouses, the less the tax liability). As Patricia Cain
notes, the "marriage penalty denies married couples the benefit of using the lower single-taxpayer
rates because the entire joint return rate system is based on an archaic view of married couples as
couples in which one spouse works and the other stays home." Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual
Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 465,487-88 (2000).
Nancy Knauer provides an enlightening brief history of the income tax code's treatment of
marriage, from the original mandate of separate tax returns for spouses which, resulted in disparities
in tax liability depending upon whether the couple resided in a community property state or a separate
property state, to the Congressional enactment of joint filing provisions in 1948, to the subsequent
protest against the "singles penalty" waged by War Widows of America who successfully argued that
they were being saddled with additional tax penalties despite the patriotic loss of their husbands
resulting in the 1969 adoption of the rate schedules, which led to the possibility of a "marriage
penalty." Knauer, supra note 372, at 147-52.
375. The marriage penalty is the increase in tax liability if a couple files jointly or as married
persons filing individually compared with the tax liability if the two persons could file individual tax
returns, and it is attributable to the graduated tax scheme. For discussions of the controversies
regarding the marriage penalty. See id. at 185-208 (demonstrating prevalence of moral dimensions of
arguments as they began in 1992 Republican "Contract with America" until publication of her article
in 1998).
376. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 16, 115 Stat.
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even before the Act more married couples benefited from a "marriage bonus"
rather than a "marriage penalty" in the income tax scheme. 377 Additionally, the
transfer of assets between unmarried parties is subject to more stringent tax
requirements,378 pronounced in cases in which great wealth is involved. 379
Especially important for the less wealthy, the social security tax and benefit
scheme3 80 likewise privileges the married over the unmarried, again with
increased advantages for married couples whose income distribution follows the
breadwinner/dependent model. 381
38 (2001). Title III of the Act, entitled Marriage Penalty Relief, provides that beginning in 2005, those
couples in the fifteen percent tax bracket shall have the marriage penalty "phased out." In assessing
this portion of the Act, the New York Times reported:
Millions of two-income couples who are in the higher brackets [than the 15% bracket],
however, will continue to be penalized. The maximum marriage penalty is almost
$18,000... but the maximum relief .. would [be a savings of] $1,531 .... The changes also
mean that more couples will collect a marriage bonus, paying less in taxes than they would as
singles because one spouse earns the bulk of the family income .... And in many cases, that
bonus will be larger.
David Cay Johnston, The Tax Bill Close Up: Some Facts, Some Tips, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at 3-1.
377. See Cain, supra note 374, at 467 n.9 (citing Congressional Budget Office, 105th Cong., For
Better or for Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax 31, tbl.5 (1997)) (concluding "that forty-two
percent of all couples experience a penalty, fifty-one percent experience a bonus, and six percent
experience neither"). The distribution of penalties and bonuses implicates class and racial disparities.
For example, low-income women may be more likely to be employed and have economic parity with
their spouses. Additionally, the aggregation of incomes will reduce any earned income tax credit
designed to benefit those in poverty. Brown, supra note 374, at 789. Brown also concludes that
"[bIlack families are more likely to pay a marriage penalty; white families are more likely to receive a
marriage bonus," id. at 791, because black women are more likely to contribute a larger share of the
marital income, in part due to wage discrimination, id. at 795-96.
378. As Patricia Cain notes, a simple sharing of income can give rise to "unexpected tax
consequences." Patricia Cain, Taxing Lesbians, 6 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN'S STUD. 471, 476-77
(1997) (citing I.R.C. §1041(a) which exempts transfers of property between spouses from being
considered as gain or loss).
379. See Knauer, supra note 372, at 171-77 (discussing estate and gift taxation and "unlimited
marital deduction" allowing non-taxable transfer of 1.25 million dollars).
380. Initiated in 1935, social security is "perhaps the most popular social welfare policy in the
United States" and operates as a tax and transfer system that provides cash benefits and health
insurance to retired or disabled, collecting almost as much in taxes as the federal income tax system
($558 billion for social security in 1998 in comparison to $692 billion for federal income tax that same
year). Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings
Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999). It is a crucial form of income
maintenance for the less wealthy who do not have other forms of income such as private pension
plans, disability insurance, or substantial assets. Id.
381. This inequity occurs because the spouse of a wage earner can choose to collect benefits
based upon her own earnings or collect fifty percent of the benefits which would be paid to the spouse
based upon his earnings. Additionally, a spouse is entitled to survivor's benefits in the event of death.
See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M. P. McCouch, Women, Fairness, and Social Security, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1209, 1230-31 (1997) (pointing out that "[t]he spousal benefit provisions introduce disparities in
the replacement rates of married couples relative to unmarried individuals .... [t]he existing benefit
formula, however, produces a significantly higher replacement rate for married couples than for
unmarried individuals with equivalent preretirement standards of living"); Jonathan Barry Forman,
Making Social Security Work for Women and Men, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 359, 369 (1999)
(noting that for the social security system to get money for spousal benefits, "the benefits provided to
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Overall, the entire federal tax scheme fosters and subsidizes the economics
of marriage. "Being first a product of politics, taxation's most conspicuous
characteristics are those of the political power represented in its provisions. '382
The political power exercised in taxation maintains the political institution of
compulsory matrimony. When lesbian and other sexual minority advocates
argue that the tax systems should accommodate same-sex couples on the same
terms as married couples, the issue of compulsory matrimony is elided.383
In addition to income tax laws, other federal laws affecting people's
economic lives privilege the marital relation and provide adverse consequences
to the unmarried. For example, the federal bankruptcy laws specify various
privileges for the married, 384 although the "biggest benefit" may be indirect, as
the laws allow one person to purchase goods for use by the other and then
discharge those debts.385
Additionally, for persons subsisting on public benefits, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) 386 stresses marriage as a means to remedy poverty387 and
individual workers must be less than actuarially fair. In essence, workers subsidize the Social Security
benefits provided to spouses and surviving spouses .... These 'extra' benefits for spouses are paid for
by reducing the benefits available to workers, including unmarried workers"); Jonathan Barry
Forman, Social Security: What Can Be Done about Marriage Penalties?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 553, 555 (1997) (contending "spousal benefits are heavily subsidized by unmarried workers. In
short, married couples make out like bandits, but unmarried workers pay the bill. Worse still, not all
married couples are winners. The only real winners are traditional, one-earner married couples, right
out of the 1930s.").
382. Nancy E. Shurtz, Critical Tax Theory: Still Not Taken Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1837, 1854
(1998).
383. See, e.g., Knauer, supra note 372, at 157 (arguing that same-sex couples and lesbian and gay
scholars seek inclusion within marital realm, while other progressive scholars are working to dismantle
marriage based tax system).
384. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to
Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM. L. REV. 69, 71,
103-112 (1998) (arguing that Congress should reconsider whether debtors should be entitled to extra
benefits based "simply on their choice or ability to marry" and listing those benefits as including
option of joint filing to minimize expenses, shielding of property held as tenants by entirety, and
option to treat non-debtor spouse as dependent regardless of actual dependency); A. Mechele
Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses be Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts, 78
B.U. L. REV. 961, 966 (1998) [hereinafter Dickerson, To Love, Honor] (arguing that law should deny
federal bankruptcy benefits to any married debtor whose spouse refuses to accept certain burdens to
avoid current situation of subsidizing married debtor by creditors and society at large, rather than
solvent spouse).
385. Dickerson, To Love, Honor, supra note 384, at 964.
386. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reclamation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
387. Accord NANCY F. COT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 222
(2000) (noting that proponents of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act "spoke as
though the marriage ceremony itself magically solved the problem of poverty" and "said 'get a job!'
and 'get married!"'); GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 78 (1998) (stating "Personal Responsibility
Act codifies the claim that marriage is the best antipoverty policy"); SANFORD F. SCHRAM, AFTER
WELFARE: THE CULTURE OF POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIAL POLICY 40 (2000) (noting "[w]elfare reform
may initially be largely about getting single mothers to work, but as those jobs fail to produce a livable
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concomitantly seeks to penalize the unmarried without directly challenging
established constitutional doctrine. 388 The first statement that Congress makes
in its findings is that "marriage is the foundation for a successful society," 389
emphasizing the rise in out-of-wedlock pregnancies by teenaged and other
women 390 and the harm to children born out of wedlock, including their reduced
chance of "growing up to have an intact marriage.391 These findings are the
support for a system with the stated purpose of "promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage." 392 This purpose becomes actualized in the funding
incentives to states to reduce the number of out-of-wedlock births,
393
wage, the policy's focus logically shifts to getting women to marry men"); Martha Albertson Fineman,
The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, passim
(1998) (arguing that independence as an ideal and dependency as a stigma prevent true welfare
reform, and that marriage is not a solution to dependency, instead, we should recognize that all
families are dependent and receive subsidies, and caretakers should be compensated); Nicole
Huberfeld, Three Generations of Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the
Recent "Workfare" Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 127-8 (1998) (criticizing Act's assumption that
"marriage is the solution" that " will solve all of welfare mothers' problems" ); Megan Weinstein, The
Teenage Pregnancy "Problem": Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 126 (1998) (arguing that
Act assumes that when teenagers marry, family will be less poor and welfare costs will be reduced).
388. In New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973), the Court held that
a statute limiting welfare assistance to families which consisted of "two adults of the opposite sex
ceremonially married to each other" unconstitutionally deprived illegitimate children equal
protection. Id. at 619-20. The brief per curium opinion, however, provoked a dissent by Justice
Rehnquist, who reasoned that the state was not acting irrationally in conditioning benefits on "the sort
of ceremonial marriage that could quite reasonably be found to be an essential ingredient of the family
unit" that the state legislature is attempting to protect, especially as compared to "communes." Id. at
622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
389. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reclamation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, tit. I, §101 (1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §601 (notes) (1996 &
Supp. V. 2000)).
390. While the findings state the "increase in the number of children receiving public assistance is
closely related to the increase in births to unmarried women," id. §101 (5) (C), the statistics for "out-
of-wedlock" births are not limited to women receiving public benefits. PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-
193, tit. I §101 (6)(B), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110-2111 (1996) (appearing at 42 U.S.C. §601 (notes) (1996 &
Supp. V. 2000)) (reporting that "out of wedlock" births in 1991 comprised 29.5% of births). One
wonders what percentage of these births are attributable to the "lesbian baby boom." Moreover, a
percentage of these births in several states could be due to married but feminist mothers. See Wendy
Chavkin et. al., Sex, Reproduction, and Welfare Reform, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 379, 385
n.32 (citing Jane Lawler Dye & Harriet B. Presser, The State Bonus to Reward a Decrease in
"Illegitimacy": Flawed Methods and Questionable Effects, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., May-June 1999, at 144
(reporting that Connecticut, Michigan, Nevada, and New York over estimate number of actual out-of-
wedlock births since "new mother is considered unmarried if the mother's last name is different from
the father's")).
391. PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I §101 (8)(E), 110 Stat. 2105, 2111 (1996) (appearing at
42 U.S.C. §601 (notes) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)).
392. PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I §401 (a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (appearing at 42
U.S.C. §601 (notes) (1996 Supp. V. 2000)).
393. PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I §402(a)(1)(v), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(1)(A)(v) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (providing that state funding plans
"[elstablish goals and take action to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
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prohibitions against providing assistance to certain unmarried teenage mothers
while allowing assistance to married teenage mothers,394 and requiring only
unmarried women to comply with the work-fare requirements. 395 For unmarried
women who nevertheless do give birth, the welfare system imposes a regime of
quasi-marriage through its mandated co-operation with paternity
determinations. 396 This imposition of marriage can be more direct when the
federal government decides to deem two people married for welfare purposes,
despite the fact that they are not legally married. 397
In the non-federal context, state laws regulating inheritance also privilege
marriage. One of the goals of intestate succession is the maintenance of the
pregnancies"); PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I §403 (a)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 2105, 2118 (1996)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)(A) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (providing "bonus" to
states to reduce illegitimacy and providing additional grant for "each bonus year for which the State
demonstrates a net decrease in out-of-wedlock births").
394. PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I § 408 (a) (4), 110 Stat. 2105,2135-36 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608 (a)(4) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (prohibiting assistance to unmarried
mothers under age of 18 who have not completed high school and are not engaged in educational
activity); PRWORA Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I § 408 (a)(5), 110 Stat. 2105, 2136 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608 (a) (5) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (prohibiting assistance to unmarried
mothers under the age of 18 who do not live with a parent or guardian).
395. Compare Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. I § 407(c)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 2105, 2132 (1996) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2)(B) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (requiring unmarried mother to work
unless she is exempted under disability); with Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 407(c)(1)(B)(ii), 110 Stat. 2105,
2131 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (c)(1)(B)(ii) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)) (not
requiring married woman to work if her spouse is working or otherwise qualifying). Congress
amended the latter statutory provision to now provide that "the individual and the other parent" in
the house be working "for a total of at least 55 hours per week," thus reducing the benefit to married
women. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 55504(d), 111 Stat. 251, 609 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (c)(1)(B)(ii) (1997 & Supp. V. 2000)).
396. While welfare policy since 1968 has required maternal compliance in paternity proceedings,
the PRWORA intensifies this policy by requiring states to reduce the grant of unmarried women who
fail to co-operate by at least twenty-five percent and providing that the grant may be entirely denied.
Pub. L. No. 104-193 tit. § 408(a)(2), 110 Stat. 2105,2135 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608
(a)(2) (1996 & Supp. V. 2000)). Gwendolyn Mink points out that it is not only conservatives who
champion enforced paternal child support as a solution to poverty, but liberals and feminists as well.
Mink, supra note 387, at 78-86. Mink, however, argues that it is important to make a distinction
between "child support that is sought and child support that is imposed," id. at 83, and to remember
that "some mothers do not have support orders because they do not want them;" some unmarried
women do not want to identify the biological father or have him involved with the child or with her, id.
at 85. She argues that the Act seeks to "foster marriage-like heterosexual relations." Id. at 71.
397. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d) allows the government to deem two people receiving SSI, supplemental
security income for disability based upon indigence, married if they "hold themselves out as husband
and wife," regardless of their actual legal status. In Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235 (7th Cir. 1993). the
court upheld this provision and its implementing regulations in a constitutional challenge, concluding
that there was no infringement on any fundamental decisional freedom to marry, the rational basis test
therefore applied, and the state's legitimate interests in efficiency, prevention of fraud, and
administrative convenience were being served in a rational manner. Id. at 239-40. See United States v.
Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1285, 1285 n.9 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984) (discussed infra
notes 426-27, 432), for a case deeming two persons as being married under the state's common law
marriage doctrine over their objections for purposes of the Federal Employees Compensation Act.
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dominance of the marital relation and the nuclear family. 398 Similarly, elective
share statutes prevent a spouse from being disinherited, despite the intent of the
testator as expressed in a will. 399  Recent attempts to broaden intestate
succession include Hawai'i's Reciprocal Beneficiary Act 4 ° and a proposal to
amend the Uniform Probate Code to include surviving committed partners 40 1 as
determined by incorporating some functional definitions that replicate the
marital relation. 40 2 Yet again, these reforms do not fundamentally challenge
compulsory matrimony or question the benefits provided for married persons
over single persons, but merely attempt to make marital privileges somewhat
398. See Fellows et al., supra note 243, at 13-16 (tracing purpose of intestacy laws to promoting
historically-valued institution of marriage).
399. For example, New York provides that regarding wills executed after 1966, a personal right
of election is given to the surviving spouse to take a share of the decedent's estate. N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 2003). The share is one third of the estate if the decedent has
children and one-half of the estate if not. Id. This provision was invoked by a same-sex partner who
was a specific and residuary legatee of the will with the exception of certain real estate, allegedly
constituting over eighty percent of the value of the estate, which was left to a lover of the decedent. In
re Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 797-98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). The court held that the
statutory term "surviving spouse" "cannot be interpreted to include homosexual life partners," id. at
799, and rejected the constitutional challenge to such a construction, id. at 800-01.
400. The laws affected by the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-7 (2000),
see supra notes 200, 242 and accompanying text, include both the intestate succession laws and the
elective share provisions. The intestate succession statutes now provide that like the spouse, the
intestate share of a surviving reciprocal beneficiary is the entire estate if there are no surviving parents
or descendants or if all of the surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse or
reciprocal beneficiary. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-102 (Michie 2001). The statute also contains
three other variations depending upon the existence and relation of other survivors. Id. The elective
share provisions, id. §§ 560:2-201-560:2214 (2001), were amended to allow a person designated as a
reciprocal beneficiary to be entitled to an elective share, the amount of which, like the amount for
spouses, is graduated depending upon the length of time the parties were in the applicable
relationship, with between one and two years being three percent and fifteen years or more being fifty
percent. Id. § 560:2-202 (2001). See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18
LAW & INEQ. 1, 36-37 (2000) (arguing these statutes will not reach child of couple who have registered
as reciprocal beneficiaries if the decedent is not legally related to the child).
401. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21, 78-
87 (1994) (proposing amendments which provide for less than spousal intestate share for committed
life partners); see also Fellows et al., supra note 243, at 92-94 (containing as appendix, Waggoner
Working Draft: Intestate Share of Committed Partner). As Professor Fellows points out, Lawrence
Waggoner is a "preeminent scholar of wills and trusts who is a national leader in probate reform" and
who has been involved with draftings of the applicable Restatement and Uniform Probate Code. Id.
at 6 & n.15.
402. Waggoner's proposal requires a "marriage-like relationship" to be assessed in accordance
with factors such as "the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of exclusivity" of the relationship,
the intermingling of finances, the existence of a co-parented child, any commitment ceremonies, and
the holding of themselves out as a "emotionally and financially committed to each other on a
permanent basis." Id. at 92-93. The proposal also includes that there be a presumption of a
committed relationship if they shared a common household for five of the past six years, registered as
domestic partners, engaged in a commitment ceremony "conducted and contemporaneously certified
by an organization," or was a "parent" to the child or had a written co-parenting agreement. Id. Thus,
Waggoner's departure from the solely formal approach of legal marriage is not strictly functional, but
combines elements of the formal and functional. For a critique of functionalism in the context of
couples, see SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 158-67.
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more inclusive.
Specific advantages for married persons persist because there is "no firm
national policy" to eradicate marital status discrimination. 4 3 Constitutionally,
classifications based upon marital status are accorded only minimal scrutiny.4°4
Statutorily, neither Title V11 40 5 nor the Fair Housing Act 40 6 prohibit marital
status discrimination. Indeed, the only federal prohibition of marital status
discrimination appears in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which was passed
in 1974 largely to protect married women who were unable to obtain credit in
their own names,40 7 although it also applies to unmarried persons.40 8
Most often, to the extent marital status discrimination is protected, it is
because various state anti-discrimination statutes include "marital status" as a
protected category. 40 9 The prospect of protecting unmarried cohabitants under
403. While made in the context of housing discrimination, Justice Thomas' remark that unlike
race discrimination, there "is surely no 'firm national policy' against marital status discrimination,"
describes the general federal landscape. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Cmm'n, 513 U.S.
979, 981 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (arguing marital status discrimination is
not protected, and in many ways is codified in law through, for example, intestacy law, surviving
spouse death benefits, and marital privilege); see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Cmm'n, 165
F.3d 692, 715 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion withdrawn 192 F.3d 1208 (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 220
F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001) (arguing "[ilt is beyond cavil that
there is no similar [to race] 'firm national policy' against marital-status discrimination").
404. See, e.g., Smith, 5 F.3d at 239 (applying rational basis scrutiny to constitutional challenge of
marital status classification in supplemental security income welfare statute).
405. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A
Proposal for Title VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (2000), for an argument that Title VII should
be amended to include marital status and a discussion of the ways in which marital status
discrimination has been litigated as sex discrimination. Employment discrimination against unwed
pregnant women or unwed mothers may violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(k) (1976).
406. Although the Civil Rights Act (Fair Housing Act) of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, 3604 (1976 &
Supp. V 2000), includes the prohibition of discrimination based upon "familial status," 42 U.S.C. §
3602(k) defines "familial status" as meaning the domicile of children with adults.
407. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976) (prohibiting creditors from discriminating against any applicant,
with respect to any aspect of credit transaction-"on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age"). The Act, as originally passed in 1974, included only sex and marital
status. Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title V, 58 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-
1691f (1988 & Supp. V 2000)). Its purpose was "to eradicate credit discrimination waged against
women, especially married women whom creditors traditionally refused to consider for individual
credit." Anderson v. United Fin. Co., 666 F.2d 1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982). In addition, the legislative
history includes much discussion of discrimination against divorced and separated women, as well as
married women. See Susan Smith Blakely, Credit Opportunity for Women: The ECOA and its Effects,
1981 Wis. L. REV. 655, 656-57 (discussing Act and its amendments and arguing for "effects test"
similar to that of Title VII because the ECOA was passed to address discrimination against women);
Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer
Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 41 (1994) (discussing Report of National Commission on
Consumer Finance and Congressional hearings).
408. See, e.g., Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(stating that although primary purpose of Act was to prevent credit discrimination against married
women, it also extends to prevent any discrimination based on marital status).
409. For example, California prohibits marital status discrimination in employment in California
Fair Housing and Employment Act. CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 12900-12906 (West 1992), and in certain
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such statutes has provoked claims by landlords asserting a violation of their
religious freedom rights by being forced to rent to people "living in sin. ' '410
welfare benefits, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18907 (West 2001) (prohibiting discrimination on basis
of marital status in provision of food stamps), although California's comprehensive Civil Rights
Statute, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-51.12 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001), does not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of marital status. In New York, marital status discrimination is prohibited in employment,
public accommodations, private and public housing, and public education, New York Human Rights
Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2001), credit, New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296-a (McKinney 2001), insurance, N.Y. INS. LAW § 2607 (McKinney 2000), and educational
opportunities, N.Y. EDUC. LAWS § 313 (McKinney 2000). New Jersey's prohibition of marital status
discrimination is similarly comprehensive, encompassing employment, public accommodations,
housing, credit and market transactions, Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1-10:5-
49 (West 1993), as well as specific provisions for public and quasi-public employment, see New Jersey
Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (West 1993) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital
status in right of citizens to hold elected office or employment); New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:1-10 (West 1993) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital status by industries
engaged in defense work); New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:2-1 (West 1993)
(prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital status in employment on public works). On the other
hand, Texas limits marital status discrimination prohibitions to credit and insurance matters. See e.g.,
TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 341.401 (Vernon 1999) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital status in
the extension of credit); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-6 (Vernon 1999) (prohibiting discrimination
on basis of marital status in provision of insurance); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.50 (Vernon's 1981)
(prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital status in provision of mortgage guaranty insurance),
although a relatively new statute prohibiting discrimination in utilities also includes marital status
discrimination, TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 17.004 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2003) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of marital status in the provision of telecommunications and retail electric
services).
410. See, e.g., Thomas, 165 F.3d at 718 (holding anti-discrimination statute may not be enforced
against landlord who, for religious reasons refuses to rent to unmarried couples), withdrawn and reh'g
granted, 192 F.3d 1208, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999), and rev'd on other grounds, 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (rejecting landlord's claim for lack of ripeness); Swanner v. Equal Rights Comm'n, 874
P.2d 274, 277 (Alaska 1994) (holding that claimed defense of religious freedom failed because
governmental interest in abolishing improper discrimination in housing outweighed landlord's interest
in acting based on his religious beliefs and landlord could not claim exemption from fair housing law
because engaging in voluntary commercial activity did not entitle him to burden private right of
unmarried couples to nondiscrimination in housing), cer't denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert); Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914 (Cal.
1996) (holding Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993)) would not exempt
landlord from state anti-discrimination provisions because landlord could choose to engage in
economic activities that were not subject to statute; prohibition did not substantially burden landlord's
free exercise of religion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 243 (Mass. 1994) (vacating and
remanding case for question of whether state has compelling interest to prevent discrimination based
on marital status to justify burden on landlord's exercise of religion); McCready v. Hoffus, 586 N.W.2d
723, 726 (Mich. 1998) (holding that state Civil Rights Act's prohibition against marital status
discrimination encompassed unmarried cohabitants and was sufficiently compelling to override any
religious freedom interests asserted by landlords who chose to participate in real estate market); State
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (plurality opinion) (holding that state's prohibition of
marital status discrimination did not apply to unmarried cohabitants and considering "state's
paramount need under our constitution to protect religious freedom").
See Maureen E. Markey, The Price of the Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right
to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1995), for an excellent
scholarly discussion of the conflict between religious freedom and marital status discrimination in
housing. See also David Kushner, Note, Free Exercise, Fair Housing, and Marital Status-Alaska Style,
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Another area of contentious litigation has been employer anti-nepotism rules
that prohibit spouses from being employed in the same company. 41' The very
existence of the scattered statutes prohibiting marital status discrimination can
conflict with-and often seem subordinate to-the "nationwide policy in favor of
marriage. '412  The coercive nature of matrimony is often apparent: married
persons asserting marital status discrimination may be successful because the
failure of their claims would imply a policy favoring non-marriage, 413 while
unmarried persons, especially couples, claiming marital status discrimination can
avoid the discrimination "simply by marrying. '414  Under this regime of
compulsory matrimony, the inability of same-sex couples to marry can mean that
sexual orientation discrimination is afforded more relief than marital status
discrimination. 415
12 ALASKA L. REV. 335 (1995) (discussing marital discrimination in housing and exemptions for
landlord's freedom of religion); Jack S. Vaitaynonta, Note, In State Legislatures We Trust: The
"Compelling Interest" Presumption and Religious Free Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 886 (2001) (discussing importance of enforcing civil rights laws, including laws
protecting against marital discrimination).
411. Jurisdictions have been divided on the question of whether statutes prohibiting marital
status discrimination forbid the common employment prohibition against relatives in general (anti-
nepotism policies), and spouses (no-spouse rules), in particular, working together. Under the broader
construction of the statutes, marital status refers to the identity, occupation or situation of a spouse, as
well as to whether an individual is married, single, divorced, widowed, and thus anti-nepotism and
anti-spouse rules are disallowed. Under a more narrow construction of "marital status," the
protection is afforded to a person's status of being married or unmarried. Compare, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v.
State 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (holding that absent compelling, bona fide occupational
qualification, anti-nepotism rule that denied full time employment to individuals whose spouses were
already full time employees violated marital status anti-discrimination statute because otherwise
employees could be discouraged from marrying); Thompson v. Bd. of Trustees, 627 P.2d 1229, 1231
(Mont. 1981) (holding that school district policy that administrators could not have spouse employed
in any capacity by the school system was violative of state statute prohibiting discrimination on basis of
marital status because this could lead to absurd result that dissolution of marriage could mean that
individuals could keep their jobs), with Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 382 A.2d 53, 56
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (holding that employer's rule that spouses cannot work in same
freight terminal fell outside statutory prohibition on discrimination based on marital status because
marital status refers to state of being married and not "relationship" with a particular person);
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 415 N.E.2d 950, 953 (N.Y.
1980) (holding that anti-nepotism rules did not violate state's ban on marital status discrimination
because term "marital status" does not encompass identity or occupation of spouse, but merely state
of being married or single).
412. Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 606 (7th Cir. 2001). Judge Posner discounts the claim
made pursuant to a Chicago ordinance prohibiting marital status discrimination by stating that "the
purpose, at least the primary purpose, of such a prohibition is surely not to dethrone marriage; it is to
prevent discrimination against married women, whose employers might think have divided loyalties.
Id. at 609. Such laws are pro-marriage, not anti- as the plaintiff suggests." Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 609-10.
413. See supra note 411 (discussing Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 386; Thompson, 627 P.2d at 1229).
414. Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 606 (discussing domestic partnership benefits which can be obtained by
heterosexual couples "simply by marrying").
415. In Levin v. Yeshiva University, 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001), New York's highest court
considered a challenge to a university's housing policy, which limited housing to students, their
spouses and children. The court concluded the policy did not result in marital discrimination because
housing did not depend on marital status, but instead merely restricted housing to those in "legally
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While specific legislative acts and judicial constructions provide the
framework for the edifice of compulsory matrimony, legal and political rhetoric
constitutes the foundation. Indeed, it is marriage that is often likened to a
foundation itself. The United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Maynard, decided in 1888, that marriage is "the most important relation in life,"
and "the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be
neither civilization nor progress" was perhaps ironically rendered in the context
of upholding a legislatively declared divorce. 41 6 In this century, the Court's
hyperbole in Griswold v. Connecticut,417 that marriage "is a coming together for
better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,"
supported the establishment of the right to contraception as an aspect of
constitutional privacy. 418 These paeans to marriage are echoed not only by the
United States Supreme Court in other decisions, 419 but by courts considering
issues such as lesbian and gay relationships and challenges to the marriage
laws, 420 grounds for separation or divorce, 421 equitable distribution of marital
recognized, family relationships with a student." Id. at 1102. The court, however, remanded the case
for determination of whether the policy disproportionately burdens lesbians and gay men, and if so,
whether the university could justify its policies as bearing a "significant relationship to a significant
business objective." Id. at 1106. Only Judge Judith Kay dissented in part, finding that the plaintiffs
stated a claim of marital status discrimination. Id. at 1109-10 (Kaye, J. dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
416. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205, 211. Maynard had left his wife and children in Ohio, traveled to
Oregon, claimed land in the Oregon Territory as a married man, then later received a divorce by the
legislative assembly of the territory, and married another woman. Id. at 190. Maynard died intestate
and the subject of the dispute is ownership of the land. Id. at 190-195. For a discussion of Maynard in
historical perspective, see HENDRICK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 261-62
(2000) (describing case as "paradigm of western remarriage" and noting that it marked understanding
that divorce was not "near criminal process," but was part of state's marital powers).
417. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
418. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
419. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (declaring unconstitutional state
statute which barred marriage for persons delinquent in child support payments) (quoting,
respectively, Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486); Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816,843-
44 (1977) (quoting Griswold and recognizing that marital relations are protected although not
biologically based in context of discussion of rights of foster parents); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S.
14, 30 (1902) (quoting Maynard in upholding Massachusetts Supreme Court's refusal to give effect to a
divorce decree rendered in South Dakota).
420. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1114 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J.,
concurring) (citing Maynard v. Hill and distinguishing lesbian ceremonial marriage which caused
plaintiff to be terminated from employment from marriage recognized as important and foundational);
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333, 361 (D.C. 1995) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386) (proposing that marriage is fundamental to our
very existence and survival (citing and quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486)); Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-57
(quoting Maynard as quoted in Zablocki to conclude that there is no right to same-sex marriage under
Hawai'i's constitutional provision protecting right to privacy); Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87 (citing
both Griswold and Maynard, but concluding that there is "commonsense" basis for marital restrictions
"based upon the fundamental difference in sex").
421. See, e.g., Rachel v. Rachel, 33 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (upholding
requirement of corroboration by non-party of grounds for divorce) (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. 190);
Rabinowitz v. Rabinowitz, 321 N.Y.S.2d 934, 940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (holding that incompatibility
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property, 422 child custody, 423 disputes surrounding estates424 the constitutionality
of "heart balm" statutes that abolish actions for breach of promise to marry,425
conviction for false statements, 426  qualifications for federal benefits, 427
insurance, 428 termination of employment,429 immigration,430 and issues regarding
marriage licenses.431  Whenever the subject involves marriage, the judiciary
hastens to stress its importance by invoking human civilization and the sacred.
Congress has likewise engaged in this valorization of marriage, despite the
fact that our federalist system entrusts domestic relations, including marriage, to
and "infrequent violence" do not justify the granting of a legal separation in case of long term
marriage) (citing Maynard).
422. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990) (holding
that marital property obtained from illicit sources is not subject to equitable distribution).
423. See, e.g., Waites v. Waites, 67 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Mo. 1978) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486,
about sanctity of marriage and adding that in child custody cases "children, faultless in the parental
dispute, are objects of sad residual conflict").
424. See, e.g., Adams v. Boan, 559 So. 2d 1084, 1087-88, 1088 n.1 (Ala. 1990) (affirming estate's
administrator to be decedent's common law wife, woman who lived with decedent from age of 16 until
his death little more than two years later, although parties "may not have achieved that idyllic
relationship" as described in Griswold and quoting language); In re Estate of De Laveaga, 75 P. 790,
795 (Cal. 1904) (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. 190, and holding that illegitimate child cannot inherit).
425. See, e.g., Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (N.Y. 1936) (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205
and upholding constitutionality of "heart balm" statute which abolished actions for breach of promise
to marry); Vrabel v. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (upholding same statute).
426. See, e.g., Seay, 718 F.2d at 1285, 1285 n.9 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 and holding that
a woman could be deemed married under state common law marriage doctrine over her objections
and affirming her conviction for making false statements that she was not married).
427. See, e.g., id. at 1285 (quoting Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 in determining whether there was
remarriage terminating federal benefits under Federal Employees Compensation Act); Mincey v.
Celebrezze, 246 F. Supp. 447, 451 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (quoting Griswold, and remanding case to
Secretary for determination of identity of proper widow of deceased in social security benefits claim).
428. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Flaumenbaum, 308 N.Y.S.2d 447, 465-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970)
(quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 as support for presumption that husband and wife are members of
same household under terms of insurance contract).
429. See, e.g., Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing and
quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, for language regarding sanctity of marriage in rejecting police
officers' constitutional challenge to regulation requiring their dismissal based upon their sexual
relationships with prostitutes); Tylo v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(citing and quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 for language regarding sanctity of marriage in discovery
dispute concerning queries about plaintiffs' relationship with her husband in pregnancy discrimination
suit brought by actress against television series producers).
430. See, e.g., Perez-Oropeza v. INS, 56 F.3d 43, 45 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at
205; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486, regarding importance of marriage in
declining to extend the sibling provision permitting discretionary waiver of deportation where alien
aided illegal entry of his spouse, parent, or child).
431. See, e.g., Moran v. Moran, 933 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Maynard, 125
U.S. at 211 and holding parties' marriage based on private marriage contract invalid and rejecting
freedom of religion challenge to state licensing requirement); In re Application of H. and W., 5 Pa. D.
& C.2d 791, 794 (Phila. County Orphans Ct. 1956) (citing Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205 and directing clerk
to issue marriage license to parties, despite fact that parties had previously been ceremoniously
married while one was underage).
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the states rather than to the federal government. 432 While the United States
Supreme Court expressed little doubt the previous year that family law was
within the exclusive province of the states,433 the proceedings of the 104th
Congressional session attest to Congressional fervor on the subject of marriage.
The PRWORA, passed in that session, is replete with hortatory claims for
marriage, including its finding that "marriage is the foundation of a successful
society. ' 434 DOMA 435 seeks to "defend" marriage from those who would
degrade it, including, but not limited to, same-sex-couples. 43 6 As Nancy Knauer
notes, the rhetoric surrounding Congressional consideration of DOMA was
"replete with the image of marriage as the elemental building block of society,
whether that be a rock, a foundation, a pillar, or a keystone. '437 Taken together,
the rhetoric surrounding DOMA and PRWORA establishes the zeal of elected
federal officials to exalt marriage.438
432. Maynard's celebration of marriage is rendered in service to state power: it implies that
because marriage creates the most important relation in life and essential to morals and civilization, it
"has always been subject to the [state] legislature," 125 U.S. at 205, and because it is the "foundation of
the family and society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress," it rests upon
the "the general law of the State, statutory or common," id. at 211. While the precise issue in Maynard
involved a question of the power of the territorial legislature rather than the judiciary to grant a
divorce, it is often cited for the proposition that it is the states that have power to determine marital
status. For example, in Seay, 718 F.2d at 1285, the court cited and quoted Maynard for the precept
that it "is a well-established rule that a state has the power to determine how its residents enter into a
marital relationship." Id. The court, therefore, concluded that there was no requirement of uniformity
for determining marriage under the Federal Employees Compensation Act, a program under which
the defendant was receiving widow's benefits that would terminate upon remarriage and upheld her
conviction for making false statements regarding her present marital status based upon South Carolina
doctrine, which recognized that "a common law marriage may exist despite denials by the husband and
wife." Id. at 1282-3. See also Vincent v. LeDoux, 83 So. 439, 440 (La. 1919) (quoting Maynard and
stating that it "is undisputed and undisputable that each of states is vested with power to determine
the marital status of its own citizens").
433. In United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court's rhetorical use of family law places
it unquestionably within the province of state rather than federal power. In holding that the federal
Gun-Free Schools Act exceeded Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejects the government's arguments that
possession of a firearm in a school zone could affect the national economy by retorting that under the
government's rationale "Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for
example." Id. at 564. Rehnquist's opinion for the Court likewise criticizes dissenting Justice Breyer's
argument that education serves commercial purposes because under such a rationale "Congress could
just as easily look at child-rearing" as commercial. Id. at 565 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 629 (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
434. Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title I § 101 (1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (appearing at 42 U.S.C. § 601
(notes) (Supp. V. 2000)). For discussion of PRWORA, see supra notes 386-97 and accompanying text.
435. Pub. L No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996 & Supp. 2002)). See
supra note 127 for list of journals containing scholarly discussion of DOMA.
436. The purpose of DOMA is to "defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,"
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906, a defense which is especially
necessary given that the "institution of marriage is already reeling because of the effects of the sexual
revolution, no-fault divorce and out-of-wedlock births," 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2919.
437. Knauer, supra note 370, at 190 (footnotes and citations to Congressional Record omitted).
438. This is not to say that this exaltation is not without its anxieties. See, e.g., SCHRAM, supra
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More consistent with federalist concerns, a few state legislatures have also
seen fit to make explicit state policy in favor of marriage. For example,
Wisconsin's Family Code specifically states that its intent is "to promote the
stability and best interests of marriage and the family," that "marriage is the
institution that is the foundation of family and of society," and that marital"stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and
the state. ' 439 Other states have enunciated their praises of traditional matrimony
in their enactments of so-called little DOMAs, which articulate their state public
policy as limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 440
In a brilliant example of not only the override of federalism through
funding,441 but also of the leverage provided by "welfare reform," the PRWORA
not only promotes marriage for poor persons, but provides incentives for states
to educate poor and non-poor alike 442 that marriage is "the expected standard of
human sexual activity" and that "sexual activity outside the context of marriage
is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects." 443  The federal
government's sex-education program-which one commentator has described as"no-sex education"n4 -demands abstinence-only sex-education. This funding,
accepted by every state except California,445 requires states that accept funding
note 387, at 112 (discussing DOMA and noting that welfare is not only social policy that reflects
"anxiety" about marriage and family).
439. WIS. STAT. § 765.001(2) (2001). Subsection (3) of § 765.001 provides that The Family Code
shall be "liberally construed" to give effect to these objectives.
440. ALA. CODE. § 30-1-19 (b) & (c) (1998) (noting that state has "special interest in
encouraging, supporting, and protecting the unique relationship" of marriage "in order to promote,
among other goals, the stability and welfare of society and "marriage is a sacred covenant"); LA Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1999) (providing legislative history stating "the state of Louisiana has
manifested through its laws and in civilian theory, that the institution of marriage is one that sustains
order and morality in our communities and preserves the posterity and well- being of our larger
society"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650 (2)(A) (West 1998) (stating purpose of Act "to
encourage traditional monogamous family unit as basic building block of our society, and foundation
of harmonious and enriching family life"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 551.1 (2002) (noting that state has
"special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting that unique relationship [of marriage] in
order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of society").
441. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding Congressional scheme of
conditioning funding for highway construction upon state's adoption of minimum drinking age of 21).
For scholarly discussions of Congressional power pursuant to the spending clause, see generally John
C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001); David
E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox:
The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141 (2002).
442. As Anna Marie Smith observes, PRWORA "reaches far beyond the relatively small
numbers of teen parents on welfare." Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of
Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 195 (2002).
Moreover, she notes that "[slome of the federal funds earmarked for poverty assistance are being
directed towards state education departments to support abstinence education courses that are
delivered to all public school students, poor and non-poor alike." Id. at 197.
443. PRWORA, 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(D)-(E) (2000).
444. JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECrING CHILDREN FROM SEX
90 (2002).
445. See Smith, supra note 442, at 197 n.284, 206 (2002) (dividing other states into four categories
[Vol. 75
2002] ASSIMILATION, MARRIAGE, AND LESBIAN LIBERATION 797
to use the monies for teaching a sex-education program limited in content to
teaching abstinence from sex outside of marriage. 446
The government is spending a substantial sum of money447 to convince
teenagers not merely to abstain from premature sex, but to abstain from
premarital sex. This abstinence-only sex-education provision within welfare
reform is buoyed by arguments regarding the economic consequences of unwed
motherhood. 448 The government, however, is not content with such arguments;
if it were, government policy could address the issue by fostering premarital birth
control, including abortion, or perhaps even more radically, economic support
for single parents. Instead, the sex-education message uses sex itself to promote
marriage. People who accede to the sex-education abstinence message are
channeled into marriage as a condition for sexual expression. For those who
disregard the abstinence-only sex-education message, 449 the coercive pressures
may occur as negative reinforcement: the funding scheme has precluded
education about ways in which they could protect themselves from HIV/AIDS,
sexually transmitted diseases, or pregnancy and has instead insisted that
marriage is the only defense.450 At the very least, according to the government
on other education information provided in addition to abstinence: severely conservative, strongly
conservative, conservative, and moderate based). Although Oregon received the only moderate
classification because it concurrently taught about contraception, it was not characterized as liberal
due to failure to require tolerance for homosexuality or gender equality. Id. at 205-06.
446. The present Secretary of Health and Human Services, apparently does not view the
program as limiting, even though it is confined to marital sex:
Abstinence education is more than saying no to nonmarital sexual activity. These programs
help teens formulate positive, achievable goals for their lives, provide them with skills to
foster communication with their family and friends on sensitive matters such as sex, and
teach them how to resist pressure to engage in risk-taking activities.
Press Release, Tommy Thomson, HHS Secretary, Regarding Committee Action of Abstinence
Program Provisions, available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020424a.html (last
modified April 24, 2002).-
447. The President's budget for 2003 pledged to spend $135 million for abstinence-only
education. Press Release, HHS, President's Budget Increases Abstinence Program Funding, available
at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2002pres/20020131a.htm (last modified January 31, 2002). In 2000,
one commentator noted that in the last five years, Congress had increased federal funding for
abstinence only sex-education by three thousand percent. Elizabeth Amdorfer, Absent Abstinence
Accountability, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585, 586 (2000).
448. See supra note 389-91 (noting Congressional findings in PRWORA include statement that
"increase in the number of children receiving public assistance is closely related to the increase in
births to unmarried women," Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title I § 101 (5) (C), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (appearing
at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (notes) (Supp. V. 2000)).
449. Arndorfer, supra note 447, at 590 (recognizing recent research fails to show effectiveness of
abstinence-only programs); Smith, supra note 442, at 196 (arguing abstinence education programs
have had no effect on students' sexual behavior).
450. See 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2)(C) (2000) (requiring abstinence be taught as only method of
contraception certain to prevent "out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other
associated health problems"). A bill is currently before the House of Representatives that provides
reauthorization of the abstinence only funding. See HR 4585, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002) (extending
funding until 2007 for abstinence only education). In addition, the Family Life Education Act which
also includes contraception and safer sex-education, has been introduced. HR 3469, 107th Cong. § 1
(2001).
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funded sex-education curriculum, engaging in sexual activity before marriage
will likely have harmful psychological effects. 451  Thus, the government is
attempting to compel marriage through sex-education by teaching teenagers that
marriage is the only acceptable condition for sexual expression.
Legal rhetoric, rules, pronouncements, and perhaps even propaganda in the
guise of sex-education are not the only strategies for maintaining a system of
compulsory matrimony. What may be broadly termed "the social" operates to"organize and propagandize" 452 marriage. Arguments for same-sex marriage
recognition adopt these social themes. For example, David Cruz draws upon an
array of sources to support his conclusion that marriage is expressive conduct. 453
With seeming approval, he notes:
- a married woman has an acceptability and legitimacy that a single
woman lacks;454
- to "make an honest woman" of someone means to lawfully marry
her;455
- marriage is a sign of maturity;456 marriage epitomizes maturity;457
- to be married is to be an adult, to accept commitment, to pledge one's
self to fidelity, loyalty, and devotion;458
- marriage means that one's sexuality is not one's predominant
interest; 459
- the desire to marry to constitute one's identity is a human desire. 46°
Such statements illustrate not only that marriage may be an "expressive
activity," but also coercively ensure that such expressive activity occurs. The
universalization of matrimony as a human desire, like the universalization of
heterosexuality as human, functions as a "theoretical and political stumbling
block. ' 461 It does not allow for the questioning of matrimony as a choice or
451. 42 U.S.C § 710 (b)(2)(E) (2000).
452. See Rich, supra note 349, at 50.
453. David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment and Marriage as an
Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925 (2001).
454. Id. at 937 (citing Jeanne M. Eck, The Shun Factor, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at D5).
455. Id. at 939. Cruz does not provide a specific source for this statement, but it appears to be an
interpretation of a general perception.
456. Id. at 942 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
672 (1980)).
457. Id. (citing CHRIS INGRAHAM, WHITE WEDDINGS: ROMANCING HETEROSEXUALITY IN
POPULAR CULTURE 3 (1999)).
458. Cruz, supra note 453, at 942 (citing Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of
Legitimacy: Stripping Opponents of Gay and Lesbian Rights of Their "First Line of Defense" in the
Same-Sex Marriage Fight, 24 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 217,246 (1998)).
459. Id. at 942-43 (citing Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling,
Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511,
546 (1992)). This proposition does earn a skeptical comment regarding its validity: "Marriage...
communicates to the world (however accurately or not) that one's sex life is simply one facet of one's
life." ld. at 942 (emphasis added).
460. Id. at 940 (citing ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 346, at 45).
461. Rich, supra note 349, at 50.
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preference and leaves little space for dissenters. Moreover, any dissenters that
exist are implicitly pathologized as immature, uncommitted, unfaithful, disloyal,
undevoted, and overly sexual. For women, this pathology is expressed as more
pronounced, given the implicit view that unmarried women are unacceptable and
illegitimate, and if sexually active, somehow dishonest and disreputable.
To be "single" is to be defined " through absence," by a "lack of," and "to
conjure up images of a lone fragmentary existence," for which women have been
especially stigmatized.462 This stigma attaches despite purported celebrations of
the sexy single woman, because such a woman is still "hoping for the big white
wedding that will signal her social completion. ,463 The enactments necessary for
this social completion, from the engagement ring, the invitations, the pre-
wedding showers, parties, and dinners, to the wedding clothes, rings, ceremony,
reception, and gifts, and on to the honeymoon, are all supported by a huge
industry464 and are predominant in popular culture.465 That the ceremonies,
etiquette, and commercialism of the wedding industry are translatable to gay and
lesbian couples is unsurprising.466 Lesbians and gay men are included in the
statement that "most of us have been brought up with expectations that we will
marry," 467 yet our personal "choice," no less than the choice of heterosexuals, is
overdetermined by external social forces.468 Thus, the desire or choice to marry
should be as open to question as the desire or choice to be heterosexual. 469
462. JACLYN GELLER, HERE COMES THE BRIDE: WOMEN, WEDDINGS, AND THE MARRIAGE
MYSTIQUE 64 (2001).
463. Id. at 54. Geller supports her thesis with an analysis of popular cultural representations,
including Helen Gurley Brown and recent television programs such as Sex and the City, id. at 54-63,
and Ally McBeal, id. at 238-44.
464. See id. at 309, 314 (recognizing that American weddings represent 70 billion dollar industry
and that this money could be better spent on woman's health and education instead of diamonds and
parties).
465. GELLER, supra note 462, at 295-314 (examining television shows, movies, magazines, and
self-help books focused on finding mates and planning weddings).
466. For example, in THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN AND GAY WEDDINGS, the authors
provide a range of advice from dealing with vendors, invitations, ceremony and reception locations,
wedding rings, food and beverages, to the wedding cake, wedding clothes, flowers, entertainment,
parties and gifts, photography and video, and again onto the honeymoon-in short, the same areas of
concern dealt with in traditional wedding guides. See generally AYERS & BROWN, supra note 353
(providing advice for dealing with details of lesbian and gay weddings-the same areas of concern dealt
with in traditional wedding guides). Ayers and Brown also advise that "a business that is gay-owned
or-operated won't necessarily give you ... a better price." Id. at 34.
467. PAULA MARTINAC, THE LESBIAN AND GAY BOOK OF LOVE AND MARRIAGE 76 (1998).
468. See GELLER, supra note 462, at 70-71 (opining that a woman's decision to marry is rarely
individualistic given influence of "family pressure, legal sanction, and the deluge of consumer images
linking wedlock to female happiness and self-worth").
469. Interestingly, despite the failure to consider the possibility of compulsory matrimony in his
work of marriage, David Cruz provides an excellent analysis of compulsory heterosexuality as related
to the "choice" to undergo sexual orientation conversion therapy. David. B. Cruz, Controlling
Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REv.
1297, 1340-45 (1999). Cruz argues that "given historical and present social circumstances" he gravely
doubts whether a person's choice to "submit to sexual reorientation can be voluntary" in a society in
which sexual minorities are "subject to legal and other social sanctions" and the pressures of
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Social, political, and legal forces combine to produce a system of
compulsory matrimony. Thus far, this system has excluded same-sex couples.
Nevertheless, any quest for lesbian and gay marriage occurs within this coercive
construct.
D. Marital Identity and the State
One need not perceive marriage as a "repressive" institution to take
seriously Foucault's suggestion that we question how the processes of becoming
individuals are linked to the state.470 This linkage between our individualization
and the state is inherent in much of same-sex marriage advocacy. For example,
as one same-sex marriage advocate phrases it, marriage has a necessary
"civilizing" effect,471 but such rhetoric depends upon the oppositional and
degraded state of nature. Moreover, the celebration of civilization rejects any
critique of the ways in which civilization depends upon capitalist exploitation and
inequalities. That this civilizing effect is important, "especially for gay men" who
"have been known for their promiscuous subcultures, '" 472 is not merely an
argument regarding personal happiness. The individual satisfaction with
marriage (as opposed to promiscuity) is inextricably connected to the state.
Although this connection is often articulated by metaphors rather than with
compulsory heterosexuality are difficult to quantify. Id. at 1344-45. Cruz uses the exclusion of same-
sex couples from state sanctioned marriage as a prime example of the valorization of heterosexuality.
Id. at 1345.
The issue of sexual conversion therapy is important. See MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURES: A GAY
MAN'S ODYSSEY 32-202 (1991) (detailing struggle to accept homosexuality despite therapeutic
attempts to "cure" it); Laura Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion
Therapy & Liability, 8 B.U. Pua. INT. L.J. 219, 220 (1999) (seeking to develop theory to hold
therapists who seek to alter person's sexuality liable for damages). Even so, the number of people
who submit to therapy to alter their sexual orientation is far surpassed by the number of people who
submit to therapy to achieve marital or quasi-marital relationship "success." See American
Association for Marriage and Family Therapy, A Consumer's Guide to Marriage and Family Therapy
(1997) available at http://www.aamft.org (last visited June 27, 2001) (estimating that at any given time,
marriage and family therapists are treating over 1.8 million people). Given compulsory matrimony,
one wonders whether a person's choice to submit to "marriage counseling," seek "couples therapy," or
individual therapy to "find a mate" can truly be voluntary.
470. See DREYFUS & RABINOW, supra note 106 at 208-16 (arguing individuals should be
liberated from both "the state and from the type of individualization that is linked to the state").
471. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE, supra note 346, at 9.
472. Id. at 9-10. Eskridge contends that same-sex marriage could be particularly useful for gay
men, to the extent that males have been more "sexually venturesome (more in need of civilizing in our
culture than women)," and further that "sexual variety has not been liberating to gay men." Id.
Sounding very Posnerian, he opines:
In addition to the disease costs, promiscuity has encouraged a cult of youth worship and has
contributed to the stereotype of homosexuals as people who lack a serious approach to life.
(Indeed, a culture centered around nightclubs and bars is not one that can fundamentally
satisfy the needs for connection and commitment that become more important as one grows
older.) A self-reflective gay community ought to embrace marriage for its potentially
civilizing effect on young and old alike.
Id. at 10.
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precision,4 73 arguments that married persons are wealthier and healthier4 74
necessarily implicate the state in several ways. First, while such persons may be
happier, they are also better citizens, able to contribute to the financial health of
the state by paying taxes and not receiving benefits. Indeed, marriage serves to
privatize the risks of poverty and illness and to remove governmental
responsibility. 475  The state's promotion of marriage in its welfare and
bankruptcy laws inures to the benefit of the state fisc. It also allows the state to
be efficient; marriage serves as a "bright line" category for state administrative
regulation. 476
Second, the capitalist state's conceptualization of the married couple as a"unit of consumption" and a "unit of production" is related to the state's interest
in promoting both consumption and production. 477 That this "unit" could be
redefined as a household, 478 does not detract from the central premise that what
is at stake is capitalism. The notion that marriage is an "economic partnership"
is consistent with the state's interest in economic prosperity.479
473. John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1070
(2001) (noting "careful demonstration and documentation" that marriage is beneficial to civil society
is lacking from social science arguments on benefits of marriage).
474. See generally LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).
475. For example, Waite and Gallagher argue that a married partner will help in times of a health
crisis in the way that a "friend or lover" cannot, id. at 69, seemingly discounting any notion that the
state should be required to provide assistance. Additionally, they conclude that "most of the health
benefits of marriage for women" are attributable to having more money, access to better housing and
importantly, private health insurance, "an increasingly precious commodity." Id. at 60. Again, the
possibility of a state solution, such as universal health care, remains unmentioned.
476. Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIAPIAC L. REV. 27, 57-58 (1996).
Cain nevertheless argues that the tax code should recognize same-sex couples because lack of such
recognition "can actually result in losses to the treasury," and that "failure to conform tax law to the
realities of life will produce unnecessary inefficiencies." Id. at 59.
477. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 474, at 17 (stating "[mlarriage creates not just a new unit
of consumption, but a new unit of production: Getting and staying married produces goods for the
partners, their children, and for the rest of society").
478. Cain, supra note 476, at 57 (describing how "functioning households create value to the
state").
479. See supra notes 363-401 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic benefits
that accompany marriage. As Martha Fineman has consistently and eloquently argued, the burden of
this view falls predominantly on women, who are disproportionately caretakers. See generally Martha
Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031 (2001)
(arguing that the gender neutral language and idealized equality reform in the area of custody
decisions disregards or minimizes the role of caretaker in favor of the wage earner and is therefore
often disadvantageous to women, who are usually the family's primary caretakers, and who, as a result
of this role, are forced to decrease their market activity and self-investment and instead a new set of
norms for fatherhood should be created that involve nurturing); Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking
Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995) (discussing that
marriage is seen as a way to implement social policy and achieve independence, and any alternative to
traditional notions of marriage threatens society and therefore punishes women who do not conform
to that model, and suggesting that society look at the function of families, instead of their form);
Martha Fineman, Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73
IND. L.J. 535 (1998) (calling for the abolition of marriage as a legal concept and for the
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
Lastly, it is important to always recall that the state itself creates the
conditions that allow the married to be wealthier and healthier, through a legal
regime that benefits and promotes marriage. 480 As Brian Bix argues, separating
the institution of marriage from "the incentives and disincentives to participate
in it would be a mistake."' 1 While the state's expression of its interests may not
always be consistent or coherent,482 this does not mean that there is not a
predominant orientation.
This predominant marital orientation makes it difficult to disentangle our
personal interests and the state's interests. Just as the regime of compulsory
matrimony makes it difficult to discern whether our "choices" are truly
voluntary, the linkage between state and personal concerns regarding marriage
renders the Foucauldian interrogation demanding. Similarly, when we
incompletely adopt the liberal state's preoccupation with equality-focusing on
whether we as sexual minorities are equal to heterosexuals, but excluding the
inquiries concerning whether other minorities, such as cohabiting but unmarried
heterosexuals, persons in intimate relationships with relatives, and persons who
are simultaneously married to more than one person-we may be serving the
interests of the state more than our own interests. Thus, the previous discussions
regarding problems with equality doctrine and theory as exemplified in legal
problems surrounding unmarried heterosexuals, familial marriage, and bigamy
and polygamy re-emerge when one considers the relationship between the
individual and the state. Similarly, the state's efforts to channel its inhabitants
into marriage likewise demonstrates the need to interrogate the linkage between
our identity as individuals, who seem to possess free choice, and the state's
management of our choices.
Perhaps our individual desires and the state's interests coincidentally merge;
yet questions of causation do not seem to me to be the real issue. Instead,
correlation is sufficient. Given such correlation, I believe it is imperative to
incessantly examine the techniques by which our own personal lives are
"married" to the state.
One area of greatest concern for the state, previously only implicitly
discussed, is the production of its future citizens. For same-sex marriage
advocates, the question of children has become crucial. As Nancy Polikoff has
noted, this "intertwining of marriage and parenting" became obvious during the
post-Hawai'i Supreme Court litigation in Baehr, in which the state chose child-
rearing as a compelling state interest to justify the restriction of marriage to
implementation of private ordering, which would eliminate marital privacy and thus publicize
dependency and better protect women, who traditionally bear the burden of dependency as
caretakers).
480. See supra notes 416-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the coercive promotion of
compulsory matrimony through the legal machine.
481. Brian Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Martial Status of Their Citizens, 55 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1, 8 (2000).
482. See id. at 26-29 (emphasizing incoherence of state policies on marriage and tension between
symbolic and actual support for marriage).
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opposite-sex couples. 483  As Polikoff also observes, the state of Vermont
similarly raised an argument linking marriage and child-rearing in Baker v. State,
but this contention seemingly backfired because the Vermont Supreme Court
used its previous decision allowing joint adoption by a same-sex couples to
bolster its finding that excluding same-sex couples from the benefits of marriage
violated the state constitution. 484 Subsequently, those eager to forestall same-sex
marriage arguments have focused on denying parental rights to lesbians and gay
men.485 Thus, the struggle for same-sex marriage and lesbian/gay parenting
rights have become intertwined.
These two struggles, however, are also intertwined in their implication of
assimilationist concerns. In the next section, this Article turns to a particular
aspect of lesbian parenting litigation, the equality considerations it evokes, a
discussion of the coercive aspects of motherhood, and the ways in which our
identities as mothers are linked to state interests.
V. LESBIAN MOTHERS
At an earlier point in the history of lesbian advocacy, lesbian custody
litigation could quite correctly be considered a civil rights battle for lesbians.4 86
The purpose of such litigation was to prevent lesbians previously involved in
heterosexual relationships from being denied custody based upon their status as
lesbians. Unfortunately, this situation is not merely historical; (former)
husbands and other relatives continue to deprive lesbians of the custody and
company of our children.487 The energy of our advocacy is now devoted to
483. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partners but not Parents/ Recognizing Parents but not
Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the United States, 17 N.Y.L. SC-i. J. HUM. RTs.
711, 738 (2000) (discussing how Baehr v. Lewin marked seminal retreat from positive developments in
law of lesbian and gay parenting, illustrating that state still equated same-sex couples with negative
parenting); see also Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *16-20 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996) (discussing and rejecting state's arguments).
484. See Polikoff, infra note 486, at 746 (noting that Vermont Supreme Court used its past
treatment of child-raising to reject state's explanation for its marriage restriction); see also Baker, 744
A.2d at 882 (reasoning that exclusion of same-sex couples from legal protections of marriage exposes
their children to precise risks that state argues marriage laws are designed to guard against).
485. Polikoff, supra note 486, at 749-50.
486. Unfortunately, I am unable to attribute this insight to particular lesbians on particular
occasions. I believe I have heard it voiced by Nancy Polikoff, Mary Dunlap, and Liz Hendrickson.
This does not mean, however, that "civil rights" were a prominent part of the litigation. In fact, a
conferring of lesbian civil rights in custody cases has been explicitly advised against. See Nan D.
Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation
Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REV. 691, 721 (1976) (suggesting that equal protection arguments in lesbian
custody litigation should be replaced by factual particularization and by decentering of mother's
lesbianism during trial phase).
487. The case of Bottoms v. Bottoms, in which a grandmother was granted custody of her lesbian
daughter's child has become the commonplace illustration. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). The trial court
decision and subsequent appeals attracted national media attention. See, e.g., B. Drummond Ayres,
Judge's Decision in Custody Case Raises Concerns, THE NEW YORK TIMES Sept. 9, 1993, at A16
(documenting collective shock and dismay within homosexual communities over the Bottoms
decision); Debbie Howlett, Judge Rules Lesbian Is "Unfit" Mother, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 1993, at Al
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another type of custody contest: one between lesbians. While the issue of
assimilation and lesbian motherhood is certainly broader than these quarrels, 488
they often entail arguments that poignantly problematize the anti-assimilationist
stance with regard to our notions of equality, coercion, and our identities.
A. Disputes Between Lesbian Mothers
Intra-lesbian disputes may be conceptualized as a situation in which one of
the lesbians is precluded from having a relationship with her child based upon
her status as a lesbian. In the typical scenario, two lesbians agree to have a child,
although the litigation often highlights very differing perspectives on the
existence, extent, and specifics of any agreement. Only one of the lesbians is the
legal mother, most typically because she is the birth mother. The other lesbian is
(detailing facts of Bottoms decision); Elizabeth Kastor, The Battle is for the Boy in the Middle; Little
Tyler's Mom is a Lesbian, So Grandma Got to Take Him Away, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 1, 1993,
at C1 (detailing facts and impact of Bottoms decision). For legal scholarship on the trial court
decision, see generally Joseph Price, Comment, Bottoms III: Visitation Restrictions and Sexual
Orientation, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 643 (1997); Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The
Lesbian Mother and the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 341
(1995); Peter Nash Swifter & Nancy Douglas Cook, Bottoms v. Bottoms: In Whose Best Interest?, 34
U. LoUISvILLE J. FAM. L. 843 (1995). In Bottoms, the lesbian mother's custody was challenged by her
mother-the child's grandmother-and the Virginia Supreme Court sustained the trial court's grant of
custody to the grandmother. 457 S.E.2d at 109. This occurred despite the more stringent standards
when a nonparent, such as a grandparent, seeks custody. See Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the
Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1408-10 (1994) (exposing
inapplicability of third-party doctrine to protect legal mothers in effort to preserve heterosexual
matrix of identity).
As between parents, a child custody dispute is resolved on the basis of the "best interest of the
child" standard, under which several different approaches to a parent's lesbianism have evolved. Most
extremely, a court may decide that lesbianism is a per se disqualification. Once popular, this approach
has been widely rejected. See, e.g., Heidi Doerhoff, Note, Assessing the Best Interests of the Child
Missouri Declares that a Homosexual Parent is Not Ipso Facto Unfit for Custody, 64 Mo. L. REV. 949,
959-60 (1999) (jurisdictions that find homosexual parents per se unfit for custody as matter of law are
rare). More moderate is the nexus approach which requires the court to find a relationship between
parental sexuality and harm to the child. Under the "true" nexus approach, the burden of persuasion
is allocated so that there must be proof that parental sexuality will have an adverse impact on the
child. Yet some courts presume adverse impact, demanding that the sexuality minority parent prove
an absence of harm, an approach that Professor Julie Shapiro calls a standard of "permissible
determinative inference." Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 624, 639-41 (1996). Scholars argue that while the nexus
approach may seem neutral, it is applied operatively to deprive sexual minorities of child custody
because of differing standards of conduct for sexual minorities than for heterosexuals. See Kathryn
Kendall, 35-AUG Trial 42, 43-46 (1999) (documenting inequitable application of nexus test); Shapiro,
supra note 487, at 641-46 evaluating misapplication and distortion of nexus test); Mark Strasser, Fit to
Be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orientation, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 841, 862 (1997)
(concluding that courts often espouse nexus test, and yet deny custody without evidence of harm).
The most liberal approach, and to my mind the only correct one, deems a parent's sexuality
irrelevant.
488. I have discussed such questions in terms of "domestication," elsewhere. See (OuT)LAw,
supra note 5, at 12941 (explicating necessity of choice within lesbian issues and fragmentation within
lesbian community over these issues).
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a nonlegal parent who has not adopted the child, either because so-called second
parent adoption is not legally available or because the parties have not availed
themselves of that process.489 The relationship between the adults deteriorates,
and, usually after a period of accommodation, the lesbian who is the legal
mother decides to deprive her former lover of all access to the child. The
nonlegal mother consults an attorney, receives support from lesbian advocacy
groups, and institutes litigation.
The situation in V.C. v. M.J.B.,490 decided by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, follows these broad outlines.491 The court rejected the idea that a non-
legal "parent" is no "parent" with any claim to visitation, a rationale advanced
by New York's highest court in Alison D. v. Virginia M.4 92 Instead, the court
favored the functional, psychological or de facto definitions of parenthood,
articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-H.
(Holtzman v. Knott).493 Under the Wisconsin test, adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court,4 94 among others,4 95 visitation will be allowed if there is a
489. See Making Mothers, supra note 5, at 17-35, for a discussion of the concept and availability
of second parent adoptions, both as a legal and factual matter.
490. 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000), affg, 725 A.2d 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
491. V.C., 748 A.2d at 542-44. V.C. and M.J.B. are described by the New Jersey Supreme Court
as "lesbians," who began "dating" and then having a "relationship," which an expert "likened" to "a
heterosexual marriage." Id. at 544. During their relationship, M.J.B. was inseminated and there was
some controversy about whether V.C. and M.J.B. "jointly" decided that M.J.B. be inseminated. Id. at
542. According to the court, V.C. claimed that the parties jointly decided to have children" and
"jointly researched and decided which sperm donor to use," while M.J.B. "acknowledged that she
consulted V.C." but that "she individually made the final choice about which sperm donor to use" and
that V.C. was initially unaware of M.J.B.'s visits to a doctor regarding the insemination. Id. M.J.B.
became pregnant with twins and according to the court, both women attended prenatal and Lamaze
classes, and "V.C. took M.J.B. to the hospital and she was present in the delivery room at the birth of
the children. Id. At the hospital, the nurses and staff treated V.C. as if she were a mother. V.C., 748
A.2d at 542. Immediately following the birth, the nurses gave one child to M.J.B. to hold and the
other to V.C. and took pictures of the four of them together." Id.
M.J.B. and V.C. remained together until the twins were almost two years old, with both women
participating in the care of the children. id. at 543-44. At trial, the decision-making regarding the
twins' day care and medical care became subject to intense debate because M.J.B. characterized V.C.'s
role as "mere helper and not co-parent." Id. at 543. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that it was
"clear that M.J.B. brought V.C. to the [child care] center she selected prior to making a final decision"
and that "M.J.B. listed V.C. as the 'other mother' on the children's pediatrician and day care
registration forms" and gave V.C. "medical power of attorney over the children." Id. When M.J.B.
terminated the relationship with V.C., at first the women pursued arrangements that involved V.C. as
a parent in the twins' lives. V.C., at 544. Soon these arrangements disintegrated and as the appellate
court related, M.J.B. decided that she wanted her new lover - and not V.C. - to be the children's other
mother, testifying that "she, the children and her new partner were a family now." V.C., 725 A.2d at
16.
492. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). The court stated that the term
parent does not include categories of non-parents who have developed a relationship with the child.
Id.
493. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995). The court listed requirements necessary to establish a parent-
like relationship with the child. Id. at 434-36.
494. The court in V.C. stated that the "most thoughtful and inclusive definition of de facto
parenthood is in the test enunciated" by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and adopted the test because it
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"parent-like" relationship between any petitioner and the child, which is proved
by meeting four elements:
1) the legal parent fostered and consented to development of a parent-
like relationship between the petitioner and the child;
2) the petitioner and child lived together in the same household;
3) the petitioner assumed the obligations of parenthood by taking
responsibility for the child's care, education, and development,
including but not limited to financial contribution, and did not
expect financial compensation;
4) the petitioner has been in a parent-like relationship a sufficient
amount of time to have a bonded relationship. 496
In addition to these elements, state interference requires a "triggering
event" such that the parent must have interfered with the relationship between
the petitioner and the child, and further that the petitioner must bring the action
within a reasonable time. 497 The Wisconsin Supreme Court's functionalist
approach in Holtzman and its careful articulation of standards is the opposite of
the formalist approach employed by New York's highest court in Alison D.
I have recently elsewhere analyzed some of the problems with the
functionalist approach as articulated in Holtzman and adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in V.C. 498 Borrowing from Professor Julie Shapiro's
critique of second-parent adoptions,499 I have argued that despite some of the
advantages of the functionalist approach, it ultimately enshrines a very
conservative and stereotyped view of parenting 5°° and places the authority for
enforcing that view in the legal system. 50 1
For purposes of evaluating intra-lesbian custody disputes from the anti-
assimilationist perspective, the inquiries are somewhat different. The first
question is whether our advocacy of functionalist definitions of lesbian parenting
fetishizes constitutional concepts rather than striving for a broader approach
such as liberation. While substantive due process rights are implicated in our
functional parent theorizing, usually as belonging to the legal parent and thus an
obstacle to overcome,502 the constitutional principle most at issue is equality.
"provided a good framework for determining psychological parenthood." V.C., 748 A.2d at 551-52.
495. The Massachusetts Supreme Court in EN.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-94 (Mass.
1999), did not explicitly adopt the Holtzman criteria, but used much of its reasoning in its development
of functional definitions of parenthood.
496. Holtzman, 533 N.W. at 435-36.
497. Id. at 421,435.
498. See Making Mothers, supra note 5, at 30-35 (arguing that functionalist approach leads to
conservative definitions of parenting and to inequality in levels of proof for person to be deemed a
parent).
499. See Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 17 (1999) (using lesbian legal theory to critically examine second-parent adoptions).
500. Making Mothers, supra note 5, at 31.
501. Id. at 15-16.
502. In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Court considered a challenge to a Washington
state statute which allowed "any person" to petition for visitation "at any time" and directed the court
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B. Equality and Motherhood
One of the most compelling arguments for judicial adoptions of lesbian
functional parenting arises from comparisons of the legal status of lesbian
parents as compared with that of heterosexual parents, specifically fathers. A
man can become a father simply because of his status as married to the child's
mother.50 3 For the most part, a biological father is deemed a parent with or
without any other connection to a child or to the child's other parent, 04 one
notable exception being the conferring of United States citizenship to the
children of unwed parents.50 5 Given the general trend of deeming fathers as
to grant visitation if it was within the "best interests of the child." The Court found that the
application of the statute violated the due process rights of the parent because the trial judge gave no
weight to the mother's determination of her child's best interests. Id. at 69-70. The Court grounded
this conclusion in almost a century of recognition for parental due process rights. Id. at 65-66 (citing
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
In the functional parenthood test enunciated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holtzman and
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in V.C., the first requirement, that of "fostering" and
"consenting," addresses the substantive due process rights of the legal parent. As the court in V.C.
stated, the legal mother can choose to maintain her "zone of autonomous privacy," but once she
abandons it and a "profound bond" between the nonlegal parent and child develops, that bond may
not then be "unilaterally terminated" by the legal parent. 748 A.2d at 552.
503. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. 9:17-43 (providing that man is presumed to be father of child if he is
married to mother and child is born during marriage or 300 days thereafter). The presumption of
fatherhood, through marriage to the mother, was held constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
504. This is not to imply that biological fathers necessarily experience this as a privilege, as many
men paying court-ordered child support could attest. See David Chambers, Fathers, The Welfare
System, and the Virtues and Perils of Child Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2589-93 (1995)
(discussing effects of collecting child support from fathers); Kindra Gromelski, You Made Your
Bed... Now You Are Going to Pay for it: An Analysis of the Effects of Virginia's Mandatory Parental
Identification in AFDC Cases Will Have on the Rights of Unwed Fathers, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 383, 397-407 (1999) (discussing disproportionate burden placed on fathers as compared to benefits
and rights they receive); Tonya Plank, Human Rights, Women's Rights and Welfare Reform: An
Analysis of H.R.4 from an International Human Rights Perspective, 17 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 345,
347-50 (1996) (discussing Work Opportunity Act of 1995 and its effect on mothers and fathers).
505. In Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), the Court rejected a challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1409 that
imposes different requirements for a child born outside the United States regarding the child's
acquisition of citizenship, depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father.
Specifically, § 1409(c) provides that a child born out of wedlock acquires at birth the nationality status
of a citizen mother who meets specified residency requirements, while § 1409(a) requires where the
father is the citizen parent that the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and that while the person is under
the age of 18 the child is legitimated under the laws of person's domicile, or the father acknowledges
paternity of the person in writing under oath, or the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court.
In considering the statutory distinction, which requires the father-but not the mother--of a
child born to unwed parents to take one of three affirmative steps before the child reaches the age of
18, the Court found that two important governmental interests support the gender distinction. Id. at
62. The first government interest is the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists. Id. at 62-64. The second interest is the determination to ensure that the child and
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parents on the basis of biology alone, however, it seems a blatant inequality to
deny parenting status to a nonbiological lesbian parent.
The functionalist standard, however, does not achieve equal treatment.
Unlike most fathers, every nonlegal lesbian parent must prove through her
actions that she deserves the status of parent. While the functionalist standard
allows the lesbian nonlegal parent some relief from absolute exclusion, it is more
separate than equal.
Furthermore, the equality is illusory even between the lesbian parents. The
intra-lesbian disputes frequently concern visitation and not custody. With regard
to custody disputes, the judicial preference remains for the biological parent. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court in V.C. opined, a child's "search for self-
knowledge" and "roots" is biologically based, requiring preference to the
biological parent. 50 6
The fissure between equality and biology is apparent both when the
nonlegal lesbian mother is compared to her partner and when she is compared to
the biological father. Constitutional equal protection doctrine has often
foundered on the shoals of biological reasoning. The basis for egregiously
unequal treatment to various racial and ethnic minorities can be biologically
grounded, 507 using the "facts" of skin, 508 blood,50 9 and genes.510 Issues of gender
the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop the real, everyday ties
that provide a connection between child and citizen parent, and in turn, the United States. Id. at 64-
68. The classification made by the statute between mothers and fathers is substantially related to these
interests because the mother's identity is self-evident by the birth that she is indeed the mother, while
the father's identity is not. Thus, there is no equal protection violation. Previously, in Miller v.
Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998), a plurality upheld the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1409, which provided that to
confer citizenship the citizen mother must only "give birth to the child," Miller, 523 U.S. at 433, while
in order for the unmarried citizen father to transmit citizenship, he must acknowledge paternity or be
subject to adjudicated paternity before the child reaches the age of eighteen, id. at 434. The plurality
opinion implied that if any parent's equality interests were implicated, it was the mother who gives
birth, rather than the father who need only be the subject of a legal proceeding. See id. (reasoning
that burdens imposed on female citizen are more severe than those imposed on male). For a critique
of Miller, see Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims: Discarding
Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal Images, 51 HASTINGS. L.J. 557, 571-72
(2000) (arguing that majority failed to distinguish biological realities from societal ones). See also
Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in
Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000) (arguing that focusing on nexus between biological sex
differences and parental rights is problematic). See generally Laurence Nolan, "Unwed Children" and
Their Parents Before the United States Supreme Court From Levy to Michael I: Unlikely Participants
in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1999), for an analysis of cases involving the
children of unwed parents.
506. "The legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best interests balance because
eventually, in the search for self-knowledge, the child's interest in his or her roots will emerge. Thus,
under ordinary circumstances when the evidence concerning the child's best interests (as between a
legal parent and psychological parent) is in equipoise, custody will be awarded to the legal parent."
V.C., 748 A.2d at 554.
507. For an enlightening discussion of the biological basis for racial categories from a cultural
studies perspective, see SARAH CHINN, TECHNOLOGY AND THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN RACISM (2000)
(using categories of skin, blood, and DNA).
The "biological" discourse can also be conflated with the religious. Perhaps the most notorious
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example is from the trial court's conviction of the Lovings for miscegenation, quoted by the United
States Supreme Court, "Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would
be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for
the races to mix." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
508. As the Court stated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896), a statute requiring
segregation in railway transportation did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment because it implicated
"merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races-a distinction which is founded in the
color of the two races, and which must always exist as long as white men are distinguished from the
other race by color." For an excellent analysis of the relationships between skin color and race see
Trina Jones, Shades of Brown, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000) (arguing that "colorism" is basis for
discrimination).
509. The use of "blood" to determine race is exemplified by the miscegenation statute declared
unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Loving which provided:
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white
person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For
the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall apply only to such person as has no
trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or
less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be
deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the
intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited by this
chapter.'
Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 n.4 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.)).
The Court in Plessy, in addition to the skin marker (see supra note 508 for a discussion of the skin
marker), also confronted the metaphor of blood, concluding that it was not properly an issue that the
varying states had decided that "any visible admixture of black blood stamps the person as belonging
to the colored race; others, that it depends upon the preponderance of blood; and still others that the
predominance of white blood must only be in the proportion of three-fourths." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552.
However, while blood may be the "best-known narrative of racial taxonomy," one author argues
that "the one-drop rule does not have the transhistorical, universal legal tradition in the United States
that some contemporary race theorists presume." Michael A. Elliott, Telling the Difference:
Nineteenth-Century Legal Narratives of Racial Taxonomy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 611, 616-17
(1999). Instead, "judges (and others) have had more than one story available to them that they could
tell to explain why a person belonged to a certain race ... judges often deployed several such stories in
a confusing and self-contradicting manner." Id. at 614.
510. For example, the linking of race, genetics, and intelligence occurs in the controversial
bestseller RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994). As the scientist Stephen J. Gould noted:
THE BELL CURVE, with its claims and supposed documentation that race and class
differences are largely caused by genetic factors and are therefore essentially immutable,
contains no new arguments and presents no compelling data to support its anachronistic
social Darwinism, so I can only conclude its success in winning attention must reflect the
depressing temper of our time-a historical moment of unprecedented ungenerosity, when a
mood for slashing social programs can be powerfully abetted by an argument that
beneficiaries cannot be helped, owing to inborn cognitive limits expressed as low I.Q. scores.
Derrick A. Bell, Who's Afraid of Critical Race Theory? 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 894 (citing Stephen
J. Gould, Curveball, NEW YORKER, Nov. 28, 1994, at 139).
See THE BELL CURVE WARS: RACE, INTELLIGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (Steven
Fraser ed., 1995), for additional critiques of THE BELL CURVE. See also Jana Leslie-Miller, From Bell
to Bell: Responsible Reproduction in the Twentieth Century, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123,
135-50 (1997) (linking Buck v. Bell to THE BELL CURVE and arguing that propositions regarding race
and genetics in THE BELL CURVE embody biological deterministic perspective similar to eugenics
movement).
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equality have also been plagued by uncertainties about coping with sexual and
physical differences. 511 Likewise, inequality regarding disability is predicated on
medical distinctions. 512
We must not fetishize present equality jurisprudence in our theorizing or
advocacy in the realm of lesbians and motherhood. Through the tiers of
scrutiny, present equal protection doctrine imbues some physical differences
with more constitutional meaning than others: racial classifications merit strict
scrutiny, 513  sex classifications earn intermediate scrutiny,514  disability
classifications can be judged by serious rational basis scrutiny,515 and age
classifications deserve mere rational basis examination. 516  Yet race, sex,
511. The VMI litigation, see supra note 29-33 and accompanying text, concerned three issues
regarding women's ability to attend the Virginia Military Institute, physical training, the absence of
privacy, and the adversative approach, VMI, 518 U.S. at 525; id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At least
two of these three issues are rooted in the physical: physical training is obviously based upon physical
characteristics and abilities, while privacy concerns stem from bodily differences between the sexes.
512. Common understandings of disability, as well as the so-called bio-medical model of
disability are bodily in nature. While this may be an improvement from earlier models of disability
that ascribed disability to sin or moral failures, the medicalization of disability remains problematic.
See Berg, supra note 19, at 5-8 (discussing regressive definitions of disability in ADA doctrine).
Moreover, as Berg brilliantly demonstrates through her examination of numerous cases,
antidiscrimination efforts under the ADA reify the body: "To establish disability under
antidiscrimination law, the plaintiff's physical or mental differences from the 'normal' body must be
constructed as defects, inadequacies, oddities, or failures." Id. at 38. A person's subjective
experiences are discounted, in favor of the understandings of medical experts. Id. at 39. These
understandings, in turn, are reductive:
[P]laintiffs who wish to persuade a judge that they are disabled have no choice but to portray
their impairment-in all its corporeal detail-as the central and defining feature of their
daily lives. Plaintiffs who make the mistake of revealing a self-perception that is not so
defined, or who characterize their impairment as anything less than crippling, are summarily
dismissed, along with their story of unequal treatment at the hands of the defendant.
Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
513. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995) (stating all racial
classifications merit strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting racial
classification deemed "suspect" and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" but upholding exclusion of
Japanese and Japanese ancestors from certain areas).
514. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating classifications by gender "must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives"). The Court in VMI added a gloss to the intermediate scrutiny standard, noting that the
justification for the gender classification must be "exceedingly persuasive," genuine, and not relying
on "overbroad generalizations" about differences between men and women. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533.
Dissenting in VMI, Scalia argued that the Court was silently replacing the intermediate scrutiny
standard previously applied in sex classification cases with a standard more akin to the strict scrutiny
standard for racial classifications. Id. at 572-73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
515. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (holding that
although legislation distinguishing between mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to
legitimate government interest, desire to harm politically unpopular group cannot be legitimate
interest, and classification's relationship to claimed goal cannot be so attenuated as to render
distinction arbitrary).
516. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (noting that state judge petitioners
challenging mandatory retirement age of 70 were "correct to assert their challenge at the level of
rational basis"); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 110-12 (1979) (applying rational basis test to uphold
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disability, and age are all considered biological. The language of immutability is
initially attractive as a logical justification, but it ultimately lacks explanatory
power.5t 7 We understand that people can and do alter their racial and sexual
identities: the courts have been confronted with deciding the legal consequences
of changes relating to race 518 and to sex.5 19 On the other hand, judicial discourse
equal protection challenge to mandatory retirement age of 60 for foreign service employees);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 317 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding
mandatory retirement for police officers of age 50 based upon physical capabilities despite possibility
that individual officers attaining age might not be physically unfit); see also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-87 (2000) (holding that Congressional passage of ADEA under section 5 of
Fourteenth Amendment is unconstitutional as not being congruent and proportional to Court's equal
protection principle that age classifications are presumptively valid under rational basis review).
517. See generally Yoshino, "Don't Ask" supra note 6, for a critique of the relationship between
immutability and assimilation in the sexual orientation context.
518. In the racial context, one scholar notes that trials at which the "central issue became the
determination of a person's racial identity were a regular occurrence in the Southern county courts in
the nineteenth century." Ariela Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 111 (1998). In her exhaustive study, Professor Gross
explores how juries considered evidence of physical markers (including inspection of skin color, hair
color and texture, and feet), documented ancestry, and social interactions. Id. at 137-50.
Additionally, while Plessy v. Ferguson is infamous for the Court's rejection of Plessy's argument
against the Louisiana statute mandating segregated railway passenger cards, Homer Plessy was also
raising an issue about racial identity. The Court described Plessy's factual allegations that he was a
person "of mixed descent, in the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African
blood" in whom the "mixture of colored blood was not discernible in him." 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
The relevance of this factual allegation is suggested at the end of the Court's opinion in its remark
tacitly approving of the varying standards used by the states to determine whether a "colored person,
as distinguished from a white person." Id. at 552. Plessy's argument on this issue as described by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, however, was not directed to the varying judicial standards, but to the
statute's apparent grant of judicial authority allowing railroad employees to make racial
determinations without any associated legal responsibility for those decisions. Ex Parte Plessy, 11 So.
948, 951 (La. 1892).
In rejecting Plessy's argument, the court stated that a "reading of the statute utterly repels these
charges" because the "discretion vested in the officer to decide primarily the coach to which each
passenger, by race, belongs, is only that necessary discretion attending every imposition of a duty, to
determine whether the occasion exists which calls for its exercise." Id. If the railroad employee made
an incorrect determination, the person refused to go into the assigned coach, and the employee thus
excluded the person from the railroad, the person would have an action for damages in light of any
"defenses which might lie open" to the employee and the railroad "based on good faith and probable
cause." Id.
Racial identity as the subject of litigation is not limited to an earlier century. Litigation can
concern racial designations on official documents in which the object of the litigation is a decree of
"whiteness." See, e.g., Doe v. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 479 So. 2d 369, 371-73 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (ruling on family's claim to change parent's racial designation on their birth certificates); Rodi v.
City of New Orleans, 94 So. 2d 108, 117 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (ruling on daughter's claim to change
racial designation on her father's death certificate). With the advent of laws protecting against racial
discrimination, litigation might also center upon persons seeking to be adjudicated as within a
protected racial minority class. See Malone v. Haley, No. 88-339 (Sup. Jd. Ct. Suffolk County, Mass.
July 25, 1989) (cited in Christopher Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1232-34 (1994) (finding twin brothers who asserted they were
black in their applications to Boston Fire Department to be white)).
519. Courts confronted with transgender issues have various strategies to determine the litigant's
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"true" gender. For example, in Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977), a court considered the effects of what was then called "sex-reassignment surgery" on the
tennis career of the former Richard Raskin, a nationally ranked tennis player, who was now Renee
Richards. Id. at 267. Before allowing Richards to compete in the women's section of the United
States Open, the association required her to take the sex-chromatin test, also known as the Barr body
test, before allowing her to compete in the tournament. Id. at 268. The Barr body test, which the
International Olympic Committee started using in 1968, sought to determine whether a person had the
second X chromosome, and thus, was classified as a "normal female," or whether a person had an XY
chromosome pattern and was thus classified as a male. Id. at 269. When Richards eventually took the
test, the results were "ambiguous." Id. at 270. The court ruled that Richards must be allowed to
compete as a woman. Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 273. While not completely rejecting the Barr body
test, the court found its usage "grossly unfair, discriminatory, and inequitable," noting that the Tennis
Association had instituted the test for the sole purpose of preventing Richards from playing in the
tournament. Richards, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. The court decided that the only rationale for a sex
determination test was to prevent fraud, such as in a case in which a man would masquerade as a
woman. Id. at 272. The court rejected any claim of fraud in Richards case, implicitly valuing Richards'
identity as an open transsexual. Id.
In stark contrast to Richards is Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) in
which the court rejected a claim for discrimination. Kenneth Ulane was hired in 1968 as a pilot for
Eastern Airlines, but after a brief absence in 1980 for sex reassignment surgery, returned to work with
a new flight license in the name of Karen Ulane. Id. at 1082-83. Eastern Airlines terminated Ulane,
citing various reasons including a belief that the sex change operation had changed Ulane from the
person Eastern Airlines had hired into a different person. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821,
832 (N.D. I11. 1983). This seemed to substantiate a basic claim for sex discrimination and the trial
court agreed. Id. at 839. The Seventh Circuit, however, held that Ulane was not discriminated against
because of sex, but because of transexuality. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. The court described a
transexual as a "biological male who takes female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered
parts of her body to make it appear to be female." Id. Thus, since Ulane only "appeared" to be
female, there was no claim for sex discrimination. Id.
Sexual function, rather than chromosomes as in Richards, or a previous "reality" as opposed to a
mere "appearance" as in Ulane, was the determinant in M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976), in which a New Jersey appellate court was faced with the issue of the validity of a
marriage. M.T., a male to female transsexual, and J.T., a male, were married in 1972, apparently
without legal difficulties. Id. at 205. J.T. eventually left M.T. and stopped supporting her. Id. When
M.T. sued for support, J.T. interposed the defense that the marriage was void because M.T. was a
male. Id. In analyzing the validity of the marriage, the court started with the presumption that only
persons of opposite-sex could lawfully marry each other. Id. at 207. In finding the marriage valid,
both the trial court and the appellate court relied upon experts to reject the argument that sex is
limited to biological sex at birth. M.T., 355 A.2d at 207. The judicial reasoning focused heavily on
M.T.'s possession of female anatomy and her ability to engage in sexual intercourse as a female. Id. at
211.
Yet in a more recent marriage case, the court held that the original birth certificate was sufficient
to defeat a claim of marriage. In Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), the marriage was
collaterally attacked by the defendant physician in a malpractice case brought by Littleton as the
spouse of her deceased husband. In considering whether Littleton was a spouse who could bring the
action, the court phrased the issue as "can a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel,
drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?" Id. at 224.
Given this initial invocation of "our Creator," the court not surprisingly held that the sexual
designation on Littleton's original birth certificate, despite the fact that it had been amended under
Texas law, was determinative. Id. at 231. In reasoning similar to that utilized by the court in Ulane,
the Texas appellate court stated that although it recognized "that there are many fine metaphysical
arguments lurking about here involving desire and being, the essence of life and the power of mind
over physics," courts "are wise not to wander too far into the misty fields of sociological philosophy,"
and concluded its opinion with the pronouncement: "There are some things we cannot will into being.
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has also not always privileged immutability: the Court in Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., found the "mentally retarded" to be "different, immutably
so," but nevertheless declined to elevate their equal protection status because
such an elevation would also lift "a variety of other groups who have perhaps
immutable disabilities" such as "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the
infirm." 520 Even without entering into the fray of biological models of sexual
orientation and their effect on equal protection, 21 equality and biology have a
hopelessly convoluted relationship.
Thus, in the context of lesbian parenting, appeals to equality should not be
based on appeals to biological models, including the biology of parenting or
motherhood. Moreover, if we are serious about liberation, the
interconnectedness of biology and equality deserves our "most exacting
scrutiny." Biology is destiny-or the shibboleth of equality-only in an
unliberated society.
Furthermore, even if equality were to be achieved, the materialities of that
equality merit scrutiny. Custody disputes are referred to by many as "battles,"
with justification. At its most crude, what is at stake is our ability to participate
in this combat and assault on our former lovers. The critiques of custody
litigation are legion. 522 Yet our goal is entry into this destructive and flawed
system.523
C. The Coercive Nature of Mothering
The second inquiry of an anti-assimilationist perspective regarding the
They just are." Id.
520. Cleburne. 473 U.S. at 445-46. In addition to this slippery slope argument, however, Justice
White, writing for the Court, recognized that current equal protection doctrine favoring classifications
rather than classes, made a higher level of scrutiny problematic from the perspective of those who
would seek state interventions on behalf of the disabled. Id. at 444 (discussing Texas and other federal
legislation intended to assist developmentally disabled).
521. See SAPPHO, supra note 5, at 11-12 (discussing competing theories of lesbian identification
and their interaction with equal protection issues); EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE:
THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 23-116 (1999) (analyzing various
theories regarding etiology of sexual orientation).
522. See DEBORAH RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 154-60 (1989), for an outline of the history of
child custody and the various critiques. See also PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE
BATrLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 80-83 (1986) (arguing that custody litigation
disproportionately disadvantages mothers); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727, 728 (1988)
(arguing that move away from legal adversarial process has resulted in troubling substitution of
rhetoric of social workers and mediators); Janet Weinstein, And the Twain Shall Meet: The Best
Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 79, 80-86 (1997) (arguing that
adversarial process in child custody disputes is inappropriate).
523. There are some suggestions for other models. See William B. Rubenstein, Divided We
Propagate: An Introduction to Protecting Families: Standards for Child Custody in Same-Sex
Relationships, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 143, 147 (1999) (wondering if gay couples can "opt out of the
traditional legal system" and use mediation assuming mediators were educated about our lives). See
also (OUT)LAW, supra note 5, at 171-75 (discussing and critiquing mediation): Fineman, supra note
522, at 727-31 (arguing against mediation in child custody).
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coercive aspects of the assimilation has special resonance in the context of
lesbian parenting. The success of functional definitions of parenting very clearly
rewards those lesbians who comply with prevailing norms of parenting-and
relationships-and very clearly excludes those who do not.5 24 The facts used in
the cases to prove psychological parenthood are those that mimic the most
traditional of traditional families, even including the names by which children
refer to their parents.525
The coercive lessons of assimilation are also conveyed through exclusion.
Building on Julie Shapiro's insights about second parent adoptions,526 the
message of the legal discourse on functional parents relegates some lesbians who
are functioning as parents as incognizable. These excluded lesbians are lesbians
whose income, histories of substance abuse or criminal convictions, or lifestyles
make them unattractive as candidates for litigation.527 The exclusion also
operates against lesbians whose only "fault" was becoming involved in a
situation in which there was a biological father. 528 No matter how much
psychological or functional parenting such lesbians perform, the present
discourse does not allow their recognition as legal mothers.
The coerciveness of motherhood occurs not only in the particular details,
but is linked to the achievement of womanhood. While feminists have fomented
a "highly voluntaristic rhetoric" surrounding motherhood, women's
empowerment is limited to a choice to "delay or space out childbearing" because
the option to totally abstain from motherhood is implicitly denied.529 The
mythic, the social, and the psychological realms construct women as mothers-
women who are not mothers are depicted as pitiful, evil, lacking, selfish,
deficient, and unfeminine.530  What one commentator names "matrigyno-
idolatry"-evident in Freud, diverse religious traditions, the doctrine of true
womanhood, and contemporary popular media-is buttressed by the negative
stereotypes of the childless woman as a mythic witch or contemporary corporate
bitch.531 Feminist attempts to resuscitate "childfree" women serve to reaffirm
motherhood. 532
524. See Making Mothers, supra note 5, at 32, for an elaboration of this argument, including how
the courts stress the spouse-like relationship among the women, even prior to the appearance of the
child.
525. As I have argued in Making Mothers, id. at 31, the courts have often found it significant to
discuss what the child called the adults in her life, and I wonder whether this leaves any room for
adult-child relations in which titles, however innovative, are eschewed in favor of less hierarchal use of
first names.
526. Shapiro, supra note 98, at 30-32.
527. See Making Mothers, supra note 5, at 31 (discussing Shapiro's contention that second parent
adoption divides lesbian community between politically attractive lesbians and those without power).
528. Id.
529. Diana Tietjens Meyers, The Rush to Motherhood-Pronatalist Discourse and Women's
Autonomy, 26 SIGNS 735, 736 (2001).
530. See MARDY S. IRELAND, RECONCEIVING WOMEN: SEPARATING MOTHERHOOD FROM
FEMALE IDENTITY 6-7 (1993) (discussing traditional views of women in myth and folklore).
531. Meyers, supra note 529, at 758-60.
532. Meyers notes that the term "childfree" itself "testifies to the intransigence of the cultural
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Such cultural messages are not lost on lesbians.533 Anthropologist Ellen
Lewin, in her groundbreaking study of lesbian mothers, notes that lesbians are
motivated to become mothers by desires to achieve adulthood, responsibility,
authenticity, naturalness, and "an identity as a 'good' woman."5 34  More
concretely, lesbians becoming mothers are often seeking acceptance from their
own families of origin by creating new families. 535  Lewin concludes that
motherhood allows lesbians to "claim membership in the group known as
'women' on the same basis as single heterosexual mothers."53 6 By becoming
mothers, lesbians can refute the accusations that we are unwomanly, unfeminine,
unnatural-denunciations perhaps made by our own families and certainly by
society at large. Because mothering may thus be a "choice" constructed from
the avoidance of pain and stigma, the coercive potential of lesbian motherhood
should not be underestimated.
D. The State Interest in Women as Mothers
Until nonbiological reproduction becomes the norm, the state interest in
women, including lesbians, as mothers, should be obvious. The state relies upon
the continued reproduction of citizens to ensure its continued existence. This
interest can take a eugenic twist when the state possesses a particular vision of its
future, causing it to promote childbearing amongst some women and suppress it
among others. For example, the American history of birth control is fraught
with governmental efforts to outlaw abortion and birth control among middle-
class white women and simultaneously limit the population of the poor, the
darker races, and immigrants.5 37 Perhaps most notoriously, the United States
refusal to acknowledge that not having children is a legitimate, and for some individuals, a positive
option." Id. at 760 n.28. More interestingly, Meyers discusses the work of one feminist psychologist
who studied childless women and divided them into two categories: the life-negating rejectors and the
life-affirming aficionados. Id. at 760 (referencing J. E. VEEVERS, CHILDLESS BY CHOICE (1980)). The
former group may fit the stereotype of selfish women, but those in the latter group are "similar to
parents." As Meyers comments:
I suppose Veevers thinks she is doing the childfree population a service by dispelling the
myth that they are all sour, maladjusted misanthropes. But inasmuch as she legitimates
voluntary childlessness by assimilating it to the psychology of parenthood, she contributes to
a retrograde current of normalizing matrigynist sentiment. Motherhood is the sine qua non
of womanhood, and even childfree women (the healthy ones, at any rate) are mothers at
heart.
Id.
533. Although Meyers seems to posit lesbians-who "cannot avoid making a conscious choice"
about motherhood-as an exception to her argument that autonomy is elusive in women's decisions
about motherhood, she admits that "sober, in-depth reflection" about mothering choices is neither
universal in the lesbian community, nor confined to lesbians. Id. at 751.
534. ELLEN LEWIN, LESBIAN MOTHERS: ACCOUNTS OF GENDER IN AMERICAN CULTURE 54-57
(Roger Sanjek ed., 1993).
535. Id. at 52, 57, 78-94.
536. Id. at 192.
537. See generally Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALITY, & REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (rev. ed. 1990) (discussing history of birth control in United
States).
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Supreme Court upheld the compulsory sterilization of an institutionalized
woman upon Justice Holmes's reasoning that society should prevent those who
are "manifestly unfit from continuing their kind," rather than wait to "execute
degenerate offspring for crime" or "let them starve for their imbecility,"
concluding that "three generations of imbeciles are enough." '538
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
children should be unparented except by the state,539 and has pronounced that
the state does not have any general power to "standardize its children" because
the "child is not the mere creature of the state." 540 The underlying premise,
however, is that the parent will act for the state in controlling and civilizing the
child.541 The Court has thus made clear that when the parent fails, the state has
the power to intervene, not merely to protect the child, but to protect its own
interests: "A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies. '542 It is not merely mothering, but proper mothering, that is necessary
to ensure the survival of the state.
The fascist state's "kinder, kirche, kuche" has its reverberations in the
capitalist state's conceptualization of women as (re)producers. Women's value
as workers is eclipsed by their value as mothers, as the Court's upholding of a
labor law limiting the hours women could work demonstrates: "the physical well-
being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race." 543  As feminist theorist Nancy
Chodorow explains, women's mothering is "pivotal to the reproduction of the
capitalist mode of production and the ideology supports it" because mothers
reproduce the workers and consumers necessary for capitalism at both the
material and emotional level. 544 The not surprising facts that the work of
538. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). As it turned out, Ms. Buck was a woman of normal
intelligence, a foster child who had become pregnant probably through rape while in the custody of
her foster parents, and court records presented her as one of the people who belong to that "shiftless,
ignorant, and worthless class of anti-social whites of the South." Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's
Daughter, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 331,336-37 (1985).
539. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02. Without citation, the Court quotes from Plato's Republic and
makes a reference to ancient Sparta regarding practices of segregating children from their parents,
concluding that this would violate "both letter and spirit of the Constitution." Id.
540. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36 (holding unconstitutional Oregon statute that required children
to attend public schools).
541. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992), for an excellent exploration of the connections
between the parental and state rights in this era.
542. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (affirming enforcement of child labor laws against Jehovah's Witness
church members using of children to distribute church newsletters on public highway).
543. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,421 (1908).
544. Nancy Chodorow, Mothering, Male Dominance, and Capitalism, in CAPITALIST
PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 83, 95, 100 (Zillah Eisenstein ed., 1979). As
Chodorow makes clear, this is not a unique insight, and she discusses the work of Talcott Parsons, the
esteemed sociologist, Max Horkheimer, critical theorist of the Frankfurt School, as well as other social
theorists which view mothering in a similar vein. Id. at 96-100. Portions of this essay appear in NANCY
CHODORow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
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mothering is devalued as work 545 and that women's reproduction is devalued in
accordance with racial and class stratifications, 546 does not detract from the
centrality of capitalistic conceptions of women as mothers.
Furthermore, the state's conceptualizing of lesbians as lesbian mothers may
also be linked to the state's interest in preserving the dominance of
heterosexuality. Mothers are assigned responsibility for their children's sexual
identity.54 7  If, as the recent empirical studies suggest, the children of
"homosexual" parents are most likely heterosexual, 54 8 then lesbian mothers are
GENDER (1978), although in her book, Chodorow is much more concerned with the psychoanalytic
aspects of theories of motherhood, emphasizing the sexual dynamics between mothers and sons which
produce male workers in capitalism. Id. at 186-90. The impact of reproductive technologies has
sharpened the idea of children as products and women as their producers. Donna L. Dickenson,
Property and Women's Alienation from Their Own Reproductive Labour, 15:3 BIOETHIcS 205, 209-10
(2001). For example, Professor Dickenson argues that the effect of the paid surrogacy debate is the
realization of the commodity value of women's labor in pregnancy and childbirth. Id.
545. For analysis of the underevaluation of women's caretaking and household work, see, e.g.,
ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS
STILL THE LEAST VALUED 45-64 (2001) (contemporary and popular account arguing that mother's
work is consistently undervalued in variety of contexts); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 60-80 (1989) (seeking to integrate Marxist and feminist perspectives
on domestic labor including discussion of "wages for housework" movement); Katharine Silbaugh,
Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997) (arguing that
women's domestic labor should be subject to a commodification analysis); Katherine Silbaugh,
Turning Labor into Love, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (comprehensive analysis of women's unpaid
labor which she values at substantial portion of gross domestic product).
The issue of women's unpaid labor is part of the platform of the Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, 1995, which emphasizes that women's contributions to development include both
renumerated and unenumerated work. Although acknowledging that, to a limited extent, international
standards for labor statistics include unenumerated domestic and community work, the platform states
that the economic contributions of this work are often undervalued and under-recorded. It continues
by urging a full accounting of women's unenumerated domestic and agricultural work so that women's
economic contributions can be fully appreciated. UNITED NATIONS REPORT OF FOURTH WORLD
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN: DECLARATION AND PLATFORM FOR ACTION, at art. 156, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (1995); 35 I.L.M. 401 (1996) available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
beijing4.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2003)
546. See supra notes 441-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of contemporary welfare
reform. See also ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE,
SEXUALITY, & REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 34-57 (1990), discussing the rise of Malthusian "moral
economy" in bourgeois culture which blames the poor and working classes for a poverty attributable
to having too many children and advocates the middle and upper classes have fewer children of
"better" quality.
547. While fathers could be "occasionally implicated in the making of properly gendered citizens,
again and again throughout the twentieth century, mothers have been held primarily responsible" for
producing "healthy, adjusted heterosexuals," and making "boys into sufficiently masculine men and
girls into feminine women." Jennifer Terry, "Momism" and the Making of Treasonous Homosexuals,
in "BAD" MOTHERS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 169-70 (Molly
Ladd-Taylor & Lauri Umansky eds., 1998).
548. For an excellent review of the social science research from a legal perspective, see Carlos
Ball & Janice Farrell Pea, Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian
Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 280-85. For Wardle's response, see Fighting with Phantoms: A
Reply to Warring with Wardle, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 629. Other treatments of the same topic include
Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their Children?
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indeed reproducing heterosexual society.549 As the present judicial discourse
illustrates, our mothering is contingent on our ability-and agreement-to
mother heterosexuals. 550
Our self-conceptualization as mothers also ensures the reproduction of
heterosexuality in another important way. As mothers, we become privatized
and insular. When we use the phrase "our children," we mean only the children
for whom we claim biological, legal, or defacto parenthood.551 Excluded in this
narrow vision of "our children" are those who will truly inherit the culture we
have ourselves inherited. Many of us who are now middle-aged lesbians can
recall our first experiences when older dykes in bars welcomed "baby dykes" or
older women made room for us in various communities. 552 This is not to say that
Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families, 32 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1996);
Charlotte J. Patterson & Richard E. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Children: Implications of
Social Science Research for Policy, 52 J. SOC. ISSUES 29 (1996).
549. I realize that this argument contrasts to sentiments that the children of lesbian and gay
parents will be more liberal and tolerant. See, e.g., M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1979) (rejecting modification of custody based upon lesbianism and stating that it is "reasonable
to expect" that children might "emerge better equipped to search out their own standards of right and
wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better
able to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and
tested knowledge, not the constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice"); LAURA BENKOV,
REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS 96 (Jane
Cavolina ed., 1994) (discussing presentation to then-Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukasis by
Dean of School of Social Work concerning "review of the clinical literature showing that the only way
children reared in gay and lesbian households differed from those in heterosexual homes was that they
tended to be more tolerant of homosexuality"); SUZANNE JOHNSON & ELIZABETH O'CONNOR, FOR
LESBIAN PARENTS 179-80 (2001) (stating that grown and nearly grown children of lesbians seem to be
more tolerant and can be future leaders against homophobia); Judith Stacey & Timothy Biblarz,
(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 159, 168-70 (April 2001)
(noting some limited evidence implies that lesbian parenting may free daughters and sons from "broad
but uneven range of traditional gender prescriptions").
My point is simply that however liberal and tolerant our heterosexual children might be, they still
have the privileges accorded to the heterosexuals in dominantly-heterosexual society.
550. Such an agreement would, to my mind, also imply agreeing to mother badly. For example, I
cannot imagine any good mothering practices which could take the parenting advice of such pundits as
Richard Posner who opined that parents can prevent the "formation of homosexual preference" by
"discouraging gender-nonconforming behavior at its outset (later is too late)," including not
"condoning 'sissyish' behavior in infancy." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 308-09 (1992)
(emphasis in original).
551. My attempt to use the phrase more broadly occurs in Ruthann Robson, Our Children: Kids
of Queer Parents and Kids Who Are Queer-Looking at Sexual Minority Rights From a Different
Perspective, 64 ALB. L. REV. 915 (2001). In a somewhat similar vein, Valerie Lehr poses the question
"Who Are "Our" Children?" as a chapter title, answering it with her discussion of sexual minority
youth. VALERIE LEHR, QUEER FAMILY VALUES: DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY
139-67 (Shane Phelan ed., 1999). Lehr only implicitly compares her previous discussion of children
growing up in gay and lesbian households with gay and lesbian youth, but she argues quite explicitly
for the agency of children and youth. Id. at 140.
552. For discussions of the importance of various public spaces for the formation of lesbian
identities, see generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF
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1920s, bars in 1950s, and political visibility in 1970s); ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY KENNEDY & MADELINE
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this transmission of various and fluctuating cultures was always simple or
carefree, only that it had the opportunity to occur. Now, many of us who are
middle-aged lesbians are ensconced at home with our toddlers, inaccessible to a
younger generation.
Thus, the assimilative aspects of mothering not only fetishize equal
protection doctrine and possess coercive aspects, but also construct lesbians as
mothers in a manner linked to the state and its interests. Yet in all of these
aspects, lesbian mother litigation and legal theorizing is deeply connected to
questions of coupledom, the legal apotheosis of which has become marriage.
VI. CONCLUSION
Neither an assimilationist nor a strict anti-assimilationist stance regarding
the question of marriage for lesbians will ensure liberation. Nevertheless, an
anti-assimilationist perspective that considers issues of equality, coercion, and
the interests of the state is vital.
I remain deeply concerned that advocates of same-sex marriage and other
quasi-marital devices for same-sex couples have capitulated to equal protection
doctrine, rather than pursuing a more generous and global version of equality.
The exclusion of different-sex couples from quasi-marital devices available to
same-sex couples is misguided and petty. More controversially, I have
maintained that attempts to differentiate same-sex couples from others who seek
to avail themselves of the marital relation-others who may be related to each
other or married to someone else-serves to undermine the claims to equality of
same-sex couples. In the quest to be included in the institution of marriage, it is
important to consider who we would continue to exclude. As I have argued,
marital incest prohibitions and polygamy prohibitions are as problematic as
same-sex marriage prohibitions.
Additionally, even if legal marriage were available on a more inclusive
basis, I am profoundly troubled by our failure to interrogate adequately our
quest, individually and collectively, to enter into the institution of legal marriage.
By naturalizing and universalizing marriage rather than heterosexuality, I fear
we are simply in danger of replacing compulsory heterosexuality with a regime
D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY (1993)
(discussing history of Buffalo, New York lesbianism with emphasis on working class bar culture);
Esther Newton, The "Fun Gay Ladies": Lesbians in Cherry Grove, 1936-1960, in CREATING A PLACE
FOR OURSELVES: LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY HISTORIES 145 (Brett Beemyn ed.,
1997) (discussing historical development of Cherry Grove lesbian community on Fire Island, New
York); Rochella Thorpe, "A House Where Queers Go": African-American Lesbian Nightlife in Detroit,
1940-1975, in INVENTING LESBIAN CULTURES IN AMERICA 40 (Ellen Lewin ed., 1996)
(reconceptualizing "public" lesbian space from perspective of segregation and discussing rent parties
and house parties as well as bars).
For a more personal example, see Leslie Feinberg, Butch to Butch: A Love Song, in THE
PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER, 83-85 (Joan Nestle, ed., 1992) (describing how she
was called "kid," taken under "wing" by older women who taught her all important things to know
such as fearing cops and to "toughen up," and describing relationship with "mentor" including "butch
'father-son' talk").
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of compulsory matrimony.
Finally, we need to consider more rigorously the confluence of our
individual and collective interests with the nation-state's interests. As a
productive unit in the capitalist state, the marital couple performs certain
functions, including the production of future citizens, which we should further
consider rather than simply adopt.
Again, it is important not to underestimate the pain of being excluded. The
legal system has denied our intimate relationships and our relationships with
children for too long. Yet like other legal reform movements, the lesbian and
queer movement cannot simply assume that assimilation is the answer for all of
us. Unproblematized, the quest for assimilation leaves those who cannot-or
will not-be assimilated outside of our community of interests. We need to
envision liberation beyond the boundaries of state-sanctioned marriage; beyond
the bounds of the state. To do this, we need to recognize the limits of marriage
and assimilation.
